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COMMON SENSE IN FOREIGN POLICY

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# COMMON SENSE IN FOREIGN POLICY

BY

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'VIEWS AND REVIEWS, FROM THE OUTLOOK OF AN ANTHROPOLOGIST,'

'A HISTORY OF THE COLONIZATION OF AFRICA BY ALIEN RACES,'

'A HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN AFRICA,' ETC., ETC.

ILLUSTRATED WITH EIGHT MAPS

BY THE AUTHOR AND BY DR. J. G. BARTHOLOMEW OF  
THE GEOGRAPHICAL INSTITUTE, EDINBURGH

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## PREFATORY NOTE

THE germ of this little work lay in a series of articles contributed to the *Daily Graphic* in the summer-autumn of 1903, entitled 'Empires of the Future.' The predictions ventured upon, in these sketches of the trend of history-in-the-making, have been somewhat closely fulfilled—as any curious person may see for himself by reading the articles in the *Daily Graphic* for the period mentioned. This coincidence is only cited as some excuse for my producing at this juncture a more elaborate work, dealing partly with actuality, but almost more with futurity. The reader will find neither the text nor the maps presenting the political delimitations of the world as they would appear in an accurate work on geography issued in the winter of 1912-3. The author's forecast of the probable frontiers in the Balkan Peninsula will, perhaps, not accord with the immediate settlement under discussion at the Conference now sitting. Bessarabia may remain for some time yet under the Russian flag, Ruthenia under that of Austria; Poland is still a province of Russia, and the Philippines are a dependency of the United States; Germany and France have not yet come to terms in regard to the Lorraine frontier and Luxemburg, nor is Germany the acknowledged mistress of a Congo Empire or the most potent State in a great confederation of Central European kingdoms. But such things as this book forecasts may well come to pass, and it is not unprofitable that we should consider how our own action may assist or retard them and in what way the British Empire would be affected by this and that redistribution of territory.

The main object of my book is a plea for the promotion of peace and good-will among white nations, to start with; and when the ambitions and the allotment of spheres of influence

amongst the Caucasian peoples have been nicely adjusted, then to see that the educational task of the Caucasian is carried out in a right, a Christian, a practical, and sympathetic fashion towards the other races and sub-species of humanity. I view without dismay or sentimentality the overrunning of the habitable globe by the white man, because I believe it has occurred several times before in the ancient history of the human species: during the Palæolithic Age, in the Neolithic period of perfected stone implements and stone-worship, in the Bronze Age, and, in a more limited degree, after the discovery of the utility of iron. Europe and Western Asia have been a great hive, swarming with frequent improvements of the human species; and these better and better ideas on the part of Nature have repeatedly leavened the mass of unregenerate mankind in the jungles and mountains, the swamps, steppes, and deserts of Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the Americas. Yet though this constant emigration of the whites leads to great improvements in course of time amongst the coloured, non-Caucasian peoples [so that they puzzle us with our own myths, fight us with our own weapons, defend themselves with the white man's early fortifications, and preserve his early arts in remote South Africa, Australia, and South America]; nevertheless, these others retain a vitality and possess a genius of their own, native to the soil. They need not fear ultimate extinction or perpetual tutelage. By leaps and bounds they are advancing now to positions of equality with the Caucasian nations in the Confederation of the World. Japan has already arrived; China, largely regenerated through the unthanked missionaries, is arriving at complete independence; there may be a hundred years hence a self-governing India, Egypt, Arabia, Armenia, Nigériâ, and Madagascar.

Meantime, where the talent has been hidden in a napkin, it is the duty and privilege of the white man to search for that talent. Having found it, he administers it to such advantage that in a short time it is multiplied a hundred-fold; but wiser than before, in the better Christianity of the twentieth century he—the white man—now takes his coloured brother into partnership and enables him to participate to an ever-increasing degree in the riches of his own land. The old Spanish and Portuguese and latter-day Leopoldian principles of colonisation

are now discarded, because we find it does not pay to do wrong. Were I not convinced that this were so, and that the opening up of the world by the white man were not in the long run a blessing to undeveloped countries and the beginning of a new and happier history among the coloured peoples, I would not in my map-making and my theorising have made so free with the waste places of the earth.

At the same time, I hold and express very strong views as to our duties and responsibilities. By our, I mean, primarily, all those who profess and call themselves Christians, and secondarily, my own fellow countrymen. Empire that is world-wide cannot be associated with selfishness, with Chinese walls of tariffs, with race-hatreds, race-exclusiveness, snobbishness, and injustice; nor with the perpetration of such stupidity as the destruction of fauna and flora. If we do not learn this lesson and act on it, the sceptre will pass from us to a daughter or a kindred people which rules its action by these principles. And, similarly, all other nations desiring to play an Imperial part, must be guided by the same code of justice, pity, reasonable unselfishness, and widely stretched sympathies.

At any moment the white man may meet with a serious or a partial check to his renewed colonisation of the world. There are still about a thousand millions of non-Caucasian, non-Christian, mainly recalcitrant peoples—chiefly in Asia and Africa—the majority of whom hate or distrust the white man, with or without good reason. A considerable proportion of these may unite to oppose the purpose and destiny of the Caucasian. They will have as their ally, the bad side of Nature, the real Evil principle, the Devil, who is ever trying to prevent Man's conquest of the Earth, and who works through germ-disease, fungoid, and bacillus; mosquito, fly, tick, bug, and flea; through hurricane, tidal wave, earthquake, flood, and drought; through the animal instincts and lusts; through false religions and false views of religion. But what we white peoples ought to strive for, with speech and pen, is unity of purpose; an alliance throughout all the world in this final struggle for mastery over Nature. We ought to adjust our ambitions and eliminate causes of conflict. Of course it would be fatuous to count on the Millennium setting in after the next



Round Table Conference at the Hague. Great Britain cannot afford to lose her proper place as a naval power, nor to allow her manhood to grow up untrained in military exercises. But when, after a time, we find—and the rest of the civilised world finds—that a war between white nations does not profit, we shall learn to reserve our armaments for constraining the recalcitrant peoples to keep the peace, and finally devote all our fierceness, all our courage, vigour, and ingeniousness to attacking and subduing to our will the forces of Nature.

‘Till the war-drum throbs no longer, and the battle-flags are furled  
 In the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the world.  
 There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,  
 And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.’

This utterance of Tennyson’s—sixty years ago, a glorious prophecy; then falling into desuetude through over-quotation and the seeming impossibility of uniting Christians against Moslems, Moslems and Christians against heathenry, scientific seekers after truth against the reactionaries in religion, politics, and political economy—is now once more permissible as a forecast: for once again, from the crest of the wave we sight the Promised Land, once more the mists rise, the clouds part, and we behold against the blue of heaven the peaks of Beulah to which we shall some day ascend.

H. H. JOHNSTON.

POLING :

*New Year's Day, 1913.*

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# COMMON SENSE IN FOREIGN POLICY

## I

### THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

SHORT titles of books and chapters are generally better than long; otherwise I should have preferred to call this little book 'A Manual dealing with the Problems to be faced and solved in shaping the Foreign Policy of the British Empire.' Twenty-seven years ago—still more so in the 'fifties and 'sixties of the last century—the publication of such a work would have savoured of indiscretion or impertinence. The foreign policy of the Empire—or, more correctly, of the United Kingdom—was, in the first place, largely initiated by Queen Victoria, who sometimes proved to be an abler judge of foreign affairs than her ministers, especially when she followed the advice of her husband. He, like herself, was intimately acquainted with the courts and dynasties of Europe and with the leading foreign languages. Elsewhere, in those days, a country's relations with its neighbours or with distant lands were dealt with almost exclusively by the head of the State—Emperor, King, or President—acting with the more-or-less dependent Minister-of-State, who was no representative of the masses, but the employé of the Monarch. Events were prepared and sprung on a submissive, a confident, or a stupid people. The public Press criticised, more often applauded, but had at most to deal with a *fait accompli* and make the best of it. Occasionally, in our own land, a statesman, out of office and discontented, went round the great provincial towns agitating against the trend of British foreign policy—perhaps wisely, perhaps unfairly, we do not yet know—and scored a slight success. But once in office his Cabinet fell in by degrees with the views of the Sovereign and the permanent officials [after the fifties of the

last century, these public servants were a factor of ever-growing importance]; and, as before, the foreign policy of the Empire was shaped by a small camarilla, consisting of the Sovereign, two Cabinet Ministers, the permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and perhaps one representative of 'la plus haute finance.' The only Press organ at all enlightened as to the course to which the country was being committed was the *Times*; and it is probable that throughout much of the last two-thirds of Queen Victoria's reign no very serious development or change in foreign or colonial policy was embarked on without the *Times* being in some way consulted, or at any rate informed a little in advance of the public or the foreign chancelleries. Then the announcement was made, and was immediately saluted by a *Times* leader, which usually accorded its approval, except during the brief attempt of Mr. Gladstone to carry out a foreign policy of his own.

There is no need to deduce blame from this statement of the way in which our foreign policy was shaped under the ministries of Peel, Russell, Derby, Aberdeen, Palmerston, Gladstone, Disraeli, and Salisbury. A glance given to the progress in power, population, wealth, and happiness of the British Empire shows that no grave mistakes were made; and it is too soon to say whether the trend imparted to British policy in this and that direction was miscalculated. The soundness of Queen Victoria's and of the Prince Consort's judgment in one or two crises (notably that of the 'Trent' *casus belli* with the Northern States in the American Civil War) has been acclaimed by several noteworthy historians, not given to flattery or inclined to make the Sovereign, who reigns, also a member of the Government. We should be rash indeed if we derided the policy which led to the Crimean War, to the opening-up of China, or to the saving of European Turkey from Russian control in 1878. It requires another quarter of a century and much close study of the intricate factors governing the cases before we can decide with well-founded convictions whether or not it would have been more in the interests of the British Empire to have wrenched Slesvig-Holstein from Germany and have restored it to Denmark; to have kept the Ionian Islands; to have refrained from giving up legitimate British claims to the

islands and coasts of eastern Central America (in the vain hope of constraining the United States to a similar policy of self-denial); to have let Turkey go under in 1858<sup>9</sup> and then to have gained by this compliance Crete and Alaska, and Egypt, while the latter was malleable. Impartial historians cannot yet prove the wisdom or unwisdom of the British withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1881, or convince themselves or us that we ought to have intervened in 1871 on behalf of France, thereby saving some portion of French Lorraine for the stricken Republic and taking measures to secure the complete detachment of Luxemburg from the German Empire as a guarantee for the inviolability of Belgium. And much of this indecision in pronouncing a verdict on episodes in the past foreign policy of the British Empire arises from our still imperfect knowledge of foreign countries, their 'material and moral' qualifications, their resources, religions, languages, and literatures. How many Englishmen, for example, are there who know anything, from personal acquaintance, of Schleswig (or Slesvig) or of Holstein? Yet these lands of our forefathers, of the Angles and the Saxons, are distant only a two days' journey from London, and, until the recent spy-mania arose on both sides of the North Sea, were most delightful and instructive countries to visit between May and November.

It is because—in comparison with our gigantic stake in the wise conduct of our foreign affairs—we are *in the mass* so lacking in a just appreciation of the lands and peoples outside the scope of the British Islands that I have desired to write this little book; merely from the point of view of one who from his youth up has travelled considerably and has had the advantage of discussing many questions of foreign policy with the personages who frame that policy or with those who are clear-sighted as to their own country's needs, ambitions, and chances of success. To such as have not had the like opportunities of forming a personal opinion on the wisest course which might be pursued in the foreign policy of the British Empire, this book may be of service.

For, after the enlargement of the franchise in 1885-6 and the great expansion of the English, Scottish, and Irish Press, which followed and became most marked at the commencement

of the twentieth century, it is futile to suppose that foreign affairs any longer remain the exclusive sphere of the small *coterie* already cited. They have become—by degrees—the subject of all others, in which, first Great Britain and Ireland, and next, the other great self-governing divisions of the Empire, are vitally interested. Because a strong foreign policy requires, eventually, the support of men willing to fight for it in the army and navy, the funds of all those who deposit their money in the great banking institutions, and of the tax-payers who will have to pay the bill for armaments. On the other hand, a weak, a rash, a short-sighted foreign policy may affect prejudicially many commercial interests and the employment of millions of skilled or unskilled workers who depend thereon for their livelihood. Manchester commerce, for example, stands to lose an important outlet by the Italian annexation of Tripoli, if through that action 400,000 square miles of North Africa become more or less closed (through prohibitive duties) to the circulation of Manchester cotton goods. A thousand British firms must inevitably suffer from an unwise policy in China.

The new Press has concerned itself more and more with questions of foreign policy. Leading articles and *communiqués*, inspired by the highest authorities in England and potentates abroad, have begun, with the new century, to appear in other journals as well as in the *Times*: in the *Daily Telegraph*, *Daily Chronicle*, *Morning Post*, *Daily Mail*, *Daily Graphic*, *Standard*, *Westminster Gazette*, *Pall Mall*, and *Star*; in the *Manchester Guardian*, *Yorkshire Post*, *Scotsman*, *Northern Whig* of Belfast, *Birmingham Post*, *Western Morning News*, and *Liverpool Courier*.

All this with the intention of 'getting at' the increased mass of voters, who would in turn react on representatives in Parliament; decide the fate of ministries or the tenure of power of great parties. The movement has more recently spread to the Press of South Africa, Canada, Australia, and India.

The great English newspapers in India, twenty years ago, may have discussed India's 'foreign' relations—that is to say, the attitude of the Calcutta or Simla government towards Bafuchistan, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, or Tibet; but they seldom produced an article—or an article of any value—on the problems of Imperial foreign policy in Europe, Africa, or

America, which arise from time to time, and demand a decision and action from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Yet these problems ultimately affect the 816,000,000 of the Indian Empire, closely or indirectly. The Press of Pretoria, Johannesburg, Capetown, and Durban is now served by men of wide outlook who have probably come from Europe with a knowledge of European questions, and whose say on British foreign policy, even though it may be biased by local interests or ideals, is important and worth studying. So, also, are the Press views on foreign topics in New Zealand, Australia, British Columbia, Manitoba, and eastern Canada.

The self-governing peoples of these daughter-nations insist on knowing now the ins and outs of the problems which Downing Street and Whitehall daily have under consideration ; because they are not going to spend their money or volunteer their lives in the dark. If they are to share in and support the foreign policy of Great Britain and Ireland they must approve of it. No doubt they will be disposed to take at first a too particularist and selfish view. Australia may think that it matters not a straw what the United States does about the Panama Canal, what happens to British Guiana, or who rules at Tangier or Constantinople : provided the New Hebrides Archipelago is acquired from France. Canada, protected on her southern border by the mightiest of single nations, the United States, believed at one time that she could remain indifferent to the balance of power in Europe, the fate of France, the safety of India, or the irrigation of Egypt. The more educated of these peoples now know—thanks to their new Press—that everything which is likely to affect the well-being and stability of the whole British Empire concerns them similarly in the value of their railway stocks, the cheapness or dearness of money, the rates of insurance, and the duration of treaties. And they now ask to be consulted by the mother-country on all the great lines of policy. They wish to see our shadow never less on the earth's superficies ; but also they do not want the Old Lady of Downing Street to make an ass of herself, by—for example—going to war to give Constantinople to Russia, to restore Alsace to France, to 'free' Hungary from Austria, to



insist on the Balkan Peninsula being all Turkish, or all Slav, or all Greek, to prevent Russia from reaching the Persian Gulf, or the State of Panamá from joining the American Union. \*

Foreign affairs are in the street now, are discussed in the 'tube' and the suburban train, on the 'bus, in the factory—even in the slum. It is not for nothing that we send yearly drafts of young men from the peasantry, the artisan, and the lower middle classes to serve in our army in Gibraltar (whence some of them drift over to Morocco), Malta (where they hear much about Italy), Egypt (where they touch twenty world questions and see the natives of many lands), India, South Africa, Malaysia, Mauritius, Jamaica, Barbados, Crete, and Cyprus. These young soldiers go out with the new education which began in the 'seventies, able already to read, mark, learn, observe, sketch, and possibly photograph; and return with many views—singularly sane ones, sometimes—on foreign and imperial policy. Still more is this the case with the bluejackets of our far-flung fleet. Such men now get more generous leave than in the cruel old days—not so very distant, when we treated the men of the lower deck like galley-slaves, by the same curious survival of traditionary culture which still makes many of us look on domestic servants as the serfs of the glebe. British bluejackets are no longer the drunken illiterates of a hundred years ago. Landed from foreign cruises they bicycle off to their homes in the twenty-mile radius of Portsmouth, Sheerness, Chatham, Weymouth, Harwich, Rosyth, Plymouth, Haulbowline, Bantry Bay; they go on shore wherever the ships of the fleet pause for a while; and among their parents, old playmates, sweetheart's brothers, and chance acquaintances they give their views on Rooshians and Prooshians, and I-tali-ans (only they now pronounce these words in the correct manner).

Equally potent as an educational force amongst the masses of the people is the industrial army which we send abroad on periods of long and short service; the young men—mere boys sometimes—who go out now as skilled mechanics to manage engines and machines of greater or less complexity, to spend six months in the north of Africa perhaps, instructing Arabs how to work some appliance connected with halfa-grass, olive-crushing, or the packing of phosphates; to Liberia to make

a road or set up mining pumps ; Egypt for cotton-ginning ; the Caucasus and Turkestan in connection with the petroleum industries ; Mexico, Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, and Argentina, as miners, mechanics, stock-men, railway-engineers, foremen-platelayers, engine-drivers, butchers, packers, and horticulturists. Others of slightly superior education in abstract science, permeate the world as botanical and zoological collectors, as photographers, electricians, builders, fruit-growers, instructors to native armies, officers in the marine, the customs, and the health departments of backward States.

Then there are the seamen, the quartermasters, the engineers, and the officers of our splendid mercantile marine, that output and expression of national energy, the imperial value of which has never been sufficiently gauged, acknowledged, and rewarded.<sup>1</sup> If we are the greatest, the most prosperous, and the freest Empire that the world has ever known, these achievements are in the main due to our mercantile marine, more even than to the Navy, the Army, the Civil Service, and the Press.

All these young and middle-aged men, and that increasing contingent of young and middle-aged women (stewardesses, nurses, governesses, hotel-manageresses, missionary women, clerks, and stenographers), of little or no social importance in the land of their birth, are for the most part too modest to wield the pen ; but nevertheless after each return from foreign travel and residence they circulate in Great Britain and Ireland, expressing to their acquaintances, relations, and employers, shrewd views and observations on this or that phase of our foreign policy. They and the cheap Press between them are assisting to educate the minds of the masses as to the real foreign interests of Great Britain, the things that really matter, the causes that are really worth the risk of fighting, worth the awful arbitrament of war on land and sea. Consequently, for ten Members of Parliament considered qualified thirty years ago for the discussion of foreign affairs in the House of Commons, there are now at least three hundred able to speak

<sup>1</sup> How many decorations have ever been bestowed on officers high in command of our merchant fleets ? Who deserve them more, in the public service ?

on the subject with acumen and representing the very decided views and interests of millions behind them.

No longer, therefore, can the foreign relations of the British Empire be properly preserved as a matter of consideration and opinion for some dozen individuals. They have really become a matter for discussion and decision by a committee of the whole nation as represented, firstly, by the national Press, and secondly, by the 670 Members of the House of Commons—for the time being our nearest approach to an Imperial Parliament. The nation of the United Kingdom refuses any longer to be bound by treaties, concluded secretly, as to which its elected legislature has not been consulted and which it has not ratified.

Yet in spite of this widespread interest in foreign affairs there has been little attempt so far to co-ordinate our national desires and ambitions, to realise what we want—as an Empire—and how we are to get it; or, indeed, how we are to preserve from molestation or encroachment the great fields of adventure we have already marked off on the map as British territory or as eventual British spheres of influence. Having from the best data available made up our minds as to the final shape and extent of the British Empire, we have next to see how this great institution fits in with the ambitions of other Powers. We must acquire some sense of proportion in measuring our means both of defence and maintenance. The trite simile of cutting out the coat to suit the extent of the cloth must never be absent from our minds. We must remember at the present day, that to defend, administer, and develop this Empire of 12,832,484 square miles (and several spheres of influence annectent thereto),<sup>1</sup> we have approximately 10,000,000

<sup>1</sup> This estimate includes the 400,000 square miles of Egypt and the 984,520 of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan which it is becoming an affectation not to enumerate as among the British protectorates or spheres of influence.

The nearest rival in extent of area to the Empire of Great Britain and Ireland is the Russian Empire of 8,648,000 square miles. Next in the list of huge states under a single metropolitan control is the French Empire of nearly 5,000,000 square miles. Then come the United States (of North America), with 3,571,000 square miles; China (less the portions of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Turkestan now practically lost to her) with about 3,000,000 square miles; and the German Empire in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Australasia, with 1,226,000 square miles. (Germany, however, is closely allied to Austria-Hungary, an expanding empire of already 261,101 square miles.)

The attempt that follows in the text to estimate the numerical validity in the World's Work, of the populations in these great empires, may seem a little

adult, educated, capable white men and women (out of a total white population of nearly 60,000,000), and some 8,000,000 possible male recruits amongst the natives of India, the negroes of British Africa and the West Indies, the Arabs and Egyptians, the Chinese, Malays, and Polynesians. Russia could produce about 20,000,000 efficient white adults for war, work, and enterprise (with an additional force of a million noteworthy Mongols and Iranians); Germany and Austria-Hungary represent an alliance which has a first-class effective force not much below 18,000,000 in numbers, adults mostly of good physique, fair education, much ability and courage. Calculated on the same bases and by the same standards, the French Empire (in its population of 81,500,000) might be rated as an 11,000,000 Power (7,000,000 efficient adult whites and 4,000,000 coloured); the United States possesses 15,000,000

fantastic, but it comes probably nearer to the truth than the conventional statements of totals in population, which take no regard for the facts that only one in four is anywhere near adult, or one in five sufficiently sound in health or mental capacity to be a valid citizen. A further deduction must still be made for inept illiteracy, even in the most progressive states at the present day; so that the lowest figure with which—to find the quotient of validity—one may divide the total population of a state in the most advanced stage of civilisation would be 6. This figure can only be used with regard to Britain and her daughter-nations, Germany, France, and the United States (besides the lesser Teutonic European States like Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, &c., which do not come into this argument). Even within this schedule there are degrees of superiority. For instance, in the present condition of the world the 7,500,000 of Canadians are worth more as efficient than a similar number of unselected English people, because of their position, potential wealth, education, and opportunities. All races are not ethnically equal in physical and mental endowment or in inherited culture of the practical type: all are not as free from religious trammels as the people of Britain, the United States, Germany, France, and Japan. The 9,000,000 adults in the British Isles are far more potent as a world-force than the 80,000,000 or 90,000,000 of Chinese adults, or the 60,000,000 of Indian men and women, or even the 30,000,000 of grown-up, mainly illiterate Russians. The chief test is education, especially a knowledge of the world; and a high level of education is not—so far—dissociated in the most advanced peoples from a high standard of physical efficiency. Look at Scotland, the United States, Scandinavia, for example, where athleticism and developed bodily strength are combined with great intelligence and widespread literacy. The Englishman is usually stronger in body than the Hindu, even than the African.

Also in the most efficient nations, women have advanced to take nearly equal rank with adult men as national workers and empire-builders. Observe the part played at home and abroad by British, American, Russian, Polish, Scandinavian, French, and Italian women. Nor are the Japanese women far behind in social importance.

able-bodied, well-endowed citizens; while Italy, with some 6,000,000 capable adults, and Japan with 7,000,000, close the list of 'great Powers.'

Spain would figure in such a reckoning at only 3,000,000, owing to the backwardness of education; and China out of her ninety or a hundred million adults could perhaps at present muster no more than the same number—3,000,000—fitted to vie with the best types of Europeans in arms, in physical strength, alertness of mind, and the enlightenment due to a modern education. The inequality of racial values, and consequently the futility of reckoning the power of empires by the returns of their censuses, is shown by the fact that the great peninsula and adjoining countries of India with a total population of some 316,000,000, submit to be governed and developed by about 100,000 white Britons, aided by about 200,000 Sikhs, 100,000 Jains, 10,000 Parsees, 500,000 Muhammadan Indians, Afghans, Baluchis, Arabs, and Persians, and 500,000 Bengali and Marathi Hindus.<sup>1</sup>

No empire is fixed for ever as a stable quantity in human affairs; efficiency and courage in one direction or another—in sea-faring and sea-fighting, in buying and selling, in the manufacture and the aiming of artillery and rifles, in the just and kindly management of savage or backward peoples—made the British Empire. These qualities exist still, in varying proportions, but they have also grown up among our foreign rivals, and we are now only one of a band of great colonising nations; though our dominions are the vastest, and incomparably the most valuable. If we continue to keep abreast of the times in intelligence, education, and physical well-being, and if the British Empire grows by degrees into a vast confederation of free, home-governed states, united on all questions of foreign policy and defence against the rest of the world, we shall be unassailable; and what is more, if we pursue a wise foreign policy (in commerce as in other directions) no one will want to assail us: we may rather prove to be the magnet for the adhesion of other alliances, the focus of a Confederation of the World.

<sup>1</sup> The total population of the British Empire, including Egypt and the Sudan (14,600,000), is stated at 434,000,000; that of China Proper at about 410,000,000; of the Russian Empire at 164,000,000.

In any case, the time has gone by for us to deal with the affairs of the British Empire—its social, sanitary, fiscal, ethnological, and faunal problems—as though they only concerned the natives of Great Britain and of her daughter-nations. Our Flag covers too vast a proportion of the habitable regions of the earth for the other peoples to be able to regard the evolution of the British Empire with indifference; especially, if, as I hope, we are to win their acquiescence in the further enlargement of our domain when a final solution is reached in the settlement of African and Asiatic affairs. It is futile to formulate in England developments of fiscal policy in the Indian Empire, Crown Colonies, or Protectorates which shall not take into consideration the interests of friendly nations or which should by the institution of a preferential tariff specially favour British commerce, and cause all these regions to become privileged areas reserved solely for the profit of the British trader. Such is the policy, it is true, of France in North Africa, in Senegambia and Nigeria, in Madagascar and Indo-China; of Russia, in Russian Asia; of the United States in Cuba, Hawaii, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. But though Russian Asia is half again as large as the area of the British Empire governed from London it has only a population of about 25,000,000 and a commerce of perhaps £14,000,000 in annual value; and the French colonial dominions, though they exceed in extent the Free Trade area of the British Empire, in productiveness fall far short of our 4,100,000 square miles.

The trade of this 4,100,000 square miles in Tropical Africa, Tropical America, British Asia, and Oceania amounts annually to a value of about £476,000,000; or, if Egypt and the Sudan (1,884,520 square miles) are to be included under the London-controlled countries,<sup>1</sup> then to £535,000,000. In this splendid

<sup>1</sup> A distinction in many matters, especially fiscal, must be drawn between the British Empire which has its policy dictated from the Cabinet and Parliament in London—that is to say, the Indian Empire, Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the West, East, and Central African Crown Colonies and Protectorates, the West Indies, Guiana, Honduras, and the Falklands, Fiji, and the British Pacific Islands, Hong-Kong and Wei-hai-wei, Borneo, Malaysia, and Ceylon—and the self-governing daughter-nations of Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The London-governed area of the Empire is 5,484,000 square miles, but it includes some of the richest countries—mostly tropical—in the world. The daughter-nations control 7,226,000 square miles of the earth's land surface.

commerce the mother- or the protecting-country—Great Britain and Ireland—plays an important, but not an excessive or selfish, part. The annual trade of the United Kingdom, with the regions above defined and governed from London, amounts to about £165,000,000 in value (£200,000,000, including British trade with Egypt and the Sudan, which for the year 1911 was £35,000,000), or less than one-third of the total of their commerce. The preferential, protectionist colonial Empire of France—4,776,126 square miles in extent—only has a total annual trade of £98,000,000 in value, of which nearly two-thirds is with France alone.

Our daughter-nations are independent of our control in most matters, especially as regards their fiscal arrangements. All of them are protectionist, and several of them accord a slight degree of preference to the goods imported from the mother-country; but this lowering of their tariffs is trivial<sup>1</sup> compared to the differential treatment exacted by the United States from her dependencies, or that which France imposes on her colonies. In spite, however, of this sin against Free Trade principles, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa do a thriving trade with the rest of the world—some £190,500,000 annually—in addition to their inter-Imperial trade of £14,500,000 and their trade with the mother-country of £223,000,000. [All these totals and calculations are of necessity approximate, but they are based as nearly as possible on the returns of 1911. The figures refer to the business transacted during a period of twelve months, and the value of 'commercial transactions' is estimated on the money-value of the imports and exports (including bullion and specie) which have been received and sent out by the countries referred to in the year 1911, or, failing returns for that year, in 1910.] The total trade of the British Empire, Egypt, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, for the twelve months ended 1911, reached the amazing value of £2,320,000,000 in round numbers (*i.e.* £2,261,290,000 for the Empire less Egypt and the Sudan and £59,000,000 for those countries). In no previous year has it

<sup>1</sup> Canada remits about 10 per cent. *ad valorem*—say, one-third of the general customs duties; South Africa an average 3 per cent.; Australia about 13 per cent.; and New Zealand about 10 per cent. *ad valorem*.

stood so high ; but the returns for 1912 do not indicate the probability of any falling off, nor was the trade-value of 1910 and 1909 much lower. Of this total, £1,357,500,000 represented the trade of the British Islands *alone*. The people of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Man, and the Channel Islands in that year—1911—did a trade with the rest of the British Empire (including Egypt and the Sudan) valued at £423,000,000, of which £223,000,000 was transacted with the daughter-nations and £200,000,000 with the London-controlled Empire (including Egypt and the Sudan). But our *foreign* trade for the same year *with countries outside the British Empire* was £969,000,000 in value ; and our best customers and providers were the United States (£180,541,537), Germany (£123,866,609), France (£82,690,528), Russia (£65,483,434), the Argentine (£47,000,000), Belgium (£39,500,000), and Holland (£36,000,000).

On this list the German Empire stands out prominently as the biggest buyer of British manufactured goods, raw products, and colonial produce, having in 1911 imported from the United Kingdom about £57,500,000 worth of merchandise, and another £33,000,000 worth from India, Egypt, Canada, South Africa, and Australasia—say, goods of the value of £90,000,000, in all, from the British Empire.

The United States may be ranked as the next best buyer of what we have to sell in the United Kingdom, its annual expenditure on our exports being about £56,000,000 ; but it ranks before any other foreign power as a purchaser from the entire British Empire, its yearly debit now reaching to something like £105,000,000. France follows next with an annual purchase of British goods (United Kingdom and Empire) of £62,000,000 in value.

What are the rough conclusions which we might draw from this fatiguing array of figures, coupled with a glance into any work of reference giving the present armed strength of the United Kingdom and of the other component parts of the British Empire ? (1) That the people of the United Kingdom carry on annually by far the biggest trade of any geographical unit in the world's countries at the present day. With a population of between 45,000,000 and 46,000,000 and a



habitable area of not more than about 120,000 square miles we possess a commerce worth nearly double that of the United States, which nation has an area of 3,571,000 square miles and a population of 94,000,000. (2) That in spite of tariff walls and protection afforded to the trade of many of our rivals we easily distance them in manufacturing, buying, banking, and selling. (3) This we do only partly because we have such a magnificent Empire—self-governed and London-governed—to draw on for raw materials and to furnish clients for our manufactures ; but mainly for the reason of our geographical position and our tremendous lead in sea-power. This advantage in sea-power (warlike and mercantile) can only be maintained by our keeping ahead of any *probable* combination of other powers which would result in an aggregation of wealth and labour force sufficient to match and defeat our forces on the sea and in the air. ‘ Improbable ’ combinations against the British Isles or the whole British Empire are not likely to occur unless throughout the Empire we adopted a fiscal policy which shut out from 12,000,000 square miles of the earth’s land-surface the commerce of other nations. Such a policy as this would not pay, because the expense in men and money needed to keep up the requisite armament of defence against some other great league of nations would balance the profits which might be derived from an excessively selfish use of our enormous Empire.

From a business man’s point of view—and our Empire has been founded and is maintained by men of business—the greatest of British interests is peace ; and the main motive of our foreign policy is to guide the development of the British Empire along paths of progress without recourse to war, least of all war with any combination of European rivals powerful enough to make the issue of the struggle uncertain and victory disastrously costly. We do well also to remember that at present our resources in fighting men of first class value are limited. Money cannot necessarily buy either courage or military training. Our navy counts for something like two-thirds of the factors in our schemes of defence and attack, but it cannot accomplish all ends. The navy alone could not reduce Russia to despair and bankruptcy, nor expel Germany from the soil of France, if France were crippled. Briefly, the

British nation and the daughter-nations require before they go to war to be sure that the issue is worth the risks and the expense in life and money.

There are many acts of injustice against our interests, or breaches of treaties, which can be submitted to arbitration. Arbitration (as in the case of the Panama Canal dues being applicable to American ships equally with all other shipping) may be refused by—what we believe to be—the offending party; but for issues not absolutely vital to the existence of the British Empire there are methods of constraint and compulsion—as weaker nations have long since found out—sufficiently effective for the enforcement of respect for treaties or fair play, without a resort to arms. There is a national boycotting of the offender's produce, a refusal to be represented at the great national festivals of the aggressor, a closing of the British money-market to the would-be borrower: though it must be admitted that in this last respect the British Government does not wield the power which the French Cabinet has over the Bourse of Paris.

But occasionally a crisis arises when a resort to arms seems inevitable, even when every concession has been made to the business man's point of view, and that of the proletariat which furnishes the bulk of the fighting force, and which, with ever-improving education, is increasingly anxious to know why it should risk its life in the Empire's cause. It would, however, be useful to tabulate the few unquestionable *casus belli* which might present themselves for the fateful pronouncement of the Imperial Council of Defence and the peace or war decision of the Imperial Parliament.

It would seem to the present writer, after sifting the opinions of the most enlightened among Imperial statesmen, that the only things worth fighting for or against are as follows:—

1. Any attempt which is not endorsed by the Dutch people to include Holland within the limits of the German Empire.

2. Any attempt, under any conditions whatever, on the part of Germany, to control the mouth of the Scheldt; or any fortification of the mouth of the Scheldt by Holland, acting under the influence of Germany, which would lock up Antwerp and interfere with its free access to the North Sea.

3. The territorial integrity, complete independence, and neutrality of Belgium and of the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg.

4. Any unprovoked attack on France, or any further annexation of territory by Germany in eastern or northern France.

5. Any further diminution of Danish territory, or an attack on the independence of Denmark which is equally opposed by Norway and Sweden.

6. Any interference by another Power with Egypt or Sinai, with the British sphere in Arabia, or with the independence and neutrality of all the rest of Arabia between the bay of Al-Kuweit and the Gulf of Akabah.

7. The establishment of any other European Power than Great Britain in control of Southern Persia east of Bandar Dilam.<sup>1</sup>

8. Any similar attempt to interpose a foreign influence in Siam west of the Menam River and the Gulf of Siam.

9. Any interference with the independence of China Proper which might upset the conditions of trade and enterprise to the marked detriment of the British Empire—that is to say, any interference with perfectly free-trade conditions in China which would give any foreign Power a commercial advantage in that Empire over other nations; similarly, the interference of any other European Power in the affairs of Tibet (it is provided, of course, that Tibet remains like the rest of the Chinese Empire, a free trade area).

10. Any attempt of the United States to exercise peculiar political or commercial privileges in South America, east of the Panama Canal zone, and in general any attempt on the part of an outside Power to interfere with the independence of the South American republics; or a disposition on the part of any South American State to confer peculiar privileges in commerce on the subjects of any foreign Power to the detriment of the free-trade principle.

11. And, of course, any attack on the territories included within the acknowledged scope of the British Empire.

These are the only *casus belli* that can occur to the mind of any reasonable British citizen. We may deeply regret that

<sup>1</sup> About sixty miles north-west of Bushir.

Germany continues to occupy that small portion of Lorraine which is inherently French-speaking, and which so far as ethnology is concerned belongs more properly to the French Empire ; we may sympathise with the desire of the Poles once again to revive in a modified and more practical shape the kingdom of Poland, and of the Finns in the western part of Finland to constitute themselves a self-governing member of a Scandinavian Confederation ; we can understand why, on the other hand, the Ruthenian people of Eastern Galicia desire to be incorporated with Russia, why Russia must in course of time annex to purely Russian control the eastern parts of Finland, and why she craves legitimately for an outlet—at any rate, a railway outlet—at the western end of the Persian Gulf, to carry the trade of the Caucasus and Southern Russia into Asiatic seas.

We can sympathise, similarly (if it were at all realisable) with the German wish to possess Trieste as a German port on the Mediterranean, and of Austria to control the western side of the Balkan Peninsula ; of Japan, some day, to include the Philippine Islands within her Empire ; of Germany to play a great part in the development of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia ; of the Jews to re-establish a Jewish kingdom in Palestine, and the Syrians to become a self-governing State under French protection ; of Austria-Germany to keep Russia out of Constantinople, and of Russia to secure some reasonable guarantee for the freedom of passage through the Dardanelles. But we are not called upon to risk the life of a single British citizen or a large amount of British money in furthering or opposing such plans. And the sooner this fact is grasped by sentimentalists and jingos—narrow-minded theorists who can only see one detail in the puzzle-map of the world, can only fit together one problem without a care as to how it may dislocate other portions of the mosaic—the better for the world's peace and prosperity, and the less danger there is of wasting British energies on objects not of essential importance.

## II

### BRITAIN AND FRANCE

WHAT should be our policy in regard to the French Republic—the French people?

France is the most conservative country in Europe; though her conservatism is modified occasionally by cataclysms. Yet the old ideas raise themselves once more above the wreckage and the mud, when the violent flood of revolution has subsided. French dislike of reforms is largely due to a national vanity based consciously, but still more hereditarily (if I may use such a fearsome adverb) on a past of unusual splendour, with which perhaps no other country in Europe but Italy or Greece can vie.<sup>1</sup>

Some who have studied France think that the French

<sup>1</sup> On account of the increasing influence of scientific deductions in enlarging the interest with which we regard foreign countries, we cannot overlook the part which has been played by the territory of France in the creation of the higher types of bird and beast. There must be something unusually stimulating in the soil of France; moreover, this land has enjoyed a greater permanence of continuous habitability above sea-level than any other part of Western or Central Europe during the Tertiary and Recent Epochs. France has occupied a most important position in the moulding of mankind and of all the great or more wonderful beasts and birds in the Western Old World. In France, seemingly (much more than in Britain, which has been throughout the ages little more than the receiver of French superfluities in fauna and flora), were generated the antelopes, the deer, and even the oxen. Here came into being the flamingo, the pheasants, and the guinea-fowl—perhaps even the parrots and hornbills, the leopard, and even more probably the lion. Possibly the great apes were perfected here, and if Man himself emerged from a similar type farther to the east and nearer Asia (though this event is still quite unfixed in locality), he certainly accomplished some of his greatest and strangest developments in the fair land of France. From this genial country swarmed the birds and beasts and the early races of Man which colonised Spain, Germany, Flanders, and Britain, Switzerland, Italy, and Africa. There were remarkable big-brained negroids once existing in France; and ancestors of the Bushman may have inhabited the Pyrenees.

respect for tradition and precedent is derived from the still powerful Germanic element in the nation. If we read aright the lessons of history and ethnology, I think we shall come to the conclusion that the Germanic peoples (the true Aryans of the tall, blond, Nordic type which has again and again regenerated and conquered the world), though they increase, multiply, overflow their borders, and thus produce great changes in human affairs ; yet have a passionate love of law and order—even of tyranny—and thereby supply the Old and the New Worlds with much of their conservatism. A recent writer on the history of France has remarked with acumen that feudalism was the result of the Gothic, Frank, Allemannic, and Norse invasions of Germany ; and that the French Revolution, which swept away the last fetters of feudalism, was the passionate revolt of the Iberian and the Kelt against the Teuton. It certainly might be said that bad as was the economic and social condition of France during the eighteenth century, its evils were less obvious in such parts as Normandy, Picardy, Artois, Lorraine, Alsace, and Burgundy, where the Germanic element in the population considerably outweighed that of the Iberian, Basque, and Auvergnat. But despite the several revolutions which have swept over France between 1789 and 1871, despite the firm establishment now of the Republic as the national form of government, France still remains a country of conservative instincts and of class inequalities.

But it is money to-day which makes the aristocracy, rather than long descent. In no country of Europe, perhaps, can money more easily buy respect and even servility than in France. I know no part of France (and I have been well acquainted with that country since 1876) which is really democratic. Money is everywhere the test by which the stranger is measured. It may be that he is a tourist living most comfortably for seven francs a day *en pension* at one of those inns or small hotels which are still the glory of France in one of the increasingly rare regions unaffected by rising prices, where six to ten francs a day is still thought a sum at which the tourist can be entertained at a handsome profit to the *hôtelier*. But alas ! in many parts of this exceptionally interesting and beautiful land, the tourist agencies should put up a notice,

'No poor trippers wanted. No economical travellers desired here.'

To appreciate this feature in the French character one has only to pass from the French health resorts or beauty spots on the Riviera, to Switzerland. Unless in the former places the foreign visitor is prepared to live as a comparatively rich person, tipping everywhere incessantly, ordering expensive meals and expensive wines, and hiring expensive motors, he is treated with thinly-veiled impertinence. In Switzerland and in most parts of Germany and Austria-Hungary—even to some extent in Italy—the stranger-tourist is regarded according to his merits. If he is a decent, law-abiding, civil-spoken person, neither in the hotel nor in the shop is he denied that kindly politeness which is the more grateful since it is obviously not an expectation of favours to come.

In France the railway companies only take into consideration the convenience and the comfort of the rich; and the whole country lies at the mercy of the motorists. Pitiless automobiles tear at a reckless pace along all the roads that are *carrossable* with little regard for the safety or convenience of the pedestrian, the bicyclist, or the occupant of a horsed carriage. In Switzerland motor traffic, except in the big towns (where it is subject to no greater restrictions than in England), is almost non-existent, owing to the desire of the cantonal authorities that all persons, even the poorest, shall enjoy to the full the amazing beauty of Swiss scenery without danger or inconvenience. France is nearly fourteen times the size of Switzerland and has many other interests besides the exhibition of her scenery. But her complaisance and indulgence towards the extreme form of selfish automobilism might be modified in the interests of the many who cannot afford this expensive mode of travel without any check to French industries or the attractions of the *ville d'eau* or the *côte d'azur*.

The difficulty about negotiating with France is that she has not yet developed a national conscience, an ideal of abstract right and wrong to which philosophers and philanthropists may appeal with any hope that its influence will override material and commercial interests. For example, France was not in the past capable, to the same extent as Great Britain, of an over-

whelming national impulse to abolish slavery and the slave trade, such as broke down all the barriers of personal and party interests in 1808 and 1834 and enabled Great Britain to forbid and penalise the slave trade to her subjects and finally to abolish slavery on terms involving the expenditure of nearly forty million pounds of national money. It is true that France in a laggard way did declare the sea-trade in slaves illegal and gradually abolished the status of slavery throughout the French dominions. But the action was taken unwillingly, was sometimes revoked and annulled, and was only finally carried to completion to please the zealous philanthropists of Great Britain. It would be unfair to minimise the splendid work achieved in the anti-slavery cause by French soldiers and administrators in North Africa, in West Africa, and in Central Africa—notably of late in Wadai. But the conquest of these countries has been the aim with France rather than the doing away with a great social evil. The absence of a national conscience is seen in regard to the question of alcohol. The French Government, especially of to-day, is very much under the thumb of the *viticulteurs* and the distillers of France. And sooner than offend these vested interests which still continue to force on an increasingly abstinent world the products of the French vineyards, the French Government allows very bad and deleterious forms of brandy and absinthe to circulate throughout Algeria, Tunis, and French West Africa<sup>1</sup>; not merely allows this, but to a certain extent pushes the sale of this new and fiery spirit, with results which are becoming apparent now in Algeria—a degree of alcoholism amongst Arabs, Berbers, and the Moorish town population, which is very regrettable.

Still more marked is the absence of a conscience in the matter of any check being placed on the destruction of bird life in the French dominions, or—what happens to be more important at the moment—the promotion of laws to prohibit at the French customs-houses the introduction of the skins and plumes of rare birds. This is a measure which several other

\* ‘How about the British Colonial Office and the gin trade with Southern Nigeria?’ a French reader may ask. Yes, we are not impeccable or incapable of sordid policies. But the two cases are not quite comparable. At any rate in Northern Nigeria, the Sudan, British East and Central and much of South Africa, we keep alcohol from the natives with rigid determination.



enlightened nations of the world would like to bring about, in co-operation with their own legislation. But in the direction of refusing (up to the present) to join us in measures for the restricting or penalising of the sale of bird-skins, France is taking up an ill-natured position. France is, and will probably remain for long, the chief centre of millinery. The deft fingers and the exquisite taste of the French man and woman shape the fashions for all civilised womankind—more especially in the matter of head-gear. And to decorate woman, a Frenchman would plunder the whole rest of the world and not care for the consequences.<sup>1</sup> It is, therefore, to France that are directed the bulk of the bird-skins obtained from India, Malaysia, Africa, and the Pacific Islands.

But just because French milliners are believed to do a profitable trade in birds-of-paradise skins and in the feathers of innumerable rare and wonderful birds of the tropical regions, the French Government holds back from any international arrangement to which Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Italy, Switzerland, Holland—and by constraint, Belgium—might otherwise be disposed to agree.

It is true that French diplomatists are able to point to the equal lack of heart and foresight on the part of our own Board of Trade, which in this respect is as shortsighted and stubborn as the French Ministry of Commerce. But the Board of Trade is able to block legislation by invoking the attitude of the French Government, and the futility of closing British ports

<sup>1</sup> Germ-diseases are spreading terribly throughout Africa and India because birds that lived on insects, ticks, worms, crustacea, and mollusca, are being destroyed in enormous numbers to gratify the French taste for millinery and the British and American craze for 'collecting.' Just at present, France does not feel the pinch as we are beginning to do, though she wonders vaguely why sleeping sickness is beginning to ruin some of her West African colonies. The refusal—up to the present—on the part of French statesmen to initiate legislation in common with Great Britain for closing French (and British) ports to the skins of birds of paradise, toucans, kingfishers, lyre-birds, parrots of many descriptions, gorgeous starlings, amazing pheasants, and so forth, blocks the way of universal legislation in civilised countries to effect the preservation of the bird fauna of the world—a preservation not necessary merely to satisfy the æsthetic sense in preserving for our delectation marvellous creatures, but necessary to maintain the balance of life on sea and land, in rivers and on coral islets, whence the supply of guano is disappearing as the birds are destroyed.

In this and in some other respects the French Government is a disappointing one to deal with, for it very seldom attempts to lead popular opinion in France.

to rare bird-skins which would then find a ready market in France.

It is a great mistake to imagine that the French people are sentimental.

They are hard as flint compared to the Teuton and Anglo-Saxon. Sentimentality is almost purely a Teutonic quality, and where it exists in France it is only in such portions of the populace as are of almost pure Teutonic descent. To realise this you have only to expostulate—ever so politely—with a Frenchwoman who is wearing the plumes of a bird of paradise, or of a nearly extinct kingfisher, humming-bird, or toucan. She may vie with you in politeness, but the hard look that comes into her eyes when you appeal to her on the ground of sentiment to discourage the needless destruction of these marvellous creations, is only equalled by the impenetrability of her mind to the economic and scientific aspect of the question—her utter indifference to the fact that this steady destruction of bird life in French West Africa, Belgian West Africa, in India, Malaysia, and Cochin China, is leading to the spread of terrible germ-diseases which are inflicting great loss of life on human beings or on their domestic animals. All this is too far away to affect her own interests, and you will get no support from her for any league for the preservation of birds; any more than she will cease to eat *mauviettes* or *grives*, larks or ortolans, with the idea of checking the destruction of song-birds and of swallows, which are dished up under one or other of these titles.

Most of the great ideas were born in France and spread thence to fertilise human intelligence throughout the world. Yet although the changing human types which have dominated this parallelogram of 207,000 square miles, have flown thence like thistle-down to germinate in other lands, the great reforms of human history have usually come into France from outside, due to what I believe to be the case, that the French-speaking people are (what they are so ready to charge other nations with being)—too 'terre à terre,' too much absorbed with material pursuits to develop great national convictions on matters of abstract right and wrong, too selfish and short-sighted to promote crusades against wrong-doing for the sheer love of doing what seems to be right. The Crusades, in fact, came to

naught largely through the utter selfishness of French princes, who cared far less for reinstituting Christianity in the country of its origin than for carving out kingdoms, principalities, and dukedoms.

The French are quite selfish in their foreign policy : so, it may be remarked, are all other nations ; but although Great Britain has always had an eye to the main chance, it must be admitted that she, like the United States and even Denmark, has sometimes reached great heights of disinterestedness, has staked her money and her men's lives for the achievement of reforms outside her own land, and has given up several advantageous positions from an abstract love of right. France, we have often been told, has made war for an idea, but when examined it is almost invariably a selfish idea. Napoleon III. went to war to liberate Italy from Austria ; but he really did so with the idea (very justifiable from a French point of view) of adding Savoy and Nice to France (additions for which Frenchmen should condone most of his political crimes), to weaken Austria in order to facilitate a possible subjugation of Rhenish Germany, and to create in Italy a future vassal ally. The wars of the French Revolution were not really started with the idea of liberating from tyranny the world outside France, but of extending the French borders to the Lower Rhine and the north of Italy. The Mexican expedition was an attempt (which failed) to create a French empire in Central America.

The French are not only very conservative in desiring to keep the unphonetic spelling of their language, but they are antiquated in their notions of colonial policy. Though better than it was, this is still in the main a heritage of the old Spanish idea, which at one time infected all the nations of Europe, not excepting Britain (the latter not being wholly freed from it till the remarkable legislation promoted by Mr. Huskisson in 1823-4). The fiscal measures adopted in Algeria, Tunis, French West Africa (except the Ivory Coast and Dahomé), Gaboon, Madagascar and the Komoro Islands, Réunion, Indo-China, all the Pacific archipelagos, and the American possessions of France, are arranged so as to give an enormous advantage to French trade and to hamper or exclude the trade of other countries. This is done by admitting all goods from France—

or nearly all—duty free, while the imports from other nations pay the full customs duties according to the high tariff of France or to some local tariff which is little, if any, lower. Even where, as on the west coast of Africa, a few French products are taxed, similar foreign products are super-taxed. The only exceptions to this order of colonial monopoly in the direction of free trade are Dahomé and the Ivory Coast, French Somaliland, French India, and French Congo. In this last-named colony, however, free trade is practically a sham owing to the privileges bestowed on French *concessionnaire* companies.

In Madagascar and French Congo, British (and German) trade has been almost killed since the French took effective possession and introduced in theory or in practice their policy of protection for French commerce. Free markets in Tunis scarcely exist, but British commerce still holds a fairly good position in that French dependency ; only, however, whilst the special provisions of the 1897 agreement between France and Britain continue to exist. It has been a bitter pill for several French politicians, publicists, and merchant-princes to swallow, that their protectorate over Morocco has only been agreed to by Britain and Germany on the understanding that a free-trade basis is to be adopted in fiscal arrangements. Almost before, however, the French protectorate could be made effective, measures were being attempted by French consuls and vice-consuls to fetter or injure foreign enterprise in Morocco.

In the foregoing paragraphs, I have said about the worst that I can in regard to France. Towards this great country we owe historically more gratitude than perhaps to any other, except Germany. After the fall of the Roman Empire of the West, France became the light of the world and remained the chief focus of Western civilisation down to the middle of the nineteenth century. Even since then, however, she has exported one fine idea after another in the arts and sciences and in the amenities of life. She is easily first in the important departments of cooking, market-gardening, and horticulture.

British civilisation from the time of Egbert onwards has been mainly derived from France. Our language and literature bear testimony to this. Not until the last half of the seventeenth

century did we begin to invent on our own account; and even several of the great eighteenth and early nineteenth century inventions in Britain were due to French inspiration or to the perfecting of French failures. France is immediately opposite to our shores. For a hundred reasons a friendship with France is more important to us than any other alliance or understanding. It is a friendship worth some sacrifices on our part.

As to France in North Africa. She has been selfish in her commercial policy, occasionally pitiless towards nomad Arabs; but she has fought a dogged fight for eighty years against the forces of recalcitrant Nature, against the obstacles put in her path by the most stupid and fanatical of religions, and against the misdirected yet splendid valour of the blind adherents of that religion, and has restored once more to a leading place amongst the world's desirable lands those provinces of North Africa which at one time were the granary and the best colony that Rome possessed. She has intervened just in time to save the stately cedars of the Atlas from extinction and many a semi-desert area from being completely engulfed by the sands of the Sahara. She has even fought with success the advance of arid conditions which were threatening to make all North Africa as uninhabitable as the Gobi Desert. She has stopped the locusts in their ravages, abated the lion, leopard, and hyena in their destruction of flocks and herds, produced water in a thousand places where water was unprocurable, and therefore has placed under cultivation something like 100,000 square miles of land formerly surrendered to the desert antelope and the simūm. I forget how many thousands of miles of good carriageable roads she has made between the frontiers of Tripoli and Morocco; but the amount has been several times stated in my own books dealing with Africa, as also the mileage of the railways which now permit men of all races and colours to travel with speed and comfort between Southern Tunis and South-east Morocco. In spite of her unfair fiscal policy, the trade of other European countries with North Africa has attained a very respectable volume. A good many British and German subjects now find outlets for their energies in employment in French North Africa. There are at

least 150,000 prosperous Spanish colonists in Western Algeria, and an equal number of Italians in East Algeria and Tunis, together with about 80,000 Maltese. Many a delightful health resort has been placed at the disposal of the world's invalids by French enterprise in North Africa, and it might be remarked in passing that life is a good deal cheaper in Algeria and Tunis than it is in France itself. In short, the work of the French nation in North Africa only takes a second rank with that of the British in India. And the civilised world is consequently so much the debtor to France in various ways, direct or indirect, that I for one—knowing North Africa intimately—side with France and against Germany in the recent attempts of the German Government to interfere with French North Africa.

France is far from perfect, however, as a ruler of alien peoples. In such a capacity her government is perhaps to be rated as below that of Germany. It is therefore to be feared that if the Germans by negotiation or by force obtained the foothold which a section of the German nation desires on the coast of Morocco, the French position in North Africa would become seriously compromised. The ten millions of Berbers and the three millions of Arabs in French North Africa do not like the French to any greater extent than the Hindus and Hindis like the British in India. The establishment of a power of the highest rank like Britain or Germany on the coast of North Africa would at once be used as a lever by the indigenes for attacks on France. The temptation would have been great for a German settlement at Agadir or Mogador to supply insurgents with arms, knowing that a very little show of sympathy and support would raise all indigenous North Africa against the French garrisons. Therefrom would have followed a disaster to civilisation and progress even more appalling than that which marked the conquest of the Roman Empire by the Vandal, and which prepared the way for the devastation of the Arab and the Turk.

I consider, therefore, that for many reasons, practical as well as sentimental, France is entitled to receive much support from Great Britain in the maintenance of her position as the only ruling power in North Africa between the Atlantic coast of Morocco and the frontiers of Tripoli. The position of Spain

in Morocco has recently been regularised. This power is admitted to the occupation, and it may be the colonisation of the northern projection of Morocco immediately opposite the Spanish coast. Such a course on the part of France was unavoidable. Spain could never have tolerated the establishment of a first-class Power across the straits of Gibraltar. But the Spaniards are not entitled by anything they have done in the past to any further share of interference in Morocco than just that portion of the north they now hold between the Muluya River on the east and a point twenty miles south of Larash, below the mouth of the Lukkos River, on the west.<sup>1</sup> For strategic reasons, and owing to British objections, Tangier and an area of about fifty square miles round it have been excepted from the Spanish sphere with the idea of this city and its surroundings being ruled internationally—a plan which in practice may not work well, but occasion international quarrels. The last European Power to hold Tangier was England, who voluntarily surrendered it to Moorish keeping. It would almost seem, therefore, that the administration of the Tangier Enclave by Britain would be justifiable in the consideration of past rights and present interests. But in the present mood of the great Powers such a proposal might cause more trouble than it is worth. There was at one time (1903-4) a plan debated for inviting the Portuguese Government to rule this tiny patch of Morocco, for the reason that Portugal was not likely to be an aggressive Power, and that she owned Tangier for something like 200 years before she bestowed it on England as part of the dowry of a Portuguese princess. But subsequent political events in Portugal have not conveyed the requisite assurance of Portuguese administrative ability, and in all probability the control over Tangier will be vested in an international committee.

The work of the French in their pacification of Western Nigeria, their occupation of Timbuktu, their opening of all the Upper Niger to peaceful commerce, their courageous investigation of the Sahara (with the result that while no harmless

<sup>1</sup> To the south of Morocco and the River Draa, Spain is further allotted a large protectorate opposite the Canary Islands and continuous with her colony of the Rio de Oro. Also a small enclave round Ifni, near Agadir.

native power has been disturbed or ousted, and no land taken away from its native holders, a vast region has nevertheless within the last twelve years been laid bare to the investigation of the civilised world), are all additional claims that France possesses for sympathy and a free hand for further developments; amongst which the noblest and most beneficial would be the Trans-Saharan Railway. Starting from either Tangier or Algiers, this line would reach the Niger, Lake Chad, and the Upper Mubangi River, and so connect with the British and Belgian systems and link up Capetown not merely with Cairo, but with Tangier, Spain, Marseilles, Calais, Dover, and London.

Into this enterprise France is willing to throw herself with all her energy, her capital, and her engineering talent, if only she is freed from the menace of Germany on her eastern frontier. By degrees it is probable that Senegal, Guinea, and French Nigeria and Sudan will be as much open to foreign commerce as are the Ivory Coast and Dahomé, with results as profitable and genial to the rest of the world's commerce as to that of France herself. It is to be hoped also that the same liberal-minded policy may gradually supervene in Madagascar. It should be a national reproach to France that her annexation of this island has done so much to injure its commerce with other nations. But in regard to Madagascar itself, the ultimate results of French intervention will be fortunate from an ethical and ethnical point of view. The much-vaunted Hovas were a group of tyrannical, half-barbarous, Mongol-Malay clans, wedded to the principle of slave labour, and pitiless towards the black man. They were at the same time so excessively immoral that their natural increase was checked, and if they had been left undisturbed by any European Power, they would have continued in the position they had held for centuries, just a semi-civilised caste of slave-holders, misusing a magnificent land of great natural endowments and keeping its population always at a low ebb. A good deal of the south-centre and south-west of Madagascar is uninhabited, partly owing to ancient slave raids. On the other hand, the neglect of agriculture in the humid districts has created swamps and jungles which swarm with germ-conveying insects. To be made healthy alike for



white, black, and yellow people, Madagascar requires the intervention of a European Power of the first rank, which, as France is doing, will spare no money, no efforts, no heroism, no martyrs for the new religion—the conquest of Nature—to exploit to the full all the benefits which this great tropical island ought to confer on the human race by the utilisation of its minerals, its forests, the chemical elements in its soil, and its climate.

French Congo must be regarded as a region of Africa destined to become part of the German Empire. It is now almost entirely detached from actual contact with the French Sudan ; but the price for French Congo in the minds of those French statesmen who are able to take long views, is the retrocession of Metz and French Lorraine.

On the other hand, Germany has sought to get possession of French Congo, and a few other things besides, without giving anything in return ; and had France yielded too much in this direction in the crisis of 1911, she could have placed no further barrier in the way of further German encroachment, until at last Britain would have suffered from her yielding. Germany, on the other hand, complains that not merely does France oppose the full satisfaction of German land-hunger in West-central Africa, but she puts many spokes between German wheels in the Near East. As co-partner with Great Britain in the affairs of the Ottoman Bank—the real Treasury of the Turkish Empire—and in other directions, at Smyrna, in Damascus, and Beirut, France refuses to Germany a third place in the direction of Turkish finance. In addition (it is well known, though not admitted), every effort during the past ten years has been put forth on the part of French diplomacy to obstruct German ambitions in the Near East. Repeatedly, France has sought to bring about a Russian interposition in the Balkans : either to prevent the growth of friendship between Serbia and Austria ; or an understanding between Austria, Germany, and Bulgaria ; or any autonomy in Turkish administration which might pave the way for the disappearance of Ottoman power from Europe and the allotment of the Turkish dominions west of the Hellespont to a Balkan confederation too likely to be eventually allied with Austria and Germany.

France has blocked the Baghdad Railway (politically though not financially) wherever and whenever she was able.

All this seems very churlish to the German. Yet as each nation must frame its policy on selfish lines, if it is to exist and prosper, France no doubt has been quite right to avail herself of every weapon near to her hand to secure a reconsideration of the Treaty of Frankfort. All this trouble has arisen from Germany being a little too drastic, a little too greedy, in 1871. Germany took then not only what she was well entitled to—the German-speaking districts of Alsace and eastern Lorraine—but the region west of the little Seille River including Metz, where the speech has been French almost from the time of Charlemagne.\* Metz, it is true, was once an Imperial city, but then France likewise was once a German kingdom. Metz had been a French possession, however, a hundred years before Strassburg, and in this direction the extension of France was justifiable because it followed the range of French speech. This small portion of French Lorraine is quite inconsiderable in area—perhaps at most 450 square miles—but it includes the threatening fortress of Metz, and represents a strategical projection of Germany into France, which is a perpetual menace to French security. Moreover, it assists to bring the Germans too much round the frontier of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

This last-named State, which was allotted to the kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, was somehow drawn into the German Customs Union in 1834; one of those advances on the part of Prussia which prepared the way for the war of 1870. The inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg (which has an area of about 1,000 square miles) speak French in some parts, and in others a low German dialect; but they are probably more French in sympathies than German. They should naturally have formed part of the kingdom of Belgium, since the larger half of the Luxemburg country is one of the Belgian provinces. What certain French statesmen would like to see is the complete *désintéressement* of Germany from the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. In other words, its exclusion from the German Customs Union, and the assertion of its complete neutrality and independence. This surrender of German sentiments and claims would of itself carry with it

(together with the retrocession of Metz) an abandonment of all German ambition to overrun and incorporate Belgium within the future limits of the German Empire. Thus France would become comparatively safe from an overwhelming surprise attack on the part of Germany, and could turn her thoughts and ambitions southwards across the Mediterranean to the full development of French Africa. Such a settlement should surely be worth much to France; not merely carrying with it the surrender of French Congo, but the recognition that Germany has strong claims to a predominant partnership in the administration of the Turkish Empire.

What should be the British attitude in these matters? So great would be the gain to Great Britain in the assurance that Belgium was safe from a German attack and outside the scope of Pan-Germanist ambitions, that we on our part might do much to facilitate arrangements between Germany and France in regard to the Nearer East and offer no objection whatever (being entitled to make none) in regard to the fate of French Congo. We might even, here and there (as in the matter of Walfisch Bay), ourselves assist to ease German colonial difficulties. In regard to Belgium, its independence and inviolability constitute one of the few justifiable causes in defence of which Britain would be compelled to wage war. A German occupation of Belgium would be followed by the German acquisition of Picardy and a deliberate attempt to push Britain on one side. Successful in this, the Germans could conquer us at leisure or, at any rate, ruin the position of our country as an Imperial Power. Any further German interference with Luxemburg would be so obviously actuated by the desire to injure France and facilitate the entry into Belgium, that it likewise would have to be resisted as an attack almost on our own frontier. Naturally, likewise, it would be a national necessity to assist France with all our strength if she were attacked by Germany without a cause.

But the fate of Alsace and German Lorraine is no business of ours, and we could not make it too clear to France that we would never pledge our support to any war of aggression against Germany for the recovery of those provinces. These regions east of the Seille River and the Vosges are German-speaking,

and their population is composed of much the same ethnic elements as those of the Rhenish provinces and Southern Germany. The Alsatians may dislike the Prussians, and with good reason, just as the Iberian-Irish detest the Anglo-Saxons, and the Welsh the English. But these are matters entirely of internal arrangement. France as a Latin nation went too far when she strove to incorporate large slices of Teutonic Germany, though she was perfectly justified in taking French-speaking Savoy, and has a strong claim to the leading voice in the fate of Belgium, because nearly half the Belgian area is occupied by the Walloons, a vigorous French-speaking people.

However much we might desire to see France satisfied as regards Metz,\* we must not follow at her heels if she incited Russia to attack Germany or Austria for the furthering of French projects. So entirely bent are the French on their own interests—and, as I began this chapter by saying, so selfish—that we actually find at the time this chapter is being written, a leading French diplomatist who has taken a great share in philanthropic congresses, writing a wild letter of reproach to the King of Montenegro (because the latter has very naturally gone to war to put an end to Turkish misrule), for no other reason than that any attempt at the present time on the part of the Balkan States to bring the intolerable conditions of human life in Macedonia to a close happens to be inconvenient to French politicians and French financiers.

In the final settlement of the affairs of the Near East which must inevitably follow the results of the Balkanic War, France has considerable claims—linguistic and historical, besides those connected with railway construction—to a protectorate over Syria between Damascus and Hamah, without prejudice to the Jewish State which will some day be founded in the Holy Land. But there is no other direction in which French business, commerce, or past sacrifices entitle France to a further share in the derelict Turkish Empire. Just as Britain has Egypt and Cyprus as her portion in what was once the Eastern Empire of Rome, so France secured long ago Algeria and Tunis. A French Protectorate over Syria and a coaling station at Beirut would sufficiently meet the legitimate requirements of France in the Levant.

When the final settlement of the Eastern Question averts Armageddon and brings Europe a step nearer to Confederation, it might be expected that France would give two proofs of her friendly understanding with the British Empire. Firstly, she might see that her possession of Northern Somaliland is not made the route by which very considerable numbers of modern rifles and millions of cartridges to fit them are imported into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan or into a possibly hostile Abyssinia. Jibuti and the Adis Ababa and Harrar railway might thus become the source of infinite trouble to Great Britain in her endeavours to maintain peace throughout the eastern half of the Sudan. There is a sufficiency of Muhammadan recalcitrancy and a yearning amongst the predatory tribes to re-establish slavery, which could be easily provoked into a dangerous revolt under Abyssinian intrigue and the introduction of French fire-arms. Secondly, France might no longer stand in the way of an effective British control over the Arabian principality of Oman on the Persian Gulf. The present French treaty right to support the independence of the Sultan of Maskat is undeniable; but its enforcement during the last three or four years has given a renewed impetus to that 'gun-running' which is providing the always inimical Muhammadans of Afghanistan with the means of raising perpetual border revolts against British rule in North-west India. Just as, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the French flag too often covered an unblushing slave traffic between Zanzibar, Madagascar, and the Persian Gulf, so, it is too often Arab and Indian sailing vessels (protected from search by hoisting the French ensign) which carry rifles and ammunition from Jibuti in French Somaliland to Maskat, or from Maskat to the coast of Persian Baluchistan. We need not affect to be very shocked at this enormity, this treachery between white nations; for the other purveyors of rifles to Afghanistan are probably English firms; and down to quite recently English and German tramp steamers conveyed to the coast of Morocco the rifles with which the Moors fought against the French and Spaniards. The Hovas of Madagascar would not have offered so prolonged a resistance to French intervention had it not been for the guns, ammunition, and military adventurers supplied to them from England. But

it is time that the nations of Europe made common cause against barbarism and ceased to secure sneaking profits out of each other's difficulties.

One point we must not overlook in our calculated friendships, and that is the renewed vigour of France. The German writers who treat of France as though she were a decayed Power, only saved from annihilation by Germany through the defensive alliance with Russia and Britain, are deceiving themselves and their readers. There is much to criticise in modern France. Paris unhappily attracts most of the insane anarchists of Europe and breeds a horrible type of blood-spilling ruffian of her own (just as the English cities and suburbs and those of Germany and the United States have their own specialities in fouler crimes). But an impartial and observant traveller studying France at the present day sees a greater vigour amongst her people than there was twenty and thirty years ago, an eagerness for work and wholesomeness in life, less interest in pornography and sexual prowess; and a courage in dangerous adventures—such as aviation and African wars—which augurs favourably for the future achievements of France if she becomes once more a nation under arms. There are no signs of physical degeneration about the French people of to-day. They are healthier and of better physique than they were in 1880. The one ominous feature in their statistics, which makes us hesitate to predict their future position as a world-power, is their very slow rate of birth-increase. Were it not for the steady immigration into the attractive land of France of Belgians, Germans, Swiss, Italians, and Catalans, the French population would be decreasing instead of slowly increasing. Nevertheless, there are now nearly 40,000,000 French or Frenchified people in France and another 300,000 of French birth or descent in North Africa. And at present these 40,300,000 citizens of France and North Africa carry on a trade (some £735,000,000 in value per annum) only third in succession to that of Great Britain (£1,357,500,000 in 1911), and next in succession to the annual trade-value of Germany (£882,000,000). The accumulated wealth of cash in France is enormous, perhaps higher than that of Great Britain. Amongst other factors of strength in this inventory of French resources must certainly be included

her African army of 50,000 'actives,' and the same number of reserves—a force which in a war with a rival Colonial Power would play a considerable part in Africa, even if it were not suitable for employment in Europe. The bravery and devotion of this African army are surely some testimony to great qualities in the typical French officer. The French fleet is just as likely to do well in the Mediterranean as the Italian or the Austrian. France, altogether, is in a far sounder position in 1912 than in 1870, even though she has a national debt of £1,301,000,000, and an annual debt-charge on her resources of £51,000,000. She is not, and perhaps never may be—even with Metz restored to her—in a position to attack Germany, in the first instance, with an assurance of victory or with sufficient population to take advantage of the fruits of victory; but she is certainly able to resist German aggression to a degree which may well cause that Power to hesitate to provoke a war. The Italian alliance with Germany and Austria will not outlive the final settlement of Eastern affairs. It has again been renewed, owing to the tactical mistake of France, seeming, in the autumn of 1912, to back up a Russian interference under Servian guise in the Balkan Peninsula. But when France withdraws from the useless and unprofitable Russian Alliance, Italy and Spain will gravitate towards her instead; and a Latin Confederation, which may not impossibly secure the adhesion of Britain, Portugal, and Greece, will be a quite sufficient makeweight against that Central European Alliance of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Balkan kingdoms, and Turkey, which will probably be the great political achievement of the twentieth century.

### III

#### BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

ENGLAND and the south-east of Scotland constitute the oldest, the most successful, and the most complete of German colonies beyond the limits of Germany. The Teutonising of England and Scotland has been more thorough than the Germanisation of France. Indeed, a good deal of England is more completely Teutonic than many parts of Germany, both in race and in language (considering as 'Teutons' the Gothic 'long-heads,' rather than the Finnish 'short-heads,' now prevailing in Germany).

The Teutonic people of Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Bohemia, and Austria at the present day are divided into two main sections in regard to language: Low Dutch and High Dutch. The first division covers the dialects of the northern and western plains; and the second, those of central Germany, the upper Rhine Valley, and the hilly or mountainous regions of the south and east. Sister languages of the German mother-speech, two thousand years ago, were the Gothic and the Scandinavian. Anglo-Saxon, the parent of English, though belonging to the Low Dutch group, has considerable affinities with the ancient Gothic speech, some of which are not so obvious in or have been lost by High German. The British peoples have also received other elements of Gothic blood and Gothic speech through the strong Scandinavian intermixture represented by the Norse and Danish invasions of Scotland and England. Linguistically and racially, the nearest allies of the English and Lowland Scots are first of all the Frisians of western Germany and northern Holland; secondly, the Platt-deutsch folk of Schleswig-Holstein; and thirdly, the Dutch and Flemings, who are directly descended from the Franks.

Anglo-Saxon—that is to say, German—England, and Lowland Scotland, were conquered and pervaded by the Norman



French, in the middle of the eleventh century. A French-Latin impress was given to the manners and customs and speech of Great Britain at that time, which became greatly strengthened under the early kings of the Angevin-Plantagenet dynasty, so that French and Latin were the official tongues of England down to about the fifteenth century. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, owing to the change of religion and the development of the English merchant service and foreign trade, a renewal of German influence set in, coming from the Rhenish provinces and from Holland. This has scarcely ceased, for at the beginning of the eighteenth century it was merged into the strong Germanisation which followed the accession of the House of Hanover to the British throne—an influence which still continues to mould the British people.

Germany has given us the best dynasty of kings our history has known since the time of Anglo-Saxon, German-speaking Alfred. Our standing army under George I. was mainly composed of German soldiers. There was a considerable immigration of clever Germans into England during the eighteenth century, which has contributed several noteworthy names to British history, besides those that were associated with the German troops employed by William III. (together with Dutch and Danish) to effect the conquest of Ireland from the Stuarts. Even before the accession of George I. it had become customary in our continental wars (dating from the victories of Marlborough) to employ German contingents on foreign service, and it was German regiments under a Prince of Hesse which captured Gibraltar for the British in 1704.

German soldiers were employed by us in our American War of 1775–83. Their introduction was the commencement of the wonderful Germanisation of the United States, which is a telling force in world-politics to-day. We sent large numbers of time-expired German soldiers (very often with English wives) to colonise South Africa and Australia. Germans also played a prominent part, in common with Scotchmen, in the great explorations and pioneering work of Canada. The renewed German colonisation of England, and the influence of remarkable Germans imported into our civil service and many branches of our industries during the splendid nineteenth

century, are so well known that the names of the German immigrants and the results of their work need not be recapitulated here. In fact, it would almost seem in history that the divided, harried, disheartened Germany of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries, found through English channels the outlet for her energies, industry, and talents which was denied to her by the religious wars, the French invasions, and the utter misrule of the House of Austria.

Of all the continental nations, there is no one so near to us in blood, in mental and physical characteristics, in faults and virtues, as Holland and Germany. Denmark and Norway come next. Yet the sea divides us, and we have our own Iberian and French elements,<sup>1</sup> we have developed our own idiosyncrasies; we are, in fact, mainly 'English.' And clearly as we may recognise our affinity with the people of Holland and northern Belgium, with the Frieslanders, the Angles and the Saxons of Schleswig and Holstein, we may not feel similarly drawn towards the Prussian element of Eastern Germany; nor are we always, in the mass, quite of one mind with Catholic Germany of the Rhine provinces and Bavaria. In fact, to put it bluntly, much as we respect Germany, and fully as we ought to admit our kinship and our indebtedness, we wish to remain British, independent, original, and detached. Consequently, there are very few English men and women, or even Irish and Scottish, who would not fight to the death to ward off a German conquest, a Germanisation imposed on us by force; or who would not similarly resist any attempt on the part of the German Empire to make us a subsidiary Power instead of a friend and fellow-worker in the main cause of humanity. That being so, we should, with deep regret, become actively hostile if Germany attacked the independence of Holland; though if Holland of her own free will entered the Germanic Confederation we could hardly intervene. But we should prepare ourselves most resolutely to fight Germany were she to invade Belgium or even Luxemburg, because we

<sup>1</sup> Ireland and Wales are nearly as Teutonic as England and Scotland owing to their repeated colonisation by Caledonians, Norsemen, Danes, Anglo-Saxons, and Flemings. But the physical type of British Teuton is the long-headed Goth in Scandinavia.

should realise that if success attended those achievements there would follow inevitably a German occupation of north-east France, with the results touched on in the last chapter. It is for this reason that the understanding has arisen with France, and will be supported by the vast majority of voters in the United Kingdom so long as it is not warped into unprovoked aggression on Germany to subserve Russian ambitions or the purely financial interests of France.

But with the main cause of civilisation in view—the conquest of the Earth by science and the struggle to bring about universal happiness for man—it is deeply to be regretted that there should be any conflict of interests between Britain and Germany, any expensive duel in armatures. Why should the foreign policy of the British Empire clash with that of Germany?

This problem has been so frequently and fully discussed of late by the author of this book, in common with many other writers,<sup>1</sup> that there shall be no undue repetition of arguments in these pages. The chief causes of Anglo-German suspicions and rivalries in armaments are due to the German longing for political and colonial expansion, and we have only to consider how far the outward growth of Germany might be assisted, or, at any rate, not opposed by Great Britain in return for a cessation of menaced attacks on the independence of the Netherlands and of France, and consequently of the British Islands.

The German people, as a whole, are resolved upon colonial expansion for two reasons. The first is, that their country is far from producing naturally the bulk of the raw products required for their industries, and they desire to assure to themselves for the future a special control over, or access to, undeveloped regions in Asia, Africa, and America, where these raw products can be obtained or where they can be cultivated; secondly, they require to be certain in these days of the growth of empires that a sufficient proportion of the earth's habitable area will remain free and open for the sale of German manufactured goods or industrial products.

<sup>1</sup> The most interesting of recent works is that by Dr. Saroléa of Edinburgh, *The Anglo-German Problem* (Nelson). The present writer's personal views on Germany and the Germans differ somewhat from those of Dr. Saroléa and are given in his book, *Views and Reviews* (Williams & Norgate).

They have realised with quickness and clarity since the unification of Germany in 1871 and the immense industrial development that followed, that they have been somewhat late in entering for the 'Colonies competition.' Indeed, in the eighties of the last century they came perilously near getting nothing at all in the scramble for colonisable Africa, Asia, and Polynesia. Already the shadow of the Monroe Doctrine had been cast over the New World. The United States had made the French position in Mexico untenable, and had intimated very clearly to Great Britain that there must be no absorption of Venezuela. Germany was not then, is not now, may never be in a position to challenge a duel with the United States with the object of hoisting the German flag on some island or in some State of Tropical America. But the protection mania of the United States has perhaps reached its acme, and fairer conditions of international trade will gradually enter into the psychology of American politics. At any rate, any further attempt on the part of the United States to arrogate to itself a privileged position in the commerce of Central and, still more, South America, similar to the fiscal policy it has imposed on Cuba, would be resisted so emphatically by a European and Japanese alliance that the United States would be defeated. Consequently, Germany should feel tolerably secure as regards the safety of her markets in Central America, Haiti, Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil : in all of which countries she is doing remarkably well, especially so in Guatemala and in northern South America.

But in regard to Africa, she wishes to assure for herself access to areas sufficiently large and properly suited for the cultivation of cotton, india-rubber, palm-oil, cocoa, coffee, cane-sugar, bananas, maize, tobacco, and other growths of warm or tropical lands ; or to metalliferous mountain regions from whence she can obtain copper, tin, diamonds, gold, and possibly precious stones, coal, and petroleum. So far she has secured about 33,700 square miles in western Dahomé—Togoland—the northward extension of which brings her to the parklands of the northern Gold Coast. Here is a region whence she can obtain quantities of palm-oil, ground-nuts, cotton, cocoa, coffee, hides, and cattle. Then she has the Kamerun (292,000 square

miles), in the coast region of which she can, or she should if she managed matters better, obtain all the cocoa she wants and grow all the coffee needed for the coffee-drinking German Empire. This region is particularly well suited to coffee-cultivation, and contains in its forests several species of indigenous coffee-tree. In the Kamerun also there are probabilities of rich mineral deposits in the far hinterland, while the south and the coast belt are not only rich in wild rubber, but eminently suited for the cultivation of the best types of American rubber-tree. The Kamerun, in fact, is one of the richest parts of Tropical Africa, and is not so much afflicted as the Congo Basin with germ-diseases—at any rate, at the present time. Through the recent extensions of the Kamerun to the east, Germany has become a Congo Power.

In East Africa she has a colony 384,200 square miles in extent which reaches from the shores of the Indian Ocean to Lakes Victoria, Tanganyika, and Nyasa. This is a region afflicted with germ-diseases so far as livestock is concerned, but offering, in all, an area of about 30,000 or 40,000 square miles well suited to white colonisation because of its altitude above sea-level and its genial climate. German East Africa is somewhat of an unknown quantity, but it may prove on close examination to possess great stores of petroleum and even a certain amount of coal. The same stories of diamonds having been discovered here, but there is little or no indication of precious metals. Yet almost the entire superficies of this vast area is well adapted to cotton-cultivation. With East Africa in hand (populated by over 10,000,000 of vigorous negroes), Germany has no right to say that she is unprovided with cotton-growing areas to feed her textile industries in their uttermost development. Here also she could grow immense quantities of foodstuffs (maize, oranges, pineapples, bananas, coco-nuts—an article of ever-appreciating value—coffee, tea, sugar, rice, and tobacco). The indigenous population is neither too sparse for the country to be without an efficient labour-force, nor too abundant and wide-spread to preclude the planting of numerous settlements of white people.

In South-west Africa, Germany has a colony of 322,450 square miles, which pushes a somewhat tiresome finger towards

the Zambezi, just touching that river in the south of Barotse-land. But the greatest concern at present of the Germans in South-west Africa is that the long coastline is only provided with one naturally good harbour, and that is Walfisch Bay, which belongs to British South Africa. At the time of our forcible-feeble objections to the creation of a German protectorate in this region (when British diplomacy, colonial and imperial, was at its worst), we somewhat spitefully retained Walfisch Bay, believing that without it Germany could do nothing, and would eventually have to abandon the enterprise. Events showed, however, that the Germans were far more enterprising and tenacious than the stupid Lord Derby and the much too *volage* Lord Granville, had assumed. They have succeeded in developing South-west Africa without the use of Walfisch Bay; yet with added difficulty. Like many other problems, it is simply a matter of spending money. By laying out two or three millions of pounds Germany could create quite a good harbour at Swakopmund, a little to the north of Walfisch Bay; and if Walfisch Bay is denied to her much longer, that is what she will do. But she will never give up control over 322,000 square miles in German South-west Africa because the British flag still flies at Walfisch Bay. On the other hand, so far as the British have any memory in diplomacy, they are angry at the existence of the German finger stretching out from the north-east corner of Damaraland and touching the Zambezi. This long narrow strip—in places only a few miles wide—separates British South Africa from Portuguese Southern Angola, which is being so much developed now by British capital and enterprise in conjunction with the Portuguese. Here, it would seem to me, exist the elements of a reconciliation. Let us cede to Germany Walfisch Bay, and let her withdraw from direct access to the Upper Zambezi. Her boundary might extend north-eastwards to the Okavango and even to the Teoge or Moremi string of lakes—might, in fact, in this direction be a little enlarged by us over the Ongova country; but not pass beyond to the region between the Teoge-Okavango, the Kwando, and the Zambezi. Access to the Zambezi at Sesheke is no use to the Germans, because the river is unnavigable both above and

below. The waterway of the Zambezi is international, and consequently quite sufficiently open to unfettered German trade.

Writers in the German Press, who review the chances of an understanding with Britain, call on us to surrender not merely Walfisch Bay, but the Island of Zanzibar and even Rhodesia ! The last-named proposition may be dismissed at once as an impossibility from every point of view, unless, of course, the British Empire were humbled in the dust. Even if Downing Street lent itself to such an idea (which it would never do) British South Africa would refuse to agree and would quite easily dare the Germans to come and take possession. The cession of Zanzibar raises very great difficulties—amongst other things, an acute point of honour. Great Britain in her Indian Ocean policy has been closely associated with Zanzibar for nearly a hundred years, and has on several occasions had to express gratitude for the friendship and virtual alliance of the Zanzibar Arabs. It is doubtful whether these influential settlers in Zanzibar and Pemba would agree willingly to a transference to German rule. They might do so perhaps twenty years hence, when Germany has shown how considerately and wisely she can govern Arabs in German East Africa, where already she is creating a good impression. But there also remain questions of strategy, of ocean cables, which make the yielding up of Zanzibar a very great sacrifice on our part—one which would have perhaps to be more dearly purchased by the Germans than the acquisition of the island would be worth to them. We have dealt very considerately with the Zanzibar question. Zanzibar Town is a free port, and there are no fortifications on the island which menace the opposite German coast. It would be an unwarrantable act of aggression on our part if there were. Although I admit the British protectorate over Zanzibar, and the immense amount of British influence that radiates from that island, are irksome features in the development of German East Africa, yet the transference of Zanzibar is a matter of great delicacy, and its retention of very great importance to British interests on the coasts of the Indian Ocean. Besides, our position there was purchased very handsomely by the cession of Heligoland.

In what other directions could Germany aspire to extend

her boundaries in Africa without undue injury to Great Britain? In French Congo, in Spanish Guinea, and over two portions of Portuguese Africa, and perhaps in the Belgian Congo likewise. The matter of French Congo has been already discussed in the previous chapter and is one which concerns France. It only affects us to the extent that if Germany were to use threats of war to compel France to surrender without any compensation the whole remainder of French Congo, we should naturally be obliged to come to the assistance of France; but if Germany and France chose to make a bargain between themselves for the disposal of that portion of French Africa, its acquisition by Germany is no concern of ours. Similarly, if Germany chose to obtain from Portugal by purchase and without compulsion the little territory of Kabinda, Portuguese Congoland—that is to say, the coast region north of the Loje or Ambriz River and of the eighth parallel of south latitude—and the northern or ‘Nyassa’ part of Portuguese East Africa, we have no occasion to interfere. So far as Great Britain is concerned, she is, I imagine, more or less bound by the Secret Agreement of 1898 with regard to the disposal of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. It is generally assumed that the text of that Agreement provided that *if* Portugal desired to dispose of her colonies the British should have the refusal of Portuguese Zambezia and of the region between the Zambezi and Delagoa Bay, ~~perhaps~~ perhaps, with some part of Southern Angola; while the Germans were to be allowed to purchase the remainder—and more especially the region of Mozambique proper—between the mouth of the Zambezi on the south and the River Ruvuma on the north.

But Portugal manifests no desire whatever to part with *any* portion of her colonial dominion, and it is reported that at the beginning of the present century she renewed her alliance with Great Britain and secured from the latter nation the promise of assistance and support if any third Power should attempt to seize or occupy the Portuguese colonial dominions against the wish of the Portuguese Government. Consequently, Britain is quite unable to bargain for an Anglo-German understanding with any part of Portuguese Asia or Africa. At the same time, as I have pointed out in recent articles and reviews,



the Portuguese have probably got more territory in Africa than they can develop for a century or more to come, with the resources at their disposal. Most of all, they badly need money for the colonisation and development of Portugal itself—a country which so far as soil, climate, and products are concerned, ought to support a population not of five—but of fifteen—millions, were it sufficiently opened up by railways. No real harm to Portuguese trading interests in Africa would be wrought by the sale to Germany of Portuguese Congo north of the limits already mentioned, or of the region lying between Lake Nyasa, the Ruvuma, and the Mtepwesi River.

As regards the Belgian Congo. Each year that goes by apparently increases the hold of the Belgians over this region and their capability as administrators of a great tropical possession. But the commercial expansion of Antwerp and the interests of Belgium generally would probably not suffer to any extent if in the future portions of the Congo State were sold either to Germany or to Great Britain; for instance, the region between the Kwango and the Kasai south of the sixth degree of south latitude (to Germany), and the Katanga country to Britain (British South Africa). For the rest, it is much more to the interests of Great Britain and France that Germany should not absorb all the Belgian Congo, though that is a matter of far less importance than any direct attack by Germany on Belgium itself. If the Belgian Colonial administration goes bankrupt and the country wishes voluntarily to dispose of its African possession, some scheme of division between Britain, France, and Germany, would have to be devised by which the main course of the Lualaba-Congo, as far as its confluence with the Mubangi, would be the German frontier on the east; while northern Congoland would go to France, and north-eastern and eastern Congoland to Great Britain.

It is here again that the interests of British South Africa come into play. British South Africa, some day, is going to be as important a factor in the politics of Africa as the United States are in the politics of America. Its growth is inevitable. Nothing can stop it, not even Great Britain herself. British South Africa intends to have its railway communication with the north unhampered by a German extension right across the

Continent. So long as the bulk of the Congo Basin remains Belgian, the Cape-to-Cairo route can pass along Belgian lines between Katanga and the French or British boundaries in the Sudan. From some point like Zemio on the Mbomu River will branch three great lines of rail. One will proceed southwards through eastern Congoland to Rhodesia and the Cape of Good Hope; another will pass north-eastwards across the Bahr-al-Ghazal to Kordofan, which is already linked up with Cairo and Alexandria; while the third stretching northwards and north-westwards, will cross the Central Sudan and the Sahara not merely to Algiers, but what is much more important, to Tangier. Consequently, the railway routes from Cape Colony to the Mediterranean will pass mainly over British, Belgian, and French territory. Subject to this safeguard there should be no British jealousy whatever about a great development of German interests over at least half the Congo Basin: that half which is enclosed within the immense loop of the main Congo itself.

German greed in this direction might be delayed or even dissipated altogether if and when Belgium adopts a policy of absolute free trade throughout the whole of her Congo dominion. If German commerce—especially from a basis in Portuguese Congo—has a fair field throughout the Belgian dominions, the German Empire may hesitate to go to the ~~expense of the regions~~ diplomatic trouble incurred by bringing the greater part of Belgian Congo under the German flag. Likewise, if the Portuguese are wise, abolish differential duties, and throw open their African colonies without restriction to the trade of all nations, Germany may be as contented with their present political status as she is with that of Guatemala or Brazil.

As to Spanish Guinea and Fernando Pô, these districts are so small in area that they are not worth much discussion. Their acquisition by Germany is a matter that in no way concerns Great Britain. France has surrendered any claims that she held at one time of pre-emption, and if Spain chooses to sell them she will do so. If she prefers to keep them, they will remain Spanish.

But a word might be addressed at this juncture to the pan-Germanists, to the eager Protestant clergymen or doctors

of philosophy or science, who propose the cession of Rhodesia to Germany or the forcible ousting of the Portuguese from Nyasaland: what use is Germany making of her African colonies at the present day? The total area of German East Africa is 884,200 square miles, of which perhaps 20,000 square miles, at the most generous estimate, is now under organised cultivation with cotton, coffee, rubber, or other exportable products. There are many parts of German East Africa which have never been examined, even superficially, as to their minerals, soil, and other resources. Even where indications of minerals have been discovered, nothing as yet has been done to turn this knowledge to account. The same remarks may apply in varying degrees to German South-west Africa, a region of immense extent, of which very little is really known, while that little points to a possibility of great wealth in mineral and metallic substances and to the existence of considerable stretches of land which might be populated by prosperous white German inhabitants, and which have been shown to be well adapted to sheep rearing. I have already referred to the potential value of the Kamerun. It has sufficient natural resources to occupy a great colonising Power for at least half a century. When we think of what the French made out of Haiti (10,000 to 11,000 square miles) during the eighteenth century, what might not Germany obtain from ~~Kamerun~~ Kamerun, which has a superficies of 292,000 square miles? Germany's eyes are larger than her stomach. Apart from her possessions in Africa, she has 96,160 square miles in Australasia and a large concession (over 200 square miles) in China. Let even her existing over-seas empire—in all 1,129,000 square miles—be developed and utilised with that thoroughness so characteristic of her people, and she will be in point of produce and industry a very wealthy colonial Power.

Yet this prospect does not content her. She points to Great Britain, with a white population in her Empire of only 59,000,000, to France with perhaps 40,300,000 of white Frenchmen, and asks why she herself, with 66,000,000 of a fast-increasing population, should not have a colonial Empire as extensive as that of France and not too inferior as compared with the area controlled by 59,000,000 to 60,000,000 British. Africa offers her rich plantation colonies—regions to which she

can send her manufactures, and from which she can obtain her raw products—but does not provide any one large space for the creation of a German people beyond the seas. The Germans who settle in England; the Germans who go to North America, Brazil, Argentine, and Chile, cease to be German subjects either in themselves or by their descendants. They become in course of time foreigners—and foreigners extraordinarily patriotic towards the Flag of their adopted country. Every year Germany sends further colonists to France, who frequently pose as Alsatians or Swiss, but who permeate France to the very Pyrenees, and become in course of time amongst the most valuable of French citizens. There are 60,000 Germans in Zurich, and perhaps in Switzerland generally, over 100,000. 'You may well be content,' is the German cry addressed to Great Britain, 'for *you* have occupied or ear-marked such an enormous proportion of the earth's surface that you do not need to talk of extension for three centuries to come! *We* may have provided sufficient elbow-room for the next twenty years, but that is not sufficient. Instinctively, we must fight for the future or our memories will be reproached by our children and our children's children.'

This may be called 'sentimental nonsense,' because it is uttered by Germans and not by Englishmen. But we are the last of the Powers who should laugh at such a saying. Moreover, the Germans, after all, are only expressing the Divine afflatus, the determination of the best type of white man to dominate the world. Germany is hatefully cramped within her present boundaries. The Baltic Sea, ice-obstructed for five months in every year, is of little help to her commerce. On the North Sea she has practically only three good ports, Cuxhaven, Wilhelmshaven, and Bremerhaven. She is forbidden to approach nearer in that direction towards the Channel or the Atlantic by the power of Great Britain. Such a prohibition is not insuperable, but to break it down might well ruin Germany financially, so that she would be too exhausted to make use of her victory when it was obtained. In what direction can she find a sea outlet adequate to her desires, which shall not (at any rate, should not) involve her in a European struggle of the first magnitude? She can only do this through

the goodwill of Austria *by the acquisition of Trieste*. Austria to be induced to cede Trieste must receive compensation elsewhere, the more so as Italy would probably have to be won over to good-humour and compliance by obtaining at the same time the district of Triente<sup>1</sup> south of the Noce and Cembra Rivers. That compensation can only lie in an eastward direction, in the Austrian Empire becoming more and more a great confederation of Southern Slavonic States in close alliance with Germany and Hungary.

Whatever may be the results of the Balkan War and the negotiations now in progress, there is a very intelligible ambition on the part of Austria to secure the port of Salonika and a continuous strip for a railway along the valley of the Mitrovitza, even if in this long lane to the Nearer East she separates the Southern Slav States of Montenegro and Servia from contact and fusion. In short, the satisfaction of Austrian ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula might lead to the satisfaction of German ambitions with regard to an outlet on the Mediterranean. This in its turn would enormously relieve the German pressure on Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France, and pave the way for a complete understanding in future between Germany and France, and relieve the anxieties of Great Britain as to Germany's intention of becoming an ~~Atlantic power~~. Austrian predominance as a kind of suzerain over the Balkan States to the north of Greece, would indirectly benefit German trade, which is ever more closely becoming one with the trade of Austria. The Turkish Sultānate would possibly not come to an end, but would henceforth, within certain limits, be directed and dominated by German councils. Germany, in fact, would become the power with the principal 'say' as to the good government and economic development of Asia Minor. Syria might be constituted as a separate State under French protection, and Judæa be offered to the Jews under an international guarantee—to become, in fact, an Eastern Belgium. Sinai and Egypt would pass under avowed British protection, and Arabia (except the southern portion, which

<sup>1</sup> In return for this acquisition of the Italian-speaking portion of the Tirol—part of *Italia irredenta*—Italy might well part with the small eastern projection of Udine, east of Cividale, which somewhat blocks the German road to Trieste.

already lies within the British sphere of influence) be regarded as a federation of independent Arab States. For the rest, Turkey in Asia—less Armenia, which might be handed over to Russia—would, in fact, become to Germany what Egypt is to England—a kingdom to be educated, regenerated, and perhaps transfused and transformed by the renewed percolation of the Aryan Caucasian. Here would be a splendid outlet for the energies of both Germany and Austria, sufficient to keep them contented, busy, prosperous, and happy, for at least a century ahead.

Who is going to object to such a settlement? Surely not Britain? The main opponent will be Russia; but some difficulty in the eventual settlement of the affairs of Austria and of Germany is anticipated from the Magyar rulers of Hungary.

The Magyars, much as they are liked by the English; and much as they have done to deserve that liking, are an incongruity in Central Europe. They are a people mainly of European stock, but with an Asiatic impress, who speak a tiresome and intrusive Asiatic language, with no literature worth mentioning anterior to 1870. They are from 9,000,000 to 10,000,000 in number, and attempt to impose their rule, their language, and their form of religion on over 8,000,000 Rumanians, 3,000,000 Germans, and 2,500,000 Slavonians (Serbs and Croats). When German Austria was weak, in 1867, they once more exacted from her an explicit recognition of Magyar control over Slavonic Croatia, which brings down the Magyar rule to the Adriatic at Fiume and along the Canale della Montagna, thus imposing a stretch of Hungarian territory, more or less controlled by the Parliament of Buda-Pest, across the Austro-German railway route to the Ægean Sea. The Magyars also share with Austria the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is clear that if German Austria is to help Germany to a Mediterranean access, and in compensation therefor is to play a great part in the direction of Balkan affairs, she must assume control over Croatia and undertake the sole management of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, she should, in that and other directions, attempt to become the focus of a great confederation of Southern Slav States, to the

east of which Hungary will be a practically independent country, with the ambition of acquiring a Black Sea outlet through Bessarabia. Will the Hungarians lend themselves to such a development, and make some other sacrifices to receive perhaps in exchange the Bukowina and—if war comes about with Russia—the assistance of Austria and Rumania in obtaining a loop of territory down to the mouth of the Dniester? Yet what is the alternative if they refuse, and if the refusal gradually brings against them a league of the German, the Southern Slav, and the Rumanian? Help from Russia will probably be attended by sardonic results. Hungary would act most wisely for herself in coming into line with the general scheme of a great Central Europe confederation in which Austria and Germany would be partners, together with Poland, Bohemia, Servia, Montenegro, Albania, Bulgaria, and Thrace. Under such a scheme Hungary might have its own separate king and be allowed to continue the Magyarisation of Western Transylvania; perhaps also have Bessarabia added to her territories, if Russia forces war on the Austro-German alliance as the alternative to the abandonment of all Near East ambitions.

The eventual inclusion of a revived kingdom of Poland within such a Central European federation may seem too ~~posterous~~ an idea. Yet it is not original: it was being discussed at the time this book was commenced, both in the Austrian Press and in French reviews. Russian Poland is Roman Catholic in religion, almost entirely, and consequently has far more affinity of sentiment with Roman Catholic Germany and Austria, than with persecuting, Greek Church Russia. Yet although the Polish-speaking parts—more than two-thirds—of Austrian-Poland are Roman Catholic, the eastern, Ruthenian portion is Greek Church in religion and Russian in language affinities and political affections.

A great step might be taken towards the eventual pacification and federation of Christian Europe if the western frontiers of Russia could be rearranged in the way described below (and further discussed more in detail in the chapter dealing with Russian affairs). So far as the interests of Austria-Germany are concerned, and those of Central Europe, the ideal

to be striven for by peaceful negotiation or as the result of unavoidable war, would be the severance from Russia of all the western projection of Poland. Russia would retain the northernmost Suwalki, province of Poland with the tacit sanction of Europe for its complete Russification. But all the rest of Poland proper would be constituted once more an independent kingdom, in alliance with Austria and Germany. Austria would dower it with Galitsia, but as some compensation to Russia, would cede to the latter Power the Ruthenian-speaking districts east of Lemberg, and as far south as the Dniester. On the other hand, the province of Bessarabia, conquered by Russia in 1812 and populated mainly by Rumanians, Bulgarians, and Tartars, would be ceded to Hungary. To this acquisition of the Magyars might be added the northernmost prolongation of Moldavia (north of Botoshani), and the little province of Bukowina; thus the south-eastern frontier of Russia thenceforth would be what it was prior too 1812, the River Dniester.<sup>1</sup>

In return for the cession to Hungary of a very small portion of Moldavia and of the complete abrogation of her sentimental claims over Bessarabia, Rumania would receive from Hungary those portions of Transylvania which are populated mainly by Rumanians—to wit, the departments of Chik, Haromsek, Udvarheli, and Fogaras.

As regards the readjustment of Balkan affairs when, in the inevitable march of events, there is no longer any Muhammadan rule west of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, in all probability Bulgaria will have acquired an indefeasible right to Thrace—possibly, even to Constantinople itself. If she can rule at the revived Byzantium and at Gallipoli, and can obtain the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, Thasos, and Samothrace, she may be willing to make her western frontier the River Struma or Kara Su, from the upper waters of this stream (ceding a small district round Kustendil to Servia) down to the Ægean coast at Orfano. To Servia she might also cede the town of Widdin, and its surrounding district of Servian-speaking people. To Rumania, she might grant a small southern extension of the

<sup>1</sup> The south-western portion of Bessarabia was only annexed by Russia in 1878, being taken then from Rumania.



Dobrudja—probably, a line drawn from Turtokai on the Danube to Ekrene on the Black Sea. These would be comparatively trifling losses of territory in comparison to the gain of the whole Adrianople province and the proud possession of Constantinople, destined some day to replace Sofia as the capital of the Bulgarian kingdom.

Servia would receive the eastern portion of the Kossovo province, including Uskup and the line of the Vardar River down to Salonika and the Ægean. Greece would have been permitted to annex Southern Thessaly up to Mount Olympus and the Middle Vistritza, and in addition the Yanina or Epirus district as far as the coast opposite Corfu. In addition to this, Greece has already secured Crete, probably not to lose it again, and may sooner or later acquire or retain the Islands of Mitilini, Chios, Samos, Nikaria, Patmos, Skarpantos, and Astropalia.<sup>1</sup>

To Montenegro will have been allotted the Skutari province. In addition, Austria might well make over to the little mountain kingdom, against compliance elsewhere, the strip of coast between Cattaro and Antivari. There would then remain the Sanjak of Novibazar, the western part of the Kossovo province, and all Albania, less Skutari. Yielding to Servia the town and district of Novibazar itself, Austria might justly be allowed to annex the rest of the Sanjak to Bosnia and become the suzerain of an Albanian principality down to the frontiers of Greece and the mouth of the River Vardar opposite Salonika. At the mouth of the Vistritza, Austria could establish a sea-port on the Ægean, opposite Servian Salonika.

By arrangement with Hungary, Austria would assume control over Croatia and Slavonia, and in time see her way to join these provinces with Bosnia-Herzegovina in one great kingdom of Slavonia, granting to such a state a considerable measure of autonomy, such as is now possessed by Bohemia. Hungary, however, would probably insist on retaining under her own administration the Seben-Semlin district between the Save and the Danube; and in exchange for her rights over Fiume and Croatia would expect to receive the province of Bukowina-Chernovits on the east. Thenceforth Hungary

<sup>1</sup> The fate of Rhodes is uncertain. It may be restored to Turkey or retained by Italy as a guarantee for the safeguarding of her interest in the Levant.

(probably destined to become some day a Black Sea Power) might only retain that connection with Austria, which would be typified by a Habsburg king and a close alliance of interests. But she would find it to her advantage, as a safeguard against Russia, to conclude a general understanding, fiscal and defensive, with the other States of Central Europe—Germany, Austria, Poland, Rumania, Servia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Montenegro.

Perhaps also, under the Austrian Imperial sway, a greater measure of independence might be granted to the Chekhs of Bohemia.<sup>1</sup> As the result of this rearrangement of political factors in south-eastern Europe, Austria would tend more than even to become the greatest of the southern Slav Powers, the Imperial headship of the southern Slavonic peoples; just as the Tsar of Russia is the Emperor of the Eastern Slavs. This position might at first, on account of the once-overbearing German influence of the Vienna Government, arouse resentment and contention of the new Balkan kingdoms, flushed with their amazing success in the war against Turkey. Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro might lean in their political friendships too much in the direction of Russia. If they did so, and if Russia pressed her advantage in this direction, then indeed there would be danger of a terrible struggle between Austria and Germany allied, on the one hand, and the Russian Empire on the other.

In such a struggle there is no doubt—in my opinion—as to the direction in which British sympathies should lie: with Austria-Germany. France, so long as she is unsatisfied on the subject of Lorraine, Luxemburg, and Belgium, might attempt not only to join Russia in attacking Germany and Austria, but would seek to drag Great Britain after her into such a struggle, with the prospect of dismembering the German dominions in Europe and Africa. Any such intervention on our part would be a fatally foolish act. It could not result in an eventual subjugation of Germany, Austria, or the allied Italy. The power that would gain most from any Anglo-French crippling of Germany, would be Russia. And most

<sup>1</sup> It is conceivable that under such an arrangement the sentiment of the German minority in Bohemia might be satisfied by the incorporation of the Karlsbad in the Bavarian kingdom,

decidedly from the point of view of our ideals in liberty and civilisation, of our position in Asia, and our commerce with the Eastern Mediterranean, any further westward accession of power to Russia would carry with it disastrous consequences. We are quite right if we seek to pave the way for the satisfaction of legitimate Russian extension southwards to the Persian Gulf or over Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan. We have no moral right to oppose any guarantees which Russia may desire to secure for the complete freedom of transit through the Dardanelles; but the day is past when she can hope to make a *mare clausum* of the Black Sea. And to see her established at Constantinople or dominating the Balkan Peninsula; still more, to leave Germany and Austria to be crushed between the French hammer and the Russian anvil, would be as bad a blow to the balance of power in Europe as was the unchecked supremacy of Napoleon.

In short: the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula to the north of the kingdom of Greece—a kingdom which as far as possible should be neutral like Belgium and Denmark—are no direct concern of the British Empire. They must be settled by an understanding or a struggle between Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and Russia on the other; with Poland, Finland, Turkey, Rumania, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Albania as interested seconds. It is not our business to go to war with Russia or with the Balkan kingdoms to enforce the moral and material claims of Germany and Austria, to free Poland, or to support Hungary; it is not to our interest to follow France if she takes sides in a contest provoked by the Balkan problem. The affairs of Asia Minor must be settled between Germany and Russia as principal negotiators, so long as German interference does not affect Syria (where France has some claim to be the predominant guardian) or Judæa, or does not extend southwards beyond a sufficient access to the Persian Gulf. If a peaceful settlement of the great problem of Central Europe could be effected by Russia taking compensation for the curtailing of her rule or her influence along her western frontier in the acquisition of a strip of Western Persia to carry her railways and her commerce from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf; or in the extension of Russian protection-

over Eastern Turkestan and Mongolia : then it would be in the interests of civilisation that Great Britain should not oppose such satisfaction to Russian interests and sentiment, in return for the release of Poland and the satisfaction of Austria.

It may shock some unreflecting readers of narrow outlook that while fully alive to what perils there are in the German problem and in Prussian ambitions, the present writer, following numerous Polish, Austrian, and even French publicists, should advocate the seeming strengthening of Germany by making her the leading state in a great Central European Confederation : and above all, that having regard to the somewhat futile Prussian-German bullying of Posen it should be thought possible for the 12,000,000 Poles of Russian Poland to contemplate rising against the Russians on the side of Austria-Germany, if a war were to break out between the Tsar and the Kaisers. But the eventual re-creation of the kingdom of Poland (Russian Poland, plus Polish-speaking Galitsia—or 'Halich,' as it calls itself) as an independent state, to become a close ally of Germany and Austria, is not an improbable birth of the twentieth century. The Poles of Posen have been kindly and generously treated by flinty Prussia comparably with the atrocious form of government which since 1830 has lain like a curse on Russian Poland. If pert Polish schoolchildren in Posen have refused to satisfy their German schoolmasters, they have been mildly smacked or lightly birched ; but in Russian Poland, down to quite recently, young and middle-aged women have been knouted and variously outraged for maintaining their right to be Polish in speech and in national outlook. Not even the advent of a limited form of constitutional government in Russia has really reconciled the Poles to a complete fusion with the other elements of that semi-Asiatic Empire. And the lamp of Polish liberty, the genius of Polish literature, and the full peculiarities of the most needlessly difficult language in Europe have been kept alive in Galitsia, thanks to the wisely generous treatment of the southern Poles by Austria since 1861. If the Poles really desire once more to people an independent state with some 16,000,000 inhabitants (Russian Poland, less Suwalki and plus two-thirds of Galitsia), they will endeavour to compose the quarrels between their

Posen relations and the Prussian Government, in the hope that a conciliated Prussia may in conjunction with Austria take up the sword some day to free the bulk of Poland from foreign rule. Only Austro-Germany can save the Polish nation. It would be to the advantage of the Quadruple Alliance (Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Rumania) to do this; to free Russian Poland from its forcible attachment to Russia and add two-thirds of Galitsia to its area, thus creating a very efficient buffer-state against future Russian encroachments on Central Europe.

In all these plans for the happiness of Central Europe (as discussed by German and Slav idealists in continental reviews), it is somehow always Austria that is to play the *beau rôle* of the unselfish State. In these readjustments, she is to give up the Trientino to satisfy Italy, to make over the German-speaking Karlsbad corner of Bohemia to Bavaria, to place the Tirol and Trieste at the disposal of the German Empire as a route to the Mediterranean, and transfer two-thirds of Galitsia to strengthen a revived Poland, and the Ruthenian remainder of that province to heal the resentment of a Poland-losing Russia. It is true that they also suggest a *Drang nach Osten* to Austria-Hungary; who by negotiation or the result of victory in warfare would acquire Bessarabia west of the Dniester and thus dower Hungary with the attributes of a Black Sea Power. But it is generally assumed Austria would be amply repaid for cessions of territory here and there by an extension of her influence or her garrisons down to the *Ægean*, which only the alliance with Germany could make a possibility and a permanence. And (it is pointed out) some Austrian sacrifices would be more apparent than real. The Habsburg emblems need not be removed from the Tirol or the town of Trieste. All this region might be permitted to join the German Customs Union (as small portions of Western Austria have done, besides independent Luxemburg), and the German Empire might be allotted a portion of the port or neighbourhood of Trieste<sup>1</sup> as a naval and coaling station for the German fleet in the Mediterranean, with all possible facilities for transit between Germany

<sup>1</sup> The Austrian naval headquarters is some distance away at Pola in Southern Istria.

and Trieste. Or the Tirol and Triestin might be constituted a quasi-independent German kingdom, like Bavaria, and an Austrian archduke, be installed as ruler. In return for the paring off of the Karlsbad district of north-west Bohemia (if the Germans are impatient at being ruled by Chekhs), Prussia might retrocede to Austria the southern projections of Silesia which are mainly inhabited by Slavs.

The whole of the present crisis in the Balkans arises from the Austrian determination to control the western part of the Balkan Peninsula and, *if driven to fight Russia*, to provide for Hungary a Bessarabian outlet towards the Black Sea. And none of these ambitious schemes would be possible without the determination of Germany to stand by Austria as her *avant-courier* in the Near East, even if her intervention in the Austro-Russian conflict brings French armies across the Vosges and into German Africa.

Yet it is much to be hoped that Austria will deal leniently and considerately with Serbia. German-speaking Germany, Austria, and Magyar Hungary must bear in mind, if they are to play the leading parts in Central Europe, that it can only be done by conciliating the western and southern Slavs and Rumans. They must make themselves appear to the last three sections of this mosaic of peoples as more desirable partners or patrons than Russia or Turkey. If the Austro-Servian difficulty can be adjusted without positive injury to Austrian interests in the Balkan Peninsula, the resultant confederation of Central Europe will be a powerful counter-agent to future wars. As a league for mutual defence, it will be too well endowed with men and money to be lightly attacked and vanquished: as a confederation of free peoples of varied types, dispositions, languages, and modes of religious belief it will be provided with a sufficient area of potential wealth and cultivable soil to be cured of wild ambitions and of aggressive policies against other leagues and empires. There will certainly be a tendency for the German language and German culture to become the cement in this mosaic and to give the whole confederation from Hamburg to Constantinople and Basra a German tone. But it will be the man-of-the-world tone, the engaging manners of the Saxon, the Swabian, the Rhinelander, the Bavarian,

Styrian, and Moravian rather than the cold disagreeableness of the Prussian. Prussia and Pomerania will no doubt furnish the steel tips of the weapons of industry and war, and the stern stuff needed for the dispositions of leaders and organisers; but in this amalgam Prussia will take its place with the other divisions of the wider Germany, with Friesland and Transylvania, Mecklenburg and Württemberg, the Tirol and Silesia, Schleswig, and Carriola.

Indeed, the more Germany extends her Imperial strength and responsibilities, the less 'Prussian' she will become; because the world cannot stand Prussianising—will not stand it; and too much 'Prussia' may bring Germany to ruin and recasting. Yet Germans must refrain from historical ingratitude and not lose sight of what they owe to Prussia since 1700 in the making of their '300 scattered States . . . the constant prey of foreign ambitions' into one united nation of great power and of a foremost place in the world's councils. To the Hohenzollern dynasty Germany stands in the same position of lasting indebtedness as United Italy does towards the House of Savoy.

It may be that the needs of German local government, local liberties, and cultural developments may before long lead to a further simplifying of State divisions, reducing the present number of Sovereign States from twenty-six to sixteen, and dividing the—at present—overwhelmingly large proportion of Prussian territory into subsidiary kingdoms and duchies under Hohenzollern princes. Such a rearrangement of local government (proposed from time to time by the more outspoken reviewers and essayists who write from the capitals of the lesser kingdoms) is delineated in my map of Central Europe, and is so much below the political horizon at the present time that it scarcely needs elaboration. Such a recasting of Germany, however, though it might entail some sacrifices from the Prussian bureaucracy, would make Germany a stronger and a happier Empire, in which the will and the true feelings of the German people would find a more direct expression. And in such an Empire as this, playing the leading part in a great Central European Confederation, there would be no longer the restless discontent and the half-insane desire for war which characterises the

vocal and the voting classes in Prussia to-day, well typified as they are by the writings of General von Bernhardi.

In all these possible changes of the map of Central and Eastern Europe, our rôle is simply that of the onlooker, unless France is wantonly attacked ; Belgium, Holland, or Luxemburg invaded ; Syria or Arabia threatened by a German intervention. For the rest, let us—if we wish to be cynical—welcome German expansion with Kruger's metaphor of the tortoise putting out its head. Germany and Austria are only dangerous to the peace of the world so long as they are penned up within their present limits. Let them once expand into a confederation with Hungary and the Balkan States and much of Turkey, and they give many hostages to Fortune. Their ventures will require to draw on the financial resources of France and Britain. French neutrality and even co-operation can be secured at the relatively cheap price of the retrocession of French Lorraine and security regarding the inviolability of Belgium. Britain must be friendly towards such a Central European Confederation of States, provided sufficient guarantees are given regarding the neutrality of Greece, and the British control over the Persian Gulf and the approaches to India. Russia would not be injured by this expansion of Central Europe, even if she assisted it by exchanging Bessarabia for Ruthenia. She would probably get as her share in the general settlement a way or a railway down through Persian Kurdistan to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, and a protectorate over Armenia. And to Western Europe generally, this Central European Confederation would prove a welcome bulwark against the fast-increasing millions of Russians.



## IV

### BRITAIN AND RUSSIA

HISTORIANS of the British Empire in future times will probably state it as their opinion that there were three acts in our foreign policy, during the first ten years of the twentieth century, which repaired many an old mistake and redounded to the credit of British statesmanship. Of these, the first was the alliance with Japan; the second, the 1904 agreement with France; and the third, the understanding with Russia effected in or about 1908. This agreement was almost entirely concerned with the affairs of Persia, but it led to something like a solution of a hundred years of rivalry in Asiatic politics. By this agreement Russia virtually acknowledged Afghanistan as exclusively a British sphere of influence, and excluded Tibet from any future schemes of Asiatic extension which she might cherish. At the same time, or succedaneous to this published agreement, Great Britain disinterested herself from the fate of Eastern Turkestan, Mongolia, and Northern Manchuria.

To return to Persia as the pivot of this first attempt to construct a permanent basis of friendship with the Russian Empire.

Persia is—or, one might with justice say, was—an Empire of about 628,000 square miles, a large proportion of which consists of nearly uninhabitable and almost untraversable desert. The total population of Persia in the year 1912 was probably 9,500,000 in numbers, and this population may be divided into the following ethnic groups: In the west, in the provinces of Tabriz, Kermanshah, and Khuzistan, the indigenous peoples belong mainly to the Armenian, Kurd, and Arab groups, linguistically as well as racially. The western part of Tabriz is, it is true, populated by Persians as well as

Georgians and Circassians, and there is a certain proportion of Persians in the eastern parts of Khuzistan. Central Persia is mainly Persian in speech and race, though along the coast region of Laristan<sup>1</sup> there is an ancient negroid element which influences the physical features and character of the people; and on the coast of Laristan (Persian Gulf) there are Arab tribes. In the far north-east between Astrabad, the Caspian, and the Meshhed district, the peoples are principally of Turkish affinities, closely allied to the Turkomans of Russian Turkestan and Merv. In the south-east, the people belong in racial type and language to the Baluch group. Real Persia, therefore—that is to say, the region populated by peoples more or less of Persian stock and type, and speaking the Persian language—is confined to the middle and eastern part of the Persian Empire between the Caspian and the Persian Gulf, between the Ardabil-Zenjan, Hamadan, Burujird, and Shuster districts of the west, and the Afghan frontier on the east.

When the delimitation of British and Russian interests in Persia was negotiated, a great mistake was made—no doubt due to the exaggerated nervousness which Great Britain shows as to admitting any rivals to her control over the Persian Gulf. The real Russian sphere in Persia should have been confined to a long and narrow strip in the extreme west, stretching from the Caucasian frontier on the north to the eastern delta of the Euphrates-Tigris on the south; Russia being permitted, if need be, to occupy the towns of Tabriz, Disful, and Muhammerah, and to build a railway from north to south through this strip to the Persian Gulf, thus connecting her Caucasian and European railway system with the warm seas of the Indian Ocean. Instead of this plan, which would have been a legitimate satisfaction of Russian ambitions, and would not necessarily have threatened the independence of real Persia or have brought Russian influence inconveniently near to the Indian frontier, the Russian sphere was defined as being a great circular band covering the northern part of Persia from Afghanistan on the east to Kurdistan on the west, and including the capital Tehran, and extending as far south as Isfahan. To give Russia such a

<sup>1</sup> Quite distinct from *Luristan*, a mountain district immediately east of the lower Tigris.

sphere as this (305,000 square miles in area) was equivalent to giving her Persia. Little that was really Persian could live outside her throttling grasp.

The British sphere of influence, on the other hand, was both modest in extent (137,000 square miles) and justified by ethnic and political considerations. It was limited virtually to Persian Baluchistan, which is only artificially severed from British Baluchistan : a region, be it noted, that includes one or more important, semi-independent, native states. This sphere of influence gave to Great Britain a sufficient control over the narrow exit from the Persian Gulf at the Straits of Ormuz. With this in her possession, Great Britain could afford to be indulgent as to both a German and a Russian railway reaching to the Persian Gulf at the other—the western—end. But Great Britain in her desire to protect all means of access to India has more or less arrogated to herself the right to dominate the southern part of independent Persia : for between the political spheres of Britain and Russia there is demarcated a region between Khorassan, Isfahan, and the Turkish frontier, which is regarded as neutral ground, and over which neither Russia nor Britain are supposed to exercise special influence. However that may be, the British at the present day are practically the guardians of Southern Persia between Isfahan and the Persian Gulf.

Meantime, the Persian Government is in a state of utter disorganisation. It is powerless to put down brigandage and to ensure safety to life and property. Whether for the next fifty years the Persians will be able to govern themselves is an open question. The action both of Britain and Russia, however, is hampered in dealing drastically with this question by the sentimentality of Europe and the United States. What Greece was to Europe between two and three thousand years ago, Persia was to Asia : a land of radiating light and civilisation. The true Persian—as distinct from the Turk, Baluch, Kurd, and Armenian—is a prepossessing type of humanity, ordinarily of good looks, white skin, tall stature, and generally European aspect. The Persians are, of course, the descendants of the ancient Aryan (Nordic) invaders who were closely akin to the ancestors of the Gothic, Greek, and German peoples. They

mixed freely with the preceding Mediterranean, Armenian, and negroid races, and consequently acquired in some cases the dark hair, brown eyes, and olive-tinted complexion to be met with along the Southern Mediterranean and in Spain. There is a good deal of facial resemblance, indeed, between the Persians, the Berbers of Morocco, and the population of Southern Spain. The Persian language, though much spoilt by the influence of Arabic, is still an expressive and mellow speech, and in comparison to the rest of Asia, Persia takes a very high place in the arts of painting, ceramics, and architecture, in poetry and prose.

The worst blow ever dealt at Persia was its conquest by the Muhammadan Arabs. Persian genius, however, was too intense, too powerful, to be completely destroyed by the semi-barbarous Semites of the Arabian Peninsula or by the terrible Turks and Tatars, reeking of mutton-fat, exulting in slaughter, and contemptuous of cities; who, additionally inflamed by Muhammadan fanaticism, ravaged Persia at intervals between the tenth and the eighteenth centuries. In spite of her downfall in 637 A.C., and of many a subsequent devastation, independent Aryan Persia arose to her feet once more under the splendid dynasty of the Sufi or Safawi Shahs<sup>1</sup>—Arab in origin, it is true, but Persian in genius—who reigned between 1499 and 1786. Unhappily, though they were mystics they were still nominally Muhammadans. They just lacked that complete independence of spirit and originality of thought which might have enabled them to cut Persia adrift, once and for all, from the fetters of Islam. These fetters were again manacled on her wrists during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, chiefly by Turkish-Tatar invasions from the north-east. At the present day, the section of the Persian people which is the most deadly enemy of Persian regeneration and independence, is the religious caste—the Mullahs, the Muhammadan clergy, in fact.<sup>2</sup>

It is true that all Persia is heretical in the eyes of true

<sup>1</sup> A designation corrupted into 'the Grand Sophy' of Persia by the European Orientalists of the seventeenth century.

<sup>2</sup> The term 'clergy,' though it is supposed to have no justification in the Islamic world is nevertheless correct in such countries as Persia, where the position of cleric or learned man in the mosque is virtually handed down from father to son.

Muslims in that it is the territory of the ~~Sunni~~ sect ; but so far as fanatical, unimprovable ignorance goes, Shias are no better than Sunnis, perhaps even a little worse, since they are more superstitious and are more deeply attached to unpractical myths.

Yet take a Persian from the nullifying conditions of his own land and put him in East Africa, at Zanzibar, in India, or Australia, and he at once becomes a personage of value and local importance. Unconsciously he ranges himself alongside the European, being, in fact, under his skin more of a European than of an Asiatic.

There is no reason to despair of the eventual regeneration and civilisation of Persia, if the Government of Tehran could be granted complete independence of foreign influence. If only Russia and Britain would come to an agreement, recognising that the complete absorption of Persia by their two Empires or the intrusion into Persia of a third European Power, was altogether undesirable from the ethical point of view, they might rearrange their spheres of influence. The Russian sphere could be drawn in the manner already described,<sup>1</sup> and if necessary be annexed to the Russian Empire, on the understanding that Russia withdrew from Tehran and the rest of Northern Persia. Real Persia would not be deprived of much, for she would lose little more than her rebellious Armenian, Kurdish, Lur, and Arab subjects. Russia might also control the Turkish-speaking districts between the Atrek River and Mashhad. The actual sphere governed by Great Britain might be demarcated on the north by a line from the Afghan-Baluch frontier to Bandar Abbas and Kishm Island on the Straits of Ormuz. The whole of 'real' Persia thenceforward between the British and Russian spheres could be left alone—at any rate, for a period of fifty years—to fight out its quarrels and emerge possibly as a civilised, prosperous, and independent nation. As to railways, which are being made the chief stalking-horse to justify interference in Persian affairs, the necessary Europe-to-India line should pass through Southern Persia from Muhammerah to the British frontier at Bandar Abbas ; whilst Russia could build as many railways as she liked from Transcaucasia down to the

<sup>1</sup> I.e. from Tabriz to Shuster and Muhammerah.

Persian Gulf, at Gada or Mashur. However much Central Persia might be engaged in civil wars, her state of disorder could not seriously threaten the Europe-to-India railway passing through Southern Persia, because with British war-vessels on the Persian Gulf it would not be difficult from time to time to send expeditionary forces to protect the railway line.

What Russia aspires to secure, however, is *not only* all Northern Persia in a broad belt bordering the Caspian Sea, but access to the Persian Gulf as well. It is possible that the British Government would eventually have agreed to this, but for the outcry of indignation which arose as to the extirpation of Persian independence, the Polonising of Persia. Probably the sentimental public for once was right in interposing its veto. The present position, however, is one which cannot continue indefinitely. Either Russia must find reasonable satisfaction for her ambitions in a direct access to the Persian Gulf, or she will continue to interfere in Tehran Government matters until at last the disorganisation and misery of Persia are irremediable. She has already secured control over the magnificent oak forests of Mazanderan.

In Central and Eastern Asia (it seems to me), British interests are sufficiently defined by the prohibition of any Russian occupation of Tibet or of any part of real China. The Russification of Northern Manchuria, of the northern parts of Mongolia, and of the provinces of Eastern Turkestan and Dzungaria, are inevitable. Probably a good deal of South-west Manchuria will be added eventually to the Japanese Empire with some satisfaction to China, west of Liao-ho River (Liao-hsi territory—the Willow Palisade). China must also insist on including the Eastern Gobi Desert in her Empire, and on retaining, even if she has to fight for it, Southern Mongolia.

There are only four directions in which Russia might come so seriously into conflict with British interests that warfare would ensue, or, at any rate, a very unfriendly attitude be forced upon us. These would be: (1) If Russia were to push through Finland to the north coast of Norway and establish herself on the shores of the Atlantic. (2) If she extended her conquests of Persia so that they brought her as a neighbour to Western Afghanistan and Baluchistan. (3) If she extended

her political influence to Tibet or annexed any part of China Proper. I have already stated reasons for assuming that the questions now in dispute, regarding her attitude towards the Balkan States and Turkey, concern only the Empires of Central Europe and do not call for British intervention. There is one other direction, however, in which British sympathies may some day be invoked : Finland.

Undoubtedly, the lot of Finland is a hard one. Here we have a most civilised progressive, enlightened country, largely Scandinavian (Swedish) in its sympathies, united politically since 1809 with the huge Russian Empire, which is still barbarous in its treatment of women, in its encouragement of alcoholism, its medieval type of Christian religion, and its protectionist policy. Finland once formed politically part of Sweden.<sup>1</sup> Its civilisation is mainly Scandinavian ; and its religion is the most enlightened type of Protestant Christianity. It is in the front rank of nations as regards liberality of political ideas and just treatment of women. If left to itself without Russian interference it would become one of the most prosperous countries of Europe. All that it asks for is complete and absolute Home Rule. But it interprets Home Rule undoubtedly in the direction of separating itself as far as possible from Russian influence and Russian policy.

As the Scandinavian nations—Norway, Sweden, and Denmark—increase in population and prosperity, they cannot but turn their thoughts more and more to the fate in the future of Finland. It is true that the original Finns were semi-Mongolians and that the Finnish language is, so to speak, an Asiatic tongue, being an offshoot of the group which includes Turkish and Magyar. But the polite language of Finland is still Swedish (the use of English and German is spreading fast), a good deal of the blood of the country is that of ancient Gothic and Scandinavian settlers, and the genius of the country is as much Scandinavian as is that of Sweden itself. The Grand-Duchy of Finland in reality owes much of its present area and political independence to Russia. It was brought under the Empire of the Tsars in 1809, and Alexander I. became its Grand Duke, adding at the time counties or provinces of Russian Finland to what may

<sup>1</sup> It has been a Grand Duchy since the seventeenth century.

be called Swedish Finland. But the pledges given by the Emperors of Russia at different times, in their capacity of Grand Dukes of Finland, have been to some degree violated. The results of the Russo-Japanese War having caused in the European Empire of Russia a profound internal discontent bordering on revolution, the Government of St. Petersburg was constrained to restore some of the political privileges of which the Finns had been robbed. The immediate result in increased prosperity has been such as to alarm the Russians and once more to turn their desires in the direction of completely incorporating Finland in the administration of the whole Russian Empire. There is some justification for this feeling. The present political boundaries of Finland (owing to Russian generosity in the early nineteenth century) come to within an easy motor-ride of St. Petersburg itself. The Baltic provinces of Russia, south-west of St. Petersburg, are mainly Finnish in race; and Finnish people extend right across the northern part of Russia to the borders of Siberia.

It is really only the more Scandinavian, western part of Finland proper which has moral claims to detachment from Russia. Perhaps some day, when, and if the Russian frontiers are adjusted, a settlement of the Finnish Question may take place. Russia may annex definitely the Åland Islands and Åbo-Helsingfors, the provinces of Viborg, Nyland, St. Michel, and Kuopio; and then grant independence to western and northern Finland, which might then become a self-governing member of the Scandinavian Confederation. The Lutheran Finns, thenceforth, who objected to the Russia of the Greek Church and the vodka tavern, could migrate into Scandinavian Finland and be at peace. The question is not one that concerns Great Britain, however, other than sentimentally,<sup>1</sup> provided Russia does not push her advantages in north-west Finland as far as the Norwegian coast. But the ultimate settlement, on some such lines, of the Finnish Question is one which (under all surface compliments and pleasantries) draws

<sup>1</sup> Some of the leading Finnish families are descended from Scots and English who emigrated to Sweden in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The patron saint of Finland is St. Henry, an English missionary-bishop of the twelfth century who, together with a later successor, Bishop Thomas, also an Englishman, converted the Finns to Roman Christianity.



Sweden towards an understanding with Germany, for if Germany and Austria were forced into war with Russia the temptation to the Swedes would then be very strong to get the question of Finland settled in accordance with Scandinavian interests and the wishes of the majority of the Finns.

One of the most palpitating problems of the immediate future will undoubtedly be what part Russia is to play in the dissolution or the re-arrangement of the Turkish Empire. She would like, unquestionably, to occupy Constantinople; but it is doubtful whether that would be permitted by the Balkan Confederation, by Austria, and by Germany; nor would it be looked on very favourably by Great Britain. A Russian administration of Armenia is probably inevitable, if the Turkish Empire is to be re-arranged. Certainly, any British objection to such a step would be purely perfunctory. What, however, will be the attitude which Russia will take, as history progresses, in regard to the control of the Black Sea outlet and the Dardanelles?

From the point of view of Russia, she has been badly treated by Europe in not being permitted to secure for her ships of war, as well as her merchant navy, absolute freedom of passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Put ourselves mentally in the place of Russia. We should have fought unremittingly to secure this outlet, just as in the same position we should let no obstacles stand between us and a port on the Persian Gulf. Germany and Austria at different times have taken a special interest in the fate of Constantinople, because they have believed that the future direct railway to India will pass from Constantinople to Baghdad, and thence onward across the Persian frontier, and that Russia should have no opportunity of controlling any part of this route. The admission of direct German or Austrian influence into the administration of Asia Minor would, we are told, be resented by Russia at the point of the sword, if it brought Germans and Austrians (or Turks working under foreign influence) to the southern shores of the Black Sea. Russia, of course, would like to make the Black Sea a *mare clausum*. She liberated Bulgaria with the intention that Bulgaria might in some way or other become a Russian province; and when Prince Alexander of

Battenberg attempted to make Bulgaria a wholly independent principality (perhaps even with Central European leanings), Russia brought about his downfall. Yet I doubt strongly if the Russian ideal of a Black Sea entirely controlled by coasts under Russian influence, is any longer feasible. Rumania has access to the Black Sea, and Rumania is absolutely anti-Russian and Central European in sympathies. Bulgaria may be very polite to Russia and very grateful for the real help afforded; but each fresh victory over the Turks carries her away farther and farther from Russian influence into alliance with Central Europe. In the settlement, however, which must follow the war between the Balkan States and Turkey—sooner or later—Russia might expect at the hands of Europe these concessions: firstly, the complete freedom of passage of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, so that the Russian fleet may pass into the Mediterranean and the fleets of other Powers enter the Black Sea. If Constantinople is to pass out of Turkish occupation into the possession of any other Power, Russia may make some claim for a depôt or a landing-place on the Scutari Peninsula opposite. The direction in which she will evince the greatest sensitiveness will be the northern coast of Asia Minor, if the rest of Asia Minor is to come under the influence of another European State. But in these directions it should once again be repeated, the settlement is one which mainly affects Russia, Austria, and Germany; and whatever they may agree to, or may impose, one on the other, there is no case for the intervention of the British Empire; provided, naturally, that if the Turkish dominions are to be materially altered in their extent and forms of government the future of Syria and Palestine is a matter which touches British interests closely, while the British position in Cyprus and Egypt will require parallel rectification.

Some hard things have been said in this book about the Russian Government and the way it is viewed in relation to the more highly-cultured, better-educated nations of Western and Central Europe. Russian treatment of the Persians has not been marked precisely by gentleness, kindness, or just-dealing. But it is far from the author's wish to depreciate the immense importance of the Russian people in the future history of the

world, or to deny them the credit and thanks they deserve for the opening up of Siberia—that future Canada of the Old World—or the pacification of Tatar and Turkestan. If they have trod on Persian toes unduly in the last five years, they have for forty years saved north-east Persia from the incessant slave-raids of the Turkomans. They have opened up the wonderful Caucasus region to the world's enterprise; and, in spite of an irritating passport system and an occasional outbreak of violence, have found in east and west Caucasus and in Trans-Caspia profitable employment for much British capital and many Englishmen (I refer more especially to the oil-wells of these regions and the machinery they require). There is, in Western and Central Asia, a *Pax Rossica* which is not a bad parallel to the *Pax Britannica* in Southern Asia and the *Pax Gallica* in North Africa. But the pioneering work and talents of Russia are too much in the preliminary axe-and-chopper, cane-knife, and blasting-powder stage to be rightly applicable to the government of highly endowed, exquisitely sensitive and gifted people like the Poles (the aristocrats of Central Europe), or twentieth-century Scandinavians like the Finns. The Russian treatment of the Jews has been unpardonably harsh, only to be paralleled in the sixteenth-century life of Spain and Portugal. The Jews may in various ways have made themselves a nuisance to the Poles of Galitsia and the Latin race of Rumania. Here the population is fairly dense and the cultivable area limited, and one can well understand that these peoples of European descent and Aryan speech may chafe at the large measure of importance acquired in their small countries by an unassimilable Semitic race, with jarring manners and customs and an exasperating gift of prospering under the least show of favour. But Russia is so vast, her territories harbour so many different racial types, that she might surely have found room somewhere between the Dniester and the Volga for Jewish colonies which would have turned for the most part into happy and contented agriculturists the two to three millions of Jews in her immense European population of 136,000,000. Such statesmanlike treatment of the question—above all, the passing of the Jews out of the Ghetto—would have saved Russia much obloquy, much disease,

and many obstacles covertly thrown across her path by Jewish financiers in Germany, Britain, and the United States.

However, this is Russia's affair, not ours. What is of concern to us, or will be to those who come after us, is the rapid increase of the Russian Christians, the Russian race, as apart from Jew and Tatar, Turkoman, and Iranian. The mass of the Russian people represents a stock (largely Gothic in descent) as vigorous, as well-endowed in physique, beauty, strength, and intelligence as any among the leading European nations. Russia only needs education of a modern type, and an enlightened Government realising the serious handicap to advancement which lies in the abuse of alcohol, to vie with the United States as a nationality capable of dominating a hemisphere. We, with our sixty millions of freer, better taught, more temperate white men (including a small but most important section of the Jews), are well able to cope in honest rivalry with the Russians in Asia at the present day, and need not in the range of practical politics fear any disturbing of the balance in that continent, as long as we retain the command of the sea, the alliance with Japan, and the unwritten, racial understanding with Canada and the United States. The one danger which could menace our Empire would be the Russian occupation of Constantinople and Asia Minor, and the facilities such developments would give for a Russian descent on Syria and Egypt—Egypt, the wasp-waist of the British Empire. Since Turkey has absolutely no hope of durability or permanent strength, the only real bulwark against a Russianising of the Near East is the introduction of our brother Germans into Asia Minor and Mesopotamia (and perhaps French influence into Syria) to restore the remains of the Byzantine Empire to Western civilisation. With such a bulwark in Asiatic Turkey, and with a Central Persia, independent of Russian control, the Indian Empire would be in no way menaced by the Russian railway access to the western end of the Persian Gulf. And with a revived China, patrolled by Japan, the United States, Germany, and Britain, we need have no fear that Russia will abuse her possession of all the northern half of Asia. On the contrary, here we may watch without the least jealousy or anxiety her efforts to subdue Nature to her will and to

people immense wastes with a vigorous race of white men, akin both in body and language not only to the Scythians of antiquity, but even—it may be—to the carriers of Neolithic civilisation, who in ancient times passed right across Asia to Japan and to North-west America. In fact, the Russians in once more Aryanising Northern and Central Asia are only repeating history. In Sakhalien they meet in the Ainps distant kinsmen, the last vestiges of the first Caucasian invasion of Eastern Asia. But they must, in all conscience, with an Empire already amounting to nearly 9,000,000 square miles, leave Central and South-eastern Europe alone and allow other European nations the honour and the profit of restoring the dominions of Alexander and Justinian to the civilisation of Greece and Rome.

## V

### BRITISH RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL

OF Portugal it might be said, in parody of a well-known phrase applied to a variety of other purposes, that if she had not existed it would have been necessary to invent her—that is to say, from the point of view of the British Isles and the British Empire. If this portion of the Atlantic coast had been in history or were now in the occupation of a great nation or strong naval power, no more serious danger to the security of British commerce or sea communications could have existed. Long before the Empire was formed, English kings and London and Bristol merchants had quickly realised the strategical importance of Portugal and the need for an alliance with that Power; and equally the wisdom of maintaining the independence of Portugal against the attacks of the Moors or the jealousies of the other Spanish kingdoms. The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, for interested motives, was renewed in the seventeenth century (when through the marriage of Charles II. we greatly improved our position in India), and again in the eighteenth century. In 1808 Portugal proved to be the heel of Achilles of the Napoleonic Empire. We landed troops there, and from a Portuguese base, in a series of military operations amongst the most marvellous in history for valour and address, drove slowly back the western half of Napoleon's power, until in 1814 our troops from the frontiers of Portugal had entered Paris.

During the nineteenth century, Anglo-Portuguese relations (once more renewed to settle dynastic troubles and quell the party of absolutism and besotted ignorance) cooled down somewhat, owing to the rival desire of both Powers to obtain a Central African Empire. The Portuguese, also, were for long on the side of slavery and maintained as far as they could a

slave trade with the southern States of the American Union and with Spanish Cuba and Portuguese Brazil. The rivalry in Africa, moreover, was accentuated by the results of Livingstone's explorations and the attempts of ambitious pioneers in South Africa to carry British influence through the centre of Africa from the Cape to Cairo, without regard for the aspirations of the Portuguese to unite Angola with Mozambique.

It is currently believed that in 1898—and the story has never been denied by anyone in authority—Great Britain and Germany came to an understanding in regard to the disposal of the Portuguese colonies—at any rate, of the colonies in Africa—in the event of Portugal wishing to part with them, or of any catastrophe attaining Portugal in Europe. Although this agreement has never been made public, it is assumed that amongst its provisions was the allotment to the British sphere of Madeira, the Açores and the Cape Verde Islands, and perhaps also Portuguese Guinea (midway between the Gambia and Sierra Leone), Delagoa Bay, all Portuguese Zambezia, and South-east Africa ; while Germany was to take over Angola and the northern half of the Mozambique province to the north of the Lower Zambezi and to the east of the Lower Shire and Nyasaland. It is probable also that by this arrangement Great Britain was to have the reversion of Portuguese rights over Timor, and in Goa and other parts of Portuguese India, whilst Germany would have inherited Macao in Southern China.

What prompted such a serious step as this prospective division of the Portuguese Overseas Empire is not clear. It was apparently due to the initiative of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, then Secretary-of-State for the Colonies, and anxious on that and on other occasions, for a good understanding with Germany in regard to world-affairs. But as no Government in Portugal at any time in the history of that country seems to have committed itself to any idea of the disposal of Portuguese colonies—with the solitary exception of the sale of Delagoa Bay in 1884, against British concessions on the Congo<sup>1</sup>—it is not clear what

<sup>1</sup> By this abortive treaty, which was not confirmed either by the British or the Portuguese legislatures, Portugal was also to have transferred to Great Britain her fortress of St. John of Ajuda and her protectorate over Dahomé on the Slave Coast of West Africa.

could have justified either the British or the German Governments in 1898 in supposing that a time was near at hand for a division of the Portuguese heritage. Great Britain, even in the critical period of 1890-91, had shrunk from any drastic measures against Portugal, had hesitated to restrain the unreasonable ambitions of certain Portuguese statesmen in regard to a Trans-African Empire stretching from Mozambique to Angola. The niceness of scruples on the part of Lord Salisbury and Lord Rosebery, more especially in regard to South-east Africa, provoked several indignant utterances from the late Cecil Rhodes, who realised that at that time the Portuguese occupation of the south-east coast of Africa was limited to a precarious hold on two seaports—Inyambane and Beira.<sup>1</sup> He did not see why claims that had expired by disuse should stand in the way of his new Rhodesia obtaining a sea-coast. The firm attitude of Lord Salisbury had already secured results for the life-work of Livingstone and other pioneers, and had established a British sphere of influence in South central Africa between Angola on the west and Mozambique on the east. This being the case, Rhodes believed that a similar decided policy in other Anglo-Portuguese negotiations might obtain access from Rhodesia to the Indian Ocean, even if the districts under actual Portuguese occupation were retained by Portugal.

But in all probability the British Foreign Office at that period felt that to press Portugal too hard in regard to the delimitation of her African possessions might result in a revolution and the transformation of its monarchy into a republic, an event which took place nearly twenty years later. If at that period such a triumph had been secured by the revolutionary party in Portugal, it would very likely have been followed by the upset of the monarchy in both Spain and Italy, in neither of which Latin countries were the crowns at all secure at that period on the head of a boy-King or of a distinctly unpopular Sovereign.

History will probably decide that Lord Salisbury was right, for even when the Republic came in Portugal many years

<sup>1</sup> Beira was founded in 1888, not far from the ancient and historic Sofala, a port which in course of time had silted up. Beira was named after the large Portuguese province of that name, which gave a title to Princes of the Royal family. Needless to say, Beira is properly pronounced Bayra, and consequently is persistently called Bye-ra by Englishmen.



afterwards, it was not as the result of any injury done by Britain to Portuguese sentiment or rights.

In fact, not long after the supposed understanding with Germany, Great Britain at the outset of the South African War formally renewed her old treaty of alliance with Portugal and guaranteed to the latter all her existing possessions. It was acknowledged in 1912 by the responsible authority for foreign affairs, that this step had taken place and that the Portuguese possessions were protected by the full strength of the British Empire.

Whether it is right in policy for our Empire to be bound to such solemn and far-reaching engagements without the consultation or approval of the legislature is a question considered in other chapters. But whatever may have been the wisdom or unwisdom of the act in 1899, it was not repudiated by any vote of the House of Commons in 1912, and therefore, received the tacit sanction of the British people. Of course, no such engagement precludes Portugal from voluntarily disposing of her colonial possessions. In such an event as that, it is to be presumed that the Anglo-German agreement of 1898 would come into force. Consequently, if Portugal decided at any time to sell Portuguese Guinea to France, Portuguese Congo and the northern part of Mozambique to Germany, Great Britain almost certainly would offer no objection. But as things stand, if—for example—the German Government were to bring pressure or threats to bear on Portugal to part with her colonies, Great Britain is pledged to resist, by force if necessary, any such pressure.

To some extent, therefore, we stand committed by this responsible attitude to the tendering of good advice to Portugal. It is these conditions which make it quite seemly, and even necessary, that we should lecture her on the iniquities formerly perpetrated in the matter of recruiting what was virtually slave labour in São Thomé; and it is incumbent on us, ever and again, to urge on the Portuguese a wiser and more liberal-minded fiscal policy in her foreign dominions. If, for example, Portugal can be induced to abolish the system of differential duties which accord an overwhelming protection to Portuguese trade with West and East Africa, Germany would have little grievance to

base on the fact that such a large proportion of African soil remained under Portuguese administration. There is little doubt that if a reasonably low tariff, and above all a tariff which did not discriminate between one nation and another could be established in East and West Africa, German trade, could prosper exceedingly both in Angola and in Mozambique.

Even as conditions are, the German and Dutch firms are to a great extent getting into their hands the whole of the commerce of Northern Mozambique, north of the Zambezi delta and east of Nyasaland. But German commerce with Angola is still very small and much hampered ; and trouble is beginning to arise (though not yet made known through the Press) between German traders who push far inland from Ovampoland and who are penetrating Southern Angola at the back, in the direction of the Okavango and Kwando Rivers. The Portuguese have but a slight hold of this region, which indeed they have only occupied and garrisoned during the last five years. They are still fighting with the warlike, stalwart Kuanyama people (a branch of the Ovampo-Herero stock). And meantime these peregrinating German traders are penetrating far northwards, attracted to the business which is being opened up by the British-made Lobito Bay railway.

Herein lies a further complication of the situation. Soon after this renewal of the treaty of alliance and the assurance that protection was accorded to Portugal, great concessions were bestowed by that country on British capitalists, at any rate, in regard to Angola. The chief results which have lasted from the promulgation of several schemes (some of which withered away) have been the Lobito Bay railway enterprise of the Tanganyika Concessions Company and the 'Nyassa' Chartered Company of Northern Mozambique. Earlier still than these undertakings, came into existence the well-known Mozambique Chartered Company, which practically administers two-thirds of Portuguese South-east Africa, the very region so much coveted at one time by Rhodes ; but as this enterprise is within what might be called 'the British sphere' according to the 1898 agreement, it does not affect the present argument of the Germans : which is, that since 1898 various forms of British enterprise have become so established

in Angola and Northern Mozambique that the effect of the 1898 agreement is considerably modified. Supposing that anything so improbable were to occur as the complete breaking-up of Portugal, it would be difficult now for the British Government to hand over Angola and Mozambique to the Germans, at least without making some reservations on behalf of very large investments of British money.

This, however, is a direction in which our Government has broken no pledges, not even in the spirit. It ~~never~~ committed itself to any arrangement by which British subjects were forbidden to invest their capital in any part of the Portuguese dominions. As a matter of fact, so far as East Africa is concerned, it is well known that the British Foreign Office has refused to give any diplomatic or other support to railway enterprises which might conflict with German interests in northern Mozambique.

Another development of great interest, also, is changing the situation; and that is seemingly the revival of Portugal herself as a colonising power. Several British missionaries and lay travellers, none of them regarded hitherto as particularly friendly towards Portugal, have recently reported with some emphasis a change for the better in the Portuguese administration both of Angola and Mozambique. Especially in regard to Portuguese Congo and Angola has it been set forth that Portuguese merchants are showing energy, activity, and tact in getting on with the natives, that they are penetrating in all directions through these great West African provinces, and actually are somewhat harassing the Belgians in the frontier regions of Congoland by their rivalry in trade. Their popularity amongst the natives of Congoland is marked, showing that the wide-spread stories of injuries inflicted by Portuguese slave-traders on the tribes of Eastern Angola have been forgotten by the quickly-appeased Negro race. Yet no impartial student of Africa could fail to condemn the policy which Portugal pursued for something like thirty years along the Kwango River, between Kwango and Kasai, and in the Bailundo highlands; carrying off the inhabitants who were too feeble to resist her emissaries (or their allies the slave-trading kings and chiefs), and deporting them as 'apprentices' for the cacao and coffee-

plantations of São Thomé. This procedure has apparently ceased under the Republic. The wounds are rapidly healing; and in every other respect and in all other directions, except possibly in the vicinity of the central Kunene River, the Portuguese are far more popular with the indigenes of Angola and Western Congoland than are the Belgians hard by, the French farther north, or the Germans farther south. A new type of Governor or Deputy-Governor has recently appeared in these provinces, sometimes recruited from Madeira.<sup>1</sup> Such men are highly educated, probably thoroughly conversant with English and English literature, and with British colonial methods; deeply interested in the preservation of fauna and flora, the registration of rainfall, and the establishment of accurate meteorological records; in agriculture, both native and exotic; and determined to make Portuguese rule equivalent to fair treatment of the indigenes and encouragement to foreign traders.

In spite of occasional squabbles and misunderstandings, there is an increasing tendency to concord, unity of views and community of interests between the ever-increasing numbers of British subjects who are working in East and West Portuguese Africa. These regions are not becoming less Portuguese; on the contrary, though the stream of emigration setting thitherwards is still very slight compared to the numbers of Portuguese that make their way to Brazil and to the British West Indies, nevertheless it is increasing and is taking hold. Healthy children are being born to the white Portuguese settled on the uplands of temperate climate in Southern Angola; and if Portugal can keep clear of any revolutions for the next

<sup>1</sup> All who are interested in Portuguese affairs should keep their eyes on Madeira. This remarkable island has from time to time produced noteworthy citizens who have served the Portuguese State with great credit. As far back as the middle of the eighteenth century, Madeira came into close relations with Great Britain, owing to the alliance with Portugal and the island being a safe place of call at all times for British ships desiring to obtain provisions. The delightful, genial climate was thought to be suited to people suffering from phthisis (which, as a matter of fact, it is not), so that from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards, Madeira was much visited by English invalids, besides being a place of resort for wine merchants. English influence has had much to say in the education of the middle and upper classes of the Madeirense Portuguese.

ten years, she may bring about a veritable colonial renaissance which will have far-reaching effects, at any rate in Africa.

These considerations, nevertheless, do not alter the fact that Portugal has had allotted to her (by the good will, chiefly, of Great Britain in past conferences and congresses) a very much larger area in Africa than she is able properly to develop and colonise. If the Portuguese people at home were better educated and therefore better able to take large views of such questions, they would probably give their consent to small portions of their colonial domains being sold at a fair price to Powers willing to buy. For instance, with scarcely any loss to Portuguese trade they might sell Portuguese Guinea to France (if she wished to purchase); and similarly dispose of the little territory of Cabinda and the northern part of Portuguese Congo to Germany; perhaps also the Ibo district of Mozambique immediately south of the Ruvuma river. With the money thus acquired they could do much to develop Portugal itself by means of light railways, and they would still remain masters of a colonial domain of something like 500,000 square miles.<sup>1</sup>

The most regrettable thing in the history of Portugal has been the neglect of Portugal itself. It is a region (including the Azores and Madeira) of 35,290 square miles in area; that is to say, considerably larger than Ireland. Like Ireland, it is very sparsely populated. If Ireland were under a proper administration, worthy of the political intelligence which generally irradiates in the councils of the British Empire, it should sustain a population of at least 10,000,000. But Portugal, with its 34,254 square miles of mostly fertile country lying under genial latitudes, with a climate well-nigh perfect, should support 15,000,000 of vigorous people, even when allowance is made for the proportion of the area which is stony mountain and uncultivable heath. It is difficult to explain why, at the present day, there are under 6,000,000 of Portuguese in the mother-country. Madeira with only 314 square miles, has a population of about 180,000. The little Azores are also thickly populated, and the Portuguese in Brazil, and above all in the British

<sup>1</sup> The present area of the Portuguese Empire beyond the seas is 802,952 square miles.

tropical colonies, have shown themselves very fecund, a race prone to large families and to early marriage. The mass of the Portuguese people at the present day is a well-to-do, contented peasantry, a people who, on the whole, are so contented with their lot that they have cared nothing for education and very little for the politics which raged over their heads in the few large towns. They regarded their Church for the most part with a tolerant affection; they were usually law-abiding and placid. The worst feature about them was their ignorance. They were scarcely better educated than in the Middle Ages. At the present day only about twenty per cent. of the population are literate. The education even of this small proportion has not, until recently, been of a high order. The universities have been asleep or too much controlled by ecclesiastics hating all modern knowledge. The very small proportion—perhaps one per cent.—of the people who filled the Portuguese administrative, military, or naval posts, usually got the better part of their education in Spain, France, England, or Germany.

Though the Portuguese are composed of very distinct ethnic elements, they possess in common a certain Portuguese 'genius' which is quite different to the general tone of the Spanish people, except in Galicia, which is really *Portugal irremiddo*. When the Moors overran the country after the defeat of the Goths in 711 they found the regions between the Algarve coast and the Douro somewhat sparsely populated by an Italianised Kelt-iberian folk—a race probably compounded in the main of a very ancient European stock and of elements akin to the Berbers, the Basques, and the Aryan Kelts, the latter having entered from the north through Galicia. The Lusitanian type of those days was no doubt much like the folk who dwell in middle Portugal at the present time, and whose closest resemblances are with the mixed Kelt-iberian people of Ireland and Western France—mostly with a round-faced visage, an inclination to a snub nose, but with dark eyes, well-furnished eyebrows, and a cheery, laughing expression. It is rare nowadays to meet in Portugal the long-faced, stern-looking Castilian; where such a type does occur is amongst the nobility and the portraits of the great heroes of the sixteenth century.

The Moors introduced a further considerable Berber element, and this, mixed with the Arab, forms the bulk of the population in southernmost Portugal at the present day. On the other hand, the Suevi and other Gothic peoples had settled thickly in Galicia and northern Portugal. This type is very common about Oporto, and may be frequently seen in the Portuguese Navy. The Gothic Portuguese are a tall, well-built race, with red or golden hair and blue eyes. Finally, the African slave trade and intercourse with Brazil introduced a negro element into the regions round Lisbon and the middle provinces, which though it has been much exaggerated by travellers giving superficial accounts of Portugal, is nevertheless discernible here and there, especially in the lower classes of the cities and amongst the soldiery.

But although composed of such diverse elements the little nation, as I have already remarked, possesses a distinct genius of its own, which in addition to its very definitely marked type of language—an independent member of the group of Romance tongues derived from the Latin—marks it out very clearly from Spain. The Iberian Peninsula, in fact, is really divided between four nations: the Portuguese in the west; the Castilians in the north-centre and south; the Catalans in the south-east and east; and the Basques in the extreme north-east. Whether or not the Spanish monarchy will in the course of the present century unify Basque, Catalan and Castilian into one completely united nation, is not quite certain, though recent events tend towards that favourable consummation. But little effort of the extermination of the Portuguese could make Spain mistress over Portugal.

There is a certain affinity between the Portuguese and the French—racial, historical, and linguistic. The first Count of Portugal was a Burgundian prince, and several Norman and Picard adventurers from Dieppe and Boulogne founded families in Portugal. Portuguese learn French with as much readiness as they acquire Castilian. As a matter of fact, if they speak a second language, it is more often French than Spanish. It is quite possible that if Napoleon's armies had not invaded Portugal and inflicted great woes on that country at the commencement of the last century, the whole

trend of Portuguese politics might have been in the direction of a French alliance. But the determined attempts made by Napoleon to destroy their independence created a political dislike and mistrust of France during all the nineteenth century, which not even racial and linguistic affinities could overcome. Portugal during the last twelve years has cast in her lot definitely with the British party in the world's politics ; and unless we do anything tactless or heartless to alienate the sympathies of the Portuguese people, their alliance with us will be a perpetual one and probably of great mutual advantage both to British and to Portuguese trade. In spite of the wretchedly bad government they have endured, with a few bright exceptions, in the annals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is a people which is waxing rather than waning, and which may be about to enter upon a period of development more remarkable even than the records of 1420-1578.

However eager we may be to have our own way throughout South or Central Africa, it will be as well to bear in mind that we have an interest even more important nearer home, and that is the welfare of Portugal itself. There is only one possibility of serious injury to Portugal : this would be a renewal of her revolutionary trouble. The little country in its finances and in its home agriculture sorely needs ten years of complete quiet and recuperation. One good service, therefore, which we could render to Portugal would be the bringing all possible influence to bear on the Royalist party (the majority of whose members now reside in England or Switzerland) to attempt for the next ten years no further conspiracy against the party in power, on the understanding that the Republican Government released its hordes of political prisoners and suspects. The Republicans should be given ten years at least in which to show that they can manage matters better than the advisers and supporters of King Manoel or King Carlos. If there is once more to be a king over the Portuguese dominions, it must be as the result of a peaceful revolution and a change of sentiment in the mass of the Portuguese people.

Meantime, the most crying need of the land is for a sane, practical, modern education, especially in all that relates to agriculture, stock-breeding, fisheries, and textile industries.



One other measure which might greatly raise the importance and prosperity of Portugal in the eyes of the world at large would be the making of Lisbon a free port, or at any rate of making access to the port of Lisbon so cheap and so easy that it became the principal place-of-call for steamers passing along Western Europe. As it is, there is a fairly good (though it might be better) service of trains with sleeping-cars between Lisbon and Calais, by which it is possible for English travellers who have good reason to dread the sea-dangers and discomforts of the western Channel and the Bay of Biscay, to travel from Charing Cross to Lisbon with only a trifling break—the crossing to Calais. They ought to be able at Lisbon to join their steamer for Brazil, West Africa, South Africa, the West Indies, New Zealand, Australia, Peru, Mexico, and all portions of the New World in the Pacific which will be reached by way of the Panama Canal. Similarly, arriving from these distant ocean voyages, they ought to be able to land, with no fuss or trouble about customs, quarantine or port regulations, at Lisbon, and there enter trains which would convey them to all parts of Europe. But innumerable bureaucratic obstacles lie in the way of this great reform, obstacles which the British Foreign Office should do its utmost to remove by pleading and explanation. It might save the life of many a sick West African official if, after a passage home over the always-smooth seas of the north-west African coast, he could land at Lisbon and thus escape the upsets, the chills, the fogs, the frights, the collisions, the wreckings, which so often occur in the Bay of Biscay and on the adjoining coasts of France and England.

The port-wine trade is slowly dying, for men and women of the most civilised nations are rapidly becoming total abstainers from alcohol in their desire to get well or remain well and live long.

Not that port wine is without many and distinct virtues ; but unfortunately those virtues are chiefly present in the undoctored wine which is only to be drunk in the country of its origin. All port wine that is exported has been made unwholesome by the addition of alcohol.

But what the owners of Portuguese vineyards should apply themselves to is a trade in fresh fruit. If there were a better

service of steamers plying between Portugal and England; we ought to receive from that region all the consignments we need of early fruit, flowers, and early vegetables, of grapes and oranges, instead of having to seek so many of these supplies from regions at a much greater distance. Portugal, in fact, under a better civil administration, with better roads, more railways, cleaner hotels, ought to be the chosen winter resort of the British people.

## VI

### BRITAIN AND AMERICA

THE greatest blunder which British foreign policy has committed in regard to America since the Napoleonic wars was the abandonment of our legitimate interests on the eastern coast of Central America. Mainly as the result of unprovoked attacks on the part of Spain, we had secured a foothold on what might be called the east coast of Guatemala, which became during the nineteenth century the colony of British Honduras. But we had equally acquired and had partially colonised the Bay Islands off the coast of Spanish Honduras, and we had exercised and acknowledged a protectorate over the Mosquito shore—that is to say, the greater part of the eastern coast of Nicaragua. The English buccaneers and pirates had been drawn into this region very much at the request of the Amerindian tribes, who desired to revenge themselves on the Spaniards for their cruelties. But for the assistance during two centuries of the Mosquito Indians, our pioneers in the trade of tropical America—dye-woods, timber, tortoiseshell, pearls, and hides—we might have had little to do with this region. As it was, we enabled the Mosquito Indians to keep themselves free of Spanish sovereignty, and they in return not only helped our seamen and traders mightily (even to the extent of accompanying our ships across the Pacific to Malaysia), but they regarded their country as being under the protection of the British King, and their own kings and chiefs as bound to receive investiture, on their accession, from the British Governor of Jamaica. Yet in 1859 we gave up the Bay Islands (where we had established colonies of Carib Indians from St. Vincent) to the Republic of Spanish Honduras, and three years earlier we had surrendered to Nicaragua our protectorate over the

Mexican coast, subject to certain stipulations which were abrogated finally a few years ago.<sup>1</sup>

We did this in the middle of the nineteenth century with the idea not only of conciliating the United States, but of encouraging that growing Power to consider herself bound by the famous Clayton-Bulwer treaty<sup>1</sup> never to acquire territory of exclusive influence in any part of Central America. This treaty (concluded in 1850) was observed by the United States as long as it was convenient. When it became inconvenient, great pressure was brought to bear upon Great Britain to cancel it, so as to leave the United States a completely free hand in Central America west of the confines of the Republic of Colombia. The only advantage we were to get out of this arrangement was the assurance that our shipping would use the projected Panama Canal on the same terms as the shipping of the United States. But in the summer of 1912 the Senate of the United States arbitrarily cancelled this portion of the treaty with Great Britain by drawing up regulations for the use of the Panama Canal which placed American shipping in a specially privileged position. Treaties, in fact, only bind the polity of the United States as long as they are convenient. They are not, really, worth the labour their negotiation entails or the paper they are written on. It is as well that this position should be realised, as it may save a great deal of fuss and disappointment in the future.

Not that the United States is at all inimical towards Great Britain. This union of fifty English-speaking, self-governing communities, which year by year develops a more national consistency and a more centralised Federal Government, tends towards an informal alliance with Great Britain, an alliance springing from a deep-seated community of interests and the strongest of all bonds—a common language. But such an alliance will never be written down, nor will it ever be possible to force the United States to do anything it does not wish to do, even to the keeping of its pledged word. But so long as we remain a free-trade country it is altogether to the interests of the United States that we shall hold a very high and authoritative

<sup>1</sup> This subject is treated of more in detail in my book *The Negro in the New World*.

place in the councils of Europe. And if the United Kingdom were ever in serious danger from a hostile European coalition, it is a prophecy almost certain of fulfilment that a fleet would sail from the United States to her rescue.

In governing all our policy in regard to the larger West India Islands and Central America there must be the conviction that our traders and capitalists work here with the assent and support of the United States, otherwise their enterprises are on an insecure footing. United States interference with Cuba has resulted in a gain to British commercial enterprise rather than a loss, in spite of the egregious preference given to United States imports by their exemption from customs duties. Canadians have built great railways almost throughout the entire length of Cuba, Englishmen have settled there as cattle-breeders and owners of sugar and other plantations. Even the British trade with the Negro Republic of Haiti has improved since the United States began to take a more active part in the re-organisation of that distracted Republic, and the same is the case in regard to Santo Domingo, alongside. When civil troubles in Mexico threatened life and property, the first hope expressed by the resident British or by the great corporations dealing with Mexican affairs in London, was that, if need be, law and order might be restored by the arms of the United States.

The one requirement necessary for our peace of mind in regard to all this region, is that the United States shall not extend a Protectionist, preferential policy across its present borders if it should feel obliged to assume political control over any part of Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua or Costa Rica. If the States maintain a fair field and no favour for all law-abiding persons who come thither for trade and industry, then not only Great Britain, but the world at large will be grateful to the United States for intervening (if need be) to save Central America from its chaotic political conditions, from the devastating ambitions of a Zelaya, a Diaz, a Barrios, or a Bonilla.

South America, on the other hand, lies possibly for all time beyond the direct tutelage of the Anglo-Saxon, or at any rate of the Anglo-Saxon as typified by the Government of the

United States. Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, are nations with an assured future emanating from their own populations. As it was said of Italy, *faranno da se*. The same phrase may perhaps be applied to Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, though not with quite such confidence. Peru at any rate stands convicted by the Putumayo exposures of an eighteenth-century intolerance in religion and an utter unfitness to govern or protect the tribes of aborigines whom Fate has most unhappily committed to her conscience-less charge. It is curious, moreover, that she has been allowed by what public opinion there is in South America to steal in behind the more kindly state of Ecuador (kindly at any rate, so far as the Amerindian people are concerned) and take away her hinterland. Vengeance, perhaps, for the slaughtered Indians may come some day from clean Chile or from Bolivia, who may combine forces in the regeneration of Peru and restore the Empire of the Incas in its fullest extent. There are signs of real progress in the much smaller territory of Ecuador, an important land owing to the rare qualities of its cacao, its 'vegetable ivory' (*jagua* nuts) its 'Panama' hats of plaited palm-bast, and its indications of great wealth in precious and other metals. Both Bolivia and Colombia—especially the former—seem to have entered on a phase of settled government and commercial prosperity.

Brazil is in some respects the most important—as it is far and away the biggest—country in South America. But it is not in such an assured position as either Chile or Argentina. This republic of twenty-one states is so vast (3,219,000 square miles), the different states are so independent of metropolitan control, and the really progressive parts are so far away down in the south, that European financiers are not altogether confident of the safety of their investments in the valley of the Amazons, and the states of Amazonas, Pará, and Bahia; though it must be admitted that the British- and American-constructed river steamships and railways of Brazil have not so far disappointed investors. Still, the steady incoming of European colonists of good quality will eventually build up a white race capable of governing the whole area efficiently. So far as natural resources go, Brazil is the most richly endowed of all the American

nations, scarcely excepting the United States.<sup>1</sup> Poor little Paraguay, the child of tears of the South American states, is probably, and has been all its independent political life, the worst governed of the Spanish-speaking republics; and it would be a happy thing for its inhabitants if they strangled their pride instead of garrotting one another, and joined the federation of the Argentine, which now has an annual trade worth something like £47,000,000.

Great Britain's chief interest in South America (where her investments in money-value exceed *by far* those of any other foreign nation) is the maintenance of Free Trade all round, and the fending-off of any intrusive foreign interest which might attempt to transform one or other of the struggling republics into a colonial dependency with preferential treatment for the nation intervening in its affairs. We have the most material reasons for supporting the independence of South America; for the returns for 1911 show that the trade for that year of the United Kingdom alone with the ten republics of South America amounted to nearly £106,000,000 in value. The only suggestion of uneasiness as to the commercial future of these republics is the fact that the United States has constructed or has recently acquired almost all the South American railways except the few British lines in Brazil. If the United States should seek, through what will soon become its monopoly of land transport, to establish preferential rates or create other privileges for American citizens, then serious trouble would arise. [See the articles on this subject in the *Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales* for December 15, 1912, and January 1st, 1913.]

In summing up British interests in South and Central America, we must not overlook, even though it be regarded as a Colonial subject and not a portion of our foreign policy, the immense importance to us in the future, for trade and national influence, of British Tropical America. We should do our utmost to weave into a loosely-knit confederation the British West Indian colonies and the states of British Guiana and

<sup>1</sup> British (United Kingdom) trade with Brazil is of an annual value of about £28,000,000; that of the United States with Brazil about £28,500,000; that of Germany with Brazil, about £14,000,000.

**British Honduras.** Together they would form a superficies of something like 111,000 square miles, with a population of some 70,000 whites and 2,000,000 of blacks and yellows. The sum total of their annual trade is very considerable in value—£21,450,000, approximately, for the year 1911. They should constitute a separate, integral portion of the British Empire, not to be absorbed by Canada, however close the trade relations may become. While preserving that degree of local government necessitated by the geographical separation of each unit of islands or groups of islands or mainland territories, they should, as far as possible, adopt a common cohesive policy in their arrangements for defence, their participation in the Imperial councils, their system of higher education, of mail service and telegraphic communication, and above all in their impartiality on the colour question.



## VII

### THE FAR EAST AND NEAR EAST

THE future possibilities of our foreign policy in regard to the independent nations of Asia, have already been discussed in dealing with the aspirations of Russia. The alliance with Japan has been productive of nothing but good—so far as the British interests have been concerned, has even possibly assisted to bring about better relations between Japan and the United States, Japan and China. Japanese claims to eastern Manchuria will probably be intensified in course of time until that province is added to Korea, whilst Russia takes northern Manchuria, and China definitely annexes (Manchuria having hitherto lain outside 'China proper') the south-western portion of this Tataric region. In any arrangements of this kind between Russia and Japan, and between these two Powers and China, there is no call for British interference save to insist on trading rights not being abrogated; but if such an allotment of Manchuria takes place, British influence will probably be brought to bear on the councils of these Powers to secure for China that portion of Manchuria which lies between the Willow Palisade and the Liao-ho River, besides the eastern desert of Gobi, the great desert of Shamo, and the districts of Ordós and Alashan. Otherwise, Russian and Japanese garrisons would be brought much too near to Peking. With the southern half of Sakhalien, with Korea and Eastern Manchuria in her possession (besides Formosa acquired nearly twenty years ago) Japan has considerable outlets for the energies of her abundant home population. And the question of further Japanese ambitions in the direction of the Philippines can be shelved to a period lying beyond the activities of the present generation.

As regards China, our commercial interests are very

important,<sup>1</sup> but not such as need give us any national concern in the fate of the far outlying provinces of Mongolia beyond the Shamo Desert, Zungaria or Turkestan. China would probably be wise in allowing those regions to come under Russian protection, since the indigenous peoples are much more nearly related to the races and tribes of Russian Asia and have frequently rebelled against Chinese rule.

In regard to Tibet, the affairs of that region must be reserved for exclusive discussion between the British Indian Empire on the one hand, and China on the other. We shall probably not oppose continuance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet if that protectorate coincides with fair treatment of the Tibetans, and if at the same time it no longer opposes the free passage of Europeans through this plateau region. China has already found that a policy of isolation in the existing state of the world is impossible. No one division or nation of humanity is entitled to wall itself in and say it will have no intercourse with its neighbours. It is quite reasonable on the part of the Tibetans to object to being included within the British Indian Empire, and in that direction their desire for independence has been respected; but there can no longer be isolation. Trade routes must be opened up between British India and Lhasa and any other centre of trade in Tibet. The Chinese authorities must cease to stir up disaffection against the British in the valley of the Brahmaputra River or in Bhutan or on the borders of Yunnan. The Tibetans, it must be remembered, are a very distinct people from the Chinese, and are related in language and race with the Bhutanese and the Burmese. The preferable arrangement of Tibetan affairs after the march to Lhasa would have been the establishment of Tibet as an independent country like Afghanistan, with its foreign affairs conducted through the Government of British India and its territory guaranteed by the strength of that Empire. But the alternative policy was adopted of recognising anew Chinese sovereignty and responsibility, and this attitude can only fairly be maintained (when

<sup>1</sup> An annual trade of about £49,750,000 in value between the United Kingdom, Hong-Kong, and China, besides investments in railways and mines. The annual trade between British India and Australia and China amounts to another £7,000,000 in annual value.

China has had time to turn round and assert herself if it is rewarded by the eventual opening of Tibet to all law-abiding people who may wish to resort thither for trade or exploration.

Siam has probably attained a long period of peace and absence of apprehension from foreign ambitions since the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement in 1896. By that agreement the British Empire has secured a recognition of its special political interests in the Salwin River basin and throughout the Malay Peninsula. Subsequently Siam has ceded to Great Britain her rights over the Malay States of Kelantan, Trengganu and Keda. Siam in the immediate future of Asiatic developments will probably be the Portugal of the Far East—an independent, well-governed, progressive State in close alliance with the British Empire, and protected from outside aggression by the strength of that Empire, so long as treaty stipulations are observed.

No inter-European trouble is likely to arise over the affairs of Afghanistan, the only other conterminous Power—Russia—having recognised Afghanistan as being exclusively within the British sphere of influence. No British Government is likely to attempt once more the conquest of Afghanistan if the ruler and people of that country behave themselves properly. Yet it is conceivable that if Afghanistan continues its intrigues with the border populations of North-west India, attempts to make itself a great storehouse of arms and ammunition which shall be ready to feed some vast Muhammadan Indian rebellion, then the definite conquest of Afghanistan may be forced on the British Empire as the only alternative to losing control over India. It is probable that it would prove as easy and rapid of accomplishment as the Russian occupation of Turkestan. Our previous defeats and disasters in Afghanistan have either been the results of exceptional incapacity on the part of British generals (balanced by splendid victories), or to apprehension of trouble with Russia in that direction, an apprehension now set at rest by the agreement of 1908. Similarly, Baluchistan, both semi-independent and Persian, is already delimited as a sphere exclusively reserved for British political direction.

This brings us to the contemplation of Arabia, and here likewise political arrangements are nearly completed. By

the 1909 agreement with Turkey our sphere of influence in Arabia starts in the north-east from the Bahrein Islands and the middle of the south coast of the Persian Gulf and crosses Arabia to its south-western extremity opposite Perim Island. Treaties concluded with independent Arab chiefs outside the now somewhat large protectorate of Aden, bring all Southern Arabia within the British sphere of influence; that is to say, these chiefs in treaty with us have pledged themselves not to cede or sell any portion of their territories to other Powers. We own the Kuria Muria Islands off the coast of Oman. The Imamate of Oman and the territory of the 'trucial' chiefs on the Persian Gulf are virtually within the British sphere. It is true that the principality of Oman is recognised as independent by both France and Britain, neither Power being able to establish a protectorate over it by the self-denying ordinance of 1863. These restrictions probably do not affect our arrangements with the small chieftainships to the west of Oman, any more than they have prevented our assuming a protectorate over the Bahrein Islands and the little state of Koweit at the north-west angle of the Persian Gulf. But they have hampered our dealings with Oman, especially the port of Maskat, in putting an end to the arms traffic with Afghanistan. Ships of various nationalities, some under our own flag, others—Arab vessels—from the Red Sea, Réunion, and Madagascar, under the French flag, have hitherto been bringing out large quantities of rifles and ammunition and landing them at places within the Oman territory, whence they were shipped across the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman, to Baluchistan, and then conveyed up country to Afghanistan. France has not been willing hitherto to release us from our pledge not to assert a British control over Oman, but has nevertheless permitted us to take measures with the ruler of that country which shall put a stop to the traffic in firearms with the Indian frontier or Afghanistan—measures, however, which are now said to be ineffective. Here the matter must rest for a period; but if the advance of Russia in one direction, of Germany or Turkey in another, should bring other European interests to bear on the affairs of the Persian Gulf, it would probably be necessary for us to make some friendly arrangement

with France so that there could be no question of British control over Oman or over the territories of the trucial chiefs. Koweit may be retained as a small British protected territory, serving as the port probably of an eventual railway from Egypt to the Persian Gulf; or we may have received sufficient guarantees of Arabian independence to remove our shield which at present protects the Amirate of Koweit from absorption into the Turkish dominions.

If the Turkish Empire is to dissolve, or, as seems more likely in regard to its Asiatic possessions, to be taken in hand by a committee of European nations, the question will arise, what is to be done about Arabia? The least disagreeable solution of the Syrian problem will probably be to encourage a French protectorate over Syria, limited in area and dealing chiefly with Damascus, the Lebanon, Palmyra and Homs. Judæa and Midian might grow by degrees into a Jewish state, wherein at last the Jews, discontented with life in Eastern Europe, might find a home and an honourable status as citizens. The new Jewish kingdom should extend from Hermon on the north to the land of Midian and the Red Sea on the south. The German protectorate over Mesopotamia would extend southwards beyond the Euphrates to the Wadi Hauran and the borders of the great Nefud Desert. Arabia, south of Mesopotamia and Judæa and north of the British sphere, ought to be a region independent of European interference and be divided up into the self-governing states of Al Hijaz, Yaman, and Nijd, the little Amirate of Koweit on the Persian Gulf remaining a distinct entity, possibly a British protectorate. Al Hijaz would, of course, include Mekka and Medina and probably be ruled by the Grand Sherif of Mekka as an independent prince. Yaman is practically governed autonomously already by the Arab leader whose capital is at Saná. Nijd or Nejd has always been independent of Turkey or of any other Power. No one would wish to interfere with it provided that on its Persian Gulf coastline of Al Hasa it did not promote piracy or slave-trading. Already there exists an agreement between Britain and Turkey by which the frontier separating Yaman from Aden is extended north-eastward till it reaches the Persian Gulf at or near the peninsula of Al Katar. The

Aden territory and protectorate are of fairly large extent, and all along the south coast of Arabia (the Hadramaut) the various Sultans of the small Arab states have been (as already stated) in special treaty relations with Great Britain since 1885. Provided they adhere to the terms of their treaties we do not wish to interfere further with them; their relations with India, both commercial and political, are somewhat intimate. The important Arab state of Oman is generally considered to extend southwards to the coast opposite the Kuria Muria Islands, which last are a British possession. I have already related that, owing to our 1863 treaty with France, we are precluded (without her consent) from establishing a British protectorate over Oman, even though that act is desired by the Imam of Maskat. But it is a British protectorate in all but name, and is so intimately bound up with the affairs of Baluchistan and British India that a way will probably be found before long of adjusting British and French ambitions in this direction so that Oman may be definitely incorporated in the British Empire. Over the territory of the trucial chiefs and Al Katar on the south shore of the Persian Gulf, together with the adjoining Bahrein Islands, we may already be said to exercise a protectorate, avowed or unavowed. This coastline is described on old maps as the Pirate Coast, and our control over it has resulted from our attempts to put down piracy in the Persian Gulf.

The little island of Perim in the middle of the Straits of Bab al Mandib has long been a British possession; but immediately opposite Perim, across a narrow channel of seawater, is the Arab town and harbour of Sheikh Said, over which, since the sixties of the last century, there have been French claims.<sup>1</sup> Up till the present time the French have refrained from enforcing their claims to Sheikh Said in the desire not to raise a subject of quarrel with Great Britain. The favoured passage for ships passing into and out of the Red Sea lies through the narrow strait between Perim and Sheikh Said, and there is no doubt that the possession of this place, if it were fortified with modern artillery, would be a most serious menace to British and other shipping. Hitherto Great Britain has evaded the question by

<sup>1</sup> The history of Sheikh Said is well described in *Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales*, for November 1, 1912, by Mons. Brunet-Millon.

regarding Sheikh Said as being Turkish territory. France, however, still maintains her claims, though she has not enforced them by occupation. That she has certain claims is indisputable, but either they may be considered to have lapsed or in any case their enforcement would be a very unfriendly act towards Great Britain, as a French garrison at Sheikh Said would really give France control over the Red Sea. So, it might be remarked, would the cession of this place to Britain. But we have already begged the question by our seizure of Aden in 1839, and, so far as we are concerned, the situation would not be any worse than it is at present for other European Powers if we extended our Aden colony for a mile or two westwards to include Sheikh Said. It might be said that the best solution is that Sheikh Said should remain a portion of Yaman, as it is considered at the present day to be, by Great Britain. But the question then arises, if any settlement of affairs in the Muhammadan East is to take place between the European Powers, whether a place like this, which practically neutralises Perim and might become a serious menace to European shipping using the Red Sea route to India, is not better placed under some kind of control from Great Britain than as the southernmost point in an independent Arab state.

Perhaps in regard to both Sheikh Said and Oman it may be possible to come to terms with France in other directions, such as the cession of the north-west portion of British Somaliland (much of the coast region of Somaliland must be maintained for the provisioning of Aden). The French have made rather a success of their small Somaliland colony, and are desirous of extending it so as to include Zeila. The British protectorate over the Arab island of Sokotra, at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden, gives us a sufficient security for the free navigation of this part of the Indian Ocean, and in ceding Zeila to France we should not yield any point of strategic importance.

## VIII

### THE CONDUCT OF OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS

It is obvious that great difficulty will attend the organisation of our Foreign Office of the future so that it may represent as fully and as fairly the people of Canada, the West Indies, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Egypt, the African Protectorates, the Indian Empire, and Malaysia, as it does the 45,000,000 of Great Britain and Ireland. At present the constitution of this branch of the public service is not satisfactory in theory, though, as so often happens in our illogical history, it works out not at all badly in practice. At the present time the tax-payers of the United Kingdom (and to a small degree those of India) alone find the money—some £689,040 per annum—for the upkeep of our extensive diplomatic and consular services. These services are more highly paid than those of any other nation in the world, though not—as regards the consular corps, all minor diplomatic and Foreign Office posts—as well paid as they should be. Although a British consul in the United States, in France, in Germany, in China, is required to give just as close attention to the affairs of a Canadian, an Australian, a New Zealander, or a South African as he does to those of the natives of the United Kingdom and of India, the whole of his pay and allowances, all the expenses connected with his work, are paid for out of the Budget annually voted in the British House of Commons. In regard to consulates in Asiatic Turkey, Persia, and Siam, the Indian Government contributes nearly all the money. Not a penny on behalf of our Diplomatic, Colonial, and Foreign Office services comes to us from the national exchequers of the great daughter nations.

On the other hand, until quite recently, the daughter nations



have complained, firstly, that the selection of candidates for the Diplomatic and Consular Corps is limited to natives of Great Britain and Ireland ;<sup>1</sup> and secondly, that they were not adequately consulted by the British Foreign or even Colonial Offices regarding their interests in all matters in relation to foreign Powers. Treaties have been made of which their Governments were only apprised, as a rule, through the public Press. This last complaint has generally been a case of much cry and little wool ; as a matter of fact, I happen to know that as a rule the permanent officials of the Imperial Offices have been just as anxious to know how such-and-such an arrangement would affect Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Canada, or South Africa, as to appraise its bearing on the commerce and security of Great Britain ; and that drafts of all but a very few agreements and treaties are submitted to the principal Colonial Governors for their consideration and that of their cabinets. But we have been informed more or less authoritatively within the last two years that arrangements have been made by which the responsible authorities in each of our daughter-nations have been fully initiated into the foreign policy of the mother-country, have been invited to approve of it or to express their disapproval ; and it is generally assumed, *nemine contradicente*, that whatever may be the foreign policy of the present Administration it meets with the concurrence—I do not say wisely, because, like most other people outside the walls of the Government Offices, I do not know what our foreign policy is—of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. Consequently, if our foreign policy is to lead us into war, we are assured beforehand of all the support which these daughter-nations may be able to give in contingents of men and in contributions of money.

But the arrangement would be a far better one, I think.

<sup>1</sup> The regulations in force provide that candidates for entrance by examination into the Diplomatic and Foreign Office services must be British subjects, born within the United Kingdom, whose parents must likewise have been British subjects born in the United Kingdom. In the Consular service the rule is nearly equally strong ; but in both cases the Secretary of State may, if he judges it to be advisable, depart from this rule and appoint British subjects born elsewhere than in the United Kingdom. This being so, the maintenance of this theoretical exclusiveness in selection is rather foolish.

if it were more clearly defined and more open to discussion; if each self-governing portion of the Empire contributed an annual payment towards the cost of the Foreign Office, Diplomatic and Consular services, on the understanding that entry into such services was equally open to natives of the daughter-states as to people of the mother-country, and that appointments and promotions to all important posts were not entirely the prerogative of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,<sup>1</sup> but resulted from 'the Secretary of State-in-Council'; which Council would consist of the Agents-General of the daughter-nations, the Secretary of State for India, and possibly the Secretaries of State for Ireland and Scotland (as they may some day be called when matters of local government have been properly adjusted in the United Kingdom). This, I imagine, is somewhat the way in which great Indian appointments are made, namely, not through the whim or unsupported opinion of the Secretary of State for India, but by the Secretary of State-in-Council.

Sufficiently consulted as to the Imperial foreign policy and the personalities to represent that policy abroad, there could be no excuse then for the daughter-nations evading, somewhat meanly, their proportionate share in the cost of maintaining this service. The proportion, no doubt, would be calculated on the population of each separate state of the Empire, and perhaps also on the average volume of its trade.

Royal Commissions have met, and perhaps have reported, on measures which might be taken to widen the class of citizens from which selections are made by the Foreign Office for appointment to its home service and to its large corps of

<sup>1</sup> In theory, of course, the Crown appoints all commissioned Diplomatic and Consular officers, and revokes their commissions. But in practice the selection for all the minor posts is generally made by the Foreign Secretary's private secretary and adopted by the Foreign Secretary, unless he chooses to make a personal selection; while the great posts are either filled up by the Foreign Secretary off his own bat, or are a matter of Cabinet discussion or agreement: all names, of course, for anything at all important being discussed with the Sovereign himself before the last-named agrees and appoints. Candidates for entry into the Foreign Office, Diplomatic, and Consular services are 'selected' (theoretically) by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and then pass before a Board of Selection composed of a few Foreign Office permanent officials who 'recommend' certain of these candidates for 'nomination.' The nominees must then pass an examination before they are appointed.

representatives abroad, Consular and Diplomatic. It is to be hoped that one or other of these Commissions will with a large mind, infected with new ideas on the subject of education, look into the educational tests imposed on the candidates. The subjects in which *Consular* officials are supposed to be examined before selection for commissioned posts are seemingly eight in number and reasonable in character. They consist of (1) *English Composition*, (2) *the making of a Précis of Correspondence* on a subject likely to come within the scope of Consular affairs; (3) *Law*, as it affects commerce, shipping, etc.; (4) *Arithmetic*; (5) *Commercial Geography*; (6) *Political Economy*; (7) *French*; (8) *German or Spanish*.

Candidates for the Student Interpreterships, which supply the special Consular service of the Levant, China, Japan and Siam, are examined in much the same subjects as are set forth below for entry into the Establishment of the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic service. And whatever may be said about the general Consular service examination programme—on the whole a suitable and rational one—any critic in matters of education, untrammelled by convention and fetish-worship, must admit that the scheme of thirty-six or thirty-eight subjects for these Levantine and Far Eastern Student Interpreterships, Foreign Office and Diplomatic appointments can only have been drawn up by an unpractical pedant, whose intelligence is still in the nineteenth century. No course of study, for example, is indicated for the fitting of these Student Interpreters for a useful life in Asia or Morocco. Much to-do about Greek ancient history and Aristotelean philosophy—nothing about Buddha or Confucius, Muhammad or the Sufi mysticism: absolutely no references at all to Asia or North Africa.

These thirty-eight subjects are: *English Composition* (for which only 500 marks are allowed, though it is one of the most important on the list); *Sanskrit* (800 marks), a dead language of some utility to a specialist in Philology or to a certain but rare type of Indian official, but of no use whatsoever in modern diplomacy; *Arabic* (a good subject if *modern Arabic* is taught; but as a rule, and judging from the published specimen questions, the Arabic expected from candidates at the F.O., trained at an English University, is an extinct form of the language, scarcely

intelligible in the Eastern world of to-day); *Greek* (Ancient of course—Modern Greek, which is useful in the Levant, being ignored alike by the English Universities, the Civil Service Commissioners, and the Eleventh Edition of the 'Encyclopædia Britannica'); *Latin*; the *English Language and Literature*; *French* (obligatory); *German* (obligatory, very rightly, but only, like French, rewarded by 600 marks all told, whereas Ancient Greek and Latin each offer 1100 marks to the student); *Italian or Spanish* (also only carrying 600 marks); *Lower Mathematics* (i.e. Arithmetic, but of a fiendishly difficult kind: this is loaded with 1200 marks, but is rarely taken up by candidates, who are passed into the public service without the certitude that they can add or subtract correctly!); *Higher Mathematics* (the equipment of a Brunel or an Astronomer Royal—1200 marks, but seldom or never taken up); *Natural Science*—Chemistry, Physics, Geology, Botany, Zoology, Animal Physiology, and Geography (for Geography, perhaps the most important subject in the whole list, only 600 marks are allowed); *Greek History* (Ancient, of course!—since Oxford, the inspirer of these curricula, was choked off Scripture History a little while ago, she has clung with a passionate fervour to the last rags of her out-worn medieval religion—the worship of Judæa, Greece and Rome); *Roman History*, stopping in the high and dry times before the thrilling Decline and Fall; *English History* (poorly rewarded by 800 marks in all); *General Modern History* (only gets 500 marks); *Logic and Psychology* (!); *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy* (!); *Political Science* (whatever that may be); *Roman Law*; and *English Law*. You will observe that there is no course of International Law put forward (a knowledge of which would be of practical use to the Consular and Diplomatic services), but this subject is brought with some vagueness within the limits of 'Political Science'; though to judge from the kind of questions put to examinees in 1911, Political Science included matter that might almost be classed as ethnology and the history of religions.

Seeing that the object of these examinations is to select from a number of candidates the best and most useful type of young man to serve His Majesty's Government abroad in the Consular and Diplomatic careers, or at home as clerks and

eventually Under-Secretaries in the Foreign Office, surely the Civil Service Commissioners, in the opening years of the twentieth century, could have devised a scope of subjects more calculated to elicit able and useful members of the Imperial Foreign Service? The first on their list, and the branch of knowledge for which most marks were to be allotted, ought to have been *Geography*. This, like *French* and *German*, *simple Arithmetic*, and *European History*, should be marked 'essential.' Yet I noticed that it was practically absent from the subjects in which successful candidates passed into all branches of the Foreign services in 1911.<sup>1</sup> Next to *Geography* for importance should come *Anthropology*, or at any rate, *Ethnology*, the Science of the Nations—some degree of preparation in the

<sup>1</sup> It might be interesting to give here what these favourite subjects were, in the case of the successful candidates of 1911: *English Composition*, *Ancient Greek* and *Latin*, *Spanish*, *English History*, *Modern History*, *Political Science*, *Political Economy*, and of course the obligatory *French* and *German*. No one took up *Zoology*, *Botany*, or *Mathematics*. *Geology* was only chosen by one candidate (and he was unsuccessful); while the melancholy 'tosh' passing under the names of 'Logic and Psychology' and 'Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy,' was studied and passed in by only one candidate—a student-interpreter, possibly for comparison with the equally fruitless forms of learned silliness which he would meet with in China. Only two amongst the many aspirants as much as looked at the questions in *Logic*, *Psychology*, *Metaphysics*, and *Philosophy*—which had been, no doubt, prepared at some expense of public money by professors of the University of Laputa.

In case the foregoing remarks are thought disrespectful, I would refer my readers to the specimen questions given in the August Examination of 1911 (published by the Civil Service Commission—*Competitions for appointment as Clerk in the Foreign Office*, etc.—to be purchased through any bookseller, price one shilling). Amongst these questions were, 'What has been the relation of *Intuitionism* to *Utilitarianism* in *British Moral Theory* before *Mill*?' and 'What reasons have we to believe that other persons exist?' (One would have thought the examiner could satisfy himself on this point by getting someone to pinch him). "All idealism must be subjective idealism." Criticise this. 'Can the claim that the *Dictum de omni et de nullo* is the fundamental principle of *sylogistic inference* be sustained?' etc.

This out-of-date spinning of word-rubbish, worthy of the scarifying caricature of a Burnand or a Mark Twain, may have been of use for argie-bargling with time-wasting Greeks in warm weather in the porch, or beneath the groves of Academe, or for delaying the meal of an intelligent ogre in pre-history; or they might even serve as subjects for debate in young men's or young women's Unions for Intellectual Improvement in a north-country town. But of what earthly use would an acquaintance with all the tricks of speech of this sort in *Metaphysics*, *Logic*, and *Psychology* be to a British Secretary of Embassy at the court of Wilhelm II, or a student-interpreter at Smyrna; or to an Envoy to the Argentine, who must know the facts about the foot-and-mouth disease from A to Z, the prices of British shorthorn bulls, or how to get an English governess out of the household of a disreputable *rastaquouère*?

science of humanity as a species, which will give the young fellow entering on this career abroad a general acquaintance with the characteristics of the diverse races and peoples of mankind, the least recondite of their manners and customs, their religions, prejudices and parliaments. The necessity for this preliminary study of racial classification cannot be over-estimated. Amongst other essential subjects for examination should be *Zoology* of a simple character, especially those branches of *Zoology* which enlighten us on germ-diseases of trypanosomes and amoebae spread by various forms of higher life<sup>1</sup>; (2) on the distribution of fauna and of those species of wild beast, bird, reptile, fish, crustacean, and insect, which enter into the operations of commerce or affect agriculture or diverse industries; (3) on the more important breeds of domestic beasts and birds and their diseases. *Botany*, though not perhaps 'essential,' is a most valuable item in the intellectual equipment of a British representative abroad, who may be called upon to report on forest fires and their effect on the climate of adjoining British countries; on forestry; and on the preservation of rare or remarkable species of tree or plant, or the extirpation of poisonous weeds or fungi. *Geology* is similarly important, especially in the South American States, in North Africa and Asia Minor, with its branches of mineralogy, its inquiries into oil springs and coal measures. *Meteorology* (a study of the weather) might also be included among the branches of Natural Science in which an examinee could qualify, though I doubt if Chemistry be really necessary to foreign-service officials, who after all must not be overloaded with knowledge and who can get the chemistry needed for their reports done for them by local specialists. In the same way, a knowledge of Higher Mathematics is not to be looked for in Diplomatic or Consular officials who are not going to be bridge-builders or astronomers. I have known men in both services who had qualified in algebra and dizzy developments of mathematics and yet had to get somebody else to turn metric or other measures and weights into their English equivalents. Though logarithms, the differential calculus and

<sup>1</sup> It is only fair to say this is dealt with in the Civil Service Commissioners' examinations; but this subject not being obligatory is seldom or never taken up.

algebra may safely be left on one side in the mental furniture of a good consul or ambassador, a knowledge of the simple rules of *Arithmetic* and of account-keeping should be expected of all candidates at these examinations, as well as conversance with all the less abstruse foreign weights and measures and the metric system, the centigrade thermometer, and foreign money-values. A superficial acquaintance with the main principles of *International Law* and a history of the principal treaties of the world since 1648, also as much of *English Law* as applies to questions of extradition, of patents, of copyright, of commercial transactions and shipping, should be expected of every candidate; and sufficient Political Economy to grasp the problems of the position of women in a civilised community, the main features of the Free-Trade-versus-Protection-and-Preference-schemes, and (historically) the bearings on the Labour question of the Slave-trade. Some study of Political Economy would also satisfy the future diplomatist that what is often stigmatised as 'Socialism' to-day is the smooth-working readjustment of burdens to-morrow. (I only make this reference because the examiners touch here and there on Socialism in their politico-economic questions.) These subjects, with a requisite attention to linguistics, complete (in my opinion) the list of things which members of our foreign services or of the Foreign Office might be desired to know. Summarised, they would read as follows, essentials being printed in Italics: *English Composition, Geography, French, German, and one other language,*<sup>1</sup> *Anthropology*

<sup>1</sup> *French and German*, all are agreed, are 'essential.' The examinee has probably learnt all the Latin he requires at school—enough, at any rate, to be able to translate the familiar tags of diplomatic phrases—the *statu quo*, the *do ut des*, the *beati possidentes*—which still enter into conversation. But persons selected for foreign service should, above all, exhibit facility in the acquirement of languages, and it would not be too severe a test of candidates to expect them to pass in a *third language*, besides French and German. The list of languages offered to them might consist of *Russian, Arabic, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and Modern Greek*. *Russian* is most important, as the speech of what will be soon 200,000,000 of people living on 8,000,000 square miles of Europe and Asia. *Russian*, moreover, is an excellent preparation for the later acquiring of Polish, Chekh, and Yugo-Slav. (Yugo-Slav—Serbian, Croatian, etc.—will soon be spoken by 12,000,000 of people in Austria and Balkania, and yet I doubt whether any Civil Service Commissioner, stuffed with Ancient Greek and classical Latin, ever heard of this South Slavonic speech.) For *Russian* should be given higher marks than for either French or German, because it is exceedingly difficult. *Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese* should be rated low in marking because of their simplicity.

(or more correctly, *Ethnology*), *Law* (as defined above), *Arithmetic* of a simple kind, *Zoology*, *Modern History* (British, European, American, Asiatic, and African), and *Political Economy* (treated in a sensible, human, and modern style). In addition to the eleven essential subjects, *one* of the following must also be taken up by a candidate: Botany, Geology, or Meteorology.

But a noteworthy feature in all examinations for the Consular and Diplomatic services should be the selection—not so much of pedants with bulging brows, or University students addle-pated with crammed learning of a useless type, but—of hearty, personable, manly, shrewd, business-like, observant, and well-informed young men, who may be employed in foreign countries as the eyes and ears and mouth-pieces of the British Imperial Government; as the makers of friendships, the detectors of plots, the protectors of British subjects, the advocates of British commerce; men who shall be no *fainéant* holders of nice posts, no raffish courtiers of married hours (unless thereby they can obtain an order for British toilette preparations), no languid *dilettanti*, concentrating all their time and abilities on collecting or discussing *bric-à-brac*; but members of a wide-spread Intelligence division. Not for the purpose of prying into defence secrets and disguised armaments—that work comes under another department—but to keep the Secretary of State informed as to the real temper and purpose of a people or a ruler, to collect and transmit all information likely to benefit British trade and industries or to interest British science. Our diplomatists must be good negotiators, and sufficiently versed in law to avoid pitfalls and to know when the cause they are asked to take up is a rotten one; sufficiently shrewd and kindly, however, to get any real grievance righted without the necessity for a Press agitation. But it is equally important that the younger men—all, in fact, except those who occupy the very highest posts and have attained the quiet privileges of advanced years—should be able to *ride*, to *understand shooting* even if they are not to report on military manœuvres, and *should possess considerable physical vigour*. They ought at any rate to impress foreign nations with the good physique of the British people.

Indeed, the first test in all examinations should be a *bodily* one. No candidate should get beyond the Advisory Board who



had bad teeth, a serious stutter, or exceptionally defective eyesight. A pleasant and ingratiating appearance, a good manner—unaffected, frank, neither sullen nor scornful, shy nor froward—should receive, together with *physical vigour and proficiency in manly sports*, a preliminary bonus in marks which should atone in some slight measure for deficiencies in scholarship.

It would also be an excellent prologue to diplomacy and to the work of a consul if the candidate selected to be examined had served for a short period in the regular army, the militia, or the Territorials, or had at least been for some time in the Boy Scouts or in a school Cadet Corps. Preference might in the first place be given to *those who could show service for three years in the Territorials or in the Royal Naval Reserve, or merchant service*. There may be some readers who loathe fault-finding with existing institutions and who will object to these criticisms of the present methods for sifting and selecting the members of our Foreign service. They will ask if things are not, after all, very well in spite of examinations in Metaphysics and Ancient Greek. They will point to Sir Barnaby Bampton-Boo and the Right Hon. Applebody Bland and Lord Eaglerange of Ambukol as examples of efficient public servants, unaware that those distinguished men, and not a few others among existing, retiring, and retired ambassadors and heads of missions, consuls-general and smart vice-consuls, have never passed any examination at all. So far have these examinations been from providing the ideal Diplomatic or Consular representative, or even Foreign Office official, that the Foreign Secretary under all recent administrations has (with the powers conferred on him) frequently imported men from outside into these services who had never passed any Foreign Office examination. Such have been lawyers (like the late Sir Julian Pauncefoot), soldiers, writers, explorers, ex-members of Parliament, Cabinet Ministers, doctors, and ex-missionaries. The men chosen had usually special aptitudes. But there is no reason why, if we had a properly selected staff of foreign representatives, these importations from the outside (occasioning as they do great bitterness and a sense of unfairness among men who have borne the burden and heat of the day) should take place. Clearly the stipulations as to selection and appoint-

ment and the vaunted examinations did not produce in all directions the class of man wanted in the foreign service.

One of the monstrously anachronistic and insolently snobbish conditions at present in force is that all candidates for Foreign Office or Diplomatic service must have an income or allowance of a minimum £400 a year. The plan of the Foreign Office is to pay its junior employes in these services very little for the first few years of their employment. I believe the idea is that for some three years, while they are forgetting the Greek, the Metaphysics, the Ancient Roman History, the Scripture History, or whatever other useless educational lumber they have brought with them from school or university, and while they are acquiring real knowledge of men and cities, they are not worth much salary. But a business-like Empire should not act thus. It would not do so in its great commercial enterprises, and in its supreme political departments it is surely more necessary than anywhere else to have men who from the very commencement of their work know what they are about, and do not need to waste valuable time in getting the first smatterings of their special education?

There is no reason but the inherent snobbishness of our statesmen which prevents the Consular and Diplomatic services from being fused, to all intents and purposes. Consular work in the great commercial centres and seaports would be an excellent apprenticeship for the Chancellery and the Legation. There are many officers in our magnificent merchant service who waltz quite as well as the smartest attaché at Vienna or Berlin; and several embassies in the past have really pivoted on the talents of some scarcely-mentioned dragoman, some vice-consul-interpreter of mixed parentage, in an absurd frock coat and quite out of society, who knew all the secrets and kept them most faithfully and loyally, who deciphered the telegrams and drafted in three languages most of the despatches, and interviewed similar, necessary, permanent drudges in the land—not of his exile, but—of his birth. Have not we who have travelled and served all met such? The man with a comic, almost a pet name, amongst the staff of the Chancellery, entirely unknown in personality at the Foreign Office—a mere name attached to a small salary in the Foreign Office list? Yet a most trusty

servant of the Empire, and the real reason why we found out *this* and halted in time before doing *that*.

The Consular service should really supply the life-blood of diplomacy: if it did so more than at present, we should undoubtedly possess in the long run more efficient diplomatic representatives of all grades. In other words, instead of beginning as attachés, all aspirants to diplomatic appointments should begin as vice-consuls; and from the vice-consuls and consuls should be selected the staff of each legation and embassy. Clever consuls should be promoted to be first secretaries, councillors, ministers, envoys, and ambassadors. As a matter of *practice*, this has frequently occurred in the past history of our Diplomatic service, and some of the most successful British representatives abroad at the great and the small capitals during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, have been men who began their career in the Consular service, perhaps even in the comparatively humble post of a vice-consul (Sir William White, for example).

Much bitterness still prevails—though it is rather a matter of memory than recent injury—in the Diplomatic and Consular services, through the importation into their ranks (sometimes as a mere act of political jobbery) of A., B., C., and D., who passed no examinations and did not even possess any special qualifications which would justify a minister in dispensing with such formality. Probably no such appointments have occurred within the last few years or are likely to occur again. Out of fairness towards those who have prepared for such a career from their youth up, and who have passed difficult examinations to justify appointment (especially if in the future examinations were really conducted to elicit efficiency), it should as far as possible be laid down as a rule that no appointments from outside are made into the regular Diplomatic and Consular services. Yet on the other hand, a certain amount of freedom must be permitted to the ministers of the Empire to make special appointments of special envoys whose work, if necessary, should overlay that of the regular representative abroad. For instance, we should be gravely injuring the interests of the Empire if the head of a State Department in London (or, by delegation, Montreal, Melbourne or Capetown)

were prevented from sending a Cobden to negotiate a commercial treaty, a Froude to conduct some historical investigation, a Gladstone to inquire (officially or unofficially) into the condition of Neapolitan political prisoners, or a Bryce to cultivate good relations with the United States.

It is sometimes complained of British ambassadors and envoys that they know too little about the masses in the countries to which they are accredited. They possess an intimate knowledge of courts, cabinets and camarillas, but are not in touch with the provinces, with provincial feeling, with popular movements, and so forth. Although, admitting that this criticism is occasionally well founded, it is necessary to object to it that the supreme representative of our Empire at the court of a great Power must in the first place have to deal with the ruler and the ministers of the country wherein he lives; that too much overt interest in the populace, the provinces, or political intrigues, would nullify his influence for good and make him objectionable to the head of the State to whom he is accredited. It is first and foremost his business to represent our views to the supreme Government of his foreign land and transmit to our Foreign Office the opinions and replies of this foreign Government.<sup>1</sup> Yet, undoubtedly the whole staff of his diplomatic and consular subordinates should be as closely as possible in touch with all political movements of the country to which they are appointed—of course, only as spectators. They should note the tone of the Press, the popularity or otherwise

<sup>1</sup> In my travels about Germany during the last two years, I have heard complaints that the British Ambassador at Berlin seldom or never visited the important kingdoms of Southern Germany or the great centres of industry in the Rhine Province, Westphalia, and Hamburg; that he would receive such a welcome at Stuttgart, and his arrival in Munich would elicit all the sympathy felt in certain directions for England. But my German friends overlooked the present delicacy of the situation in regard to their own internal divisions. Prussia in 1871 was accepted by the rest of Germany as the leading State of the Empire; yet a good deal of particularism remains, and if the British Ambassador, even quite unintentionally, evoked expressions of special friendship towards England in the subsidiary capitals of the German Empire, the results of his visit might be misinterpreted by the Imperial Government, which has its headquarters in Berlin. We still maintain (and rightly) diplomatic representatives at the courts of the leading South German States, who are sufficient to act as a focus for the encouragement of friendly relations, which, of course, must be subsidiary to the main direction of the Imperial German policy.

of rulers and ministers, the great scientific discoveries and industrial inventions, and the religious and social tendencies.

Their information transmitted through the head of their mission would enable the Foreign Office better to realise the condition of affairs in the country reported on than, even, the admirable letters from the correspondents of the great newspapers. The news which these ambassadors of the Press convey may be coloured or perverted half unconsciously, in order to suit the opinions of the newspaper proprietors or editors. One correspondent will always make out Protection to be a failure and tell you that Germans are half-starved (which is untrue); another shows it invariably to be a success, and expatiates on the succulence of dog and the soup-making qualities of horse. A great representative of the Press will see a deep-seated enmity to Britain, where his lesser colleague, representing a pacifist journal, will deduce nothing more serious than ill-timed pleasantries put forth as election manoeuvres, and assure us Barataria would never, under any circumstances, provoke the hostility of the British Empire. It is necessary that the British Cabinet should know that Monsieur X. or Count Y. is really a consummate scoundrel or a pompous ass, even though, through the adroit befooling of a Press representative, he is being held up at that moment as the saviour of Europe. In short, the supreme Council of the Empire wants to know everything without fear, favour, sensationalism or publicity, about other countries, for the safety, commerce, and position (actual if not avowed) of the British people in a great confederation of civilised nations. And this complete and impartial information it can only get through its own staff of representatives abroad, its diplomatic and consular officials.

If the Foreign services and the staff at the Foreign Office are to be of first-rate quality, careful selection and wise examination are not the only measures needed. The officials must be properly paid if the Department is to attract and retain able, clever, and upright men. Without hesitation, I should say that with the exception of the ambassadorships, and perhaps three amongst the envoys and ministers-plenipotentiary, and the Agent at Cairo, the whole of the service at home and abroad, especially the Consular corps, is underpaid. It is true that

we spend an annual total of about £689,000 on our Department of Foreign Affairs. But what is that compared to the £44,000,000 we spend on the Navy and the £25,000,000 we spend on the Foreign Service army? Although diplomacy without an army and navy behind it is of little use, yet it may safely be said that with all its small faults and imperfections our Foreign Department with its very numerous representatives of all grades scattered throughout the world has saved us from many a war and has added hundreds of millions sterling to the value of our annual commerce. Given the extent of the Empire, the population of the Empire, and the splendid trade figures which I have cited in other chapters, it is not too much to say that without any serious upset of the balance of our Imperial expenditure, we could afford to lay out not £689,000 annually on the Foreign Office, the Diplomatic and Consular corps, but £1,500,000, of which it might be expected that £500,000 would be contributed from the Governments of India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, the West Indies and Guiana, the Straits Settlements, and Egypt. But, pending the regulation of contributions from portions of the Empire outside the British Isles, even the British Isles with their bounding trade and their world-wide interests could at any rate afford to increase the present Foreign Office vote to a million sterling per annum.

The salaries of all the minor grades at the Foreign Office up to, but not including, the Under-Secretaries, should be raised, and the invidious qualification of the £400 per annum of private income be abolished. A very high standard of life is rightly required of all members of the upper division of the Foreign Office staff. They are expected to move in what is called Society, as unless they do so they cannot come sufficiently into contact with foreign envoys and their staffs. They are also expected to show hospitality as well as to receive it, and they do—and can do—a great deal of good by entertaining modestly their foreign colleagues.

There is scarcely a post in the Consular service which is adequately paid. The reader who glances down the figures of the salaries and allowances, published annually in the Foreign

Office List, may question this sweeping statement; he may single out some post in Brazil or the United States and say 'Look at that! £600 a year salary and £600 a year allowances!' He does not pause to reflect on the following circumstances: that in such countries, and not a few others abroad where Protection prevails, the house-rent of even quite a modest dwelling would be equivalent to £250 per annum, the salary of a cook £120 per annum, of a housemaid and general factotum £120 per annum, a coachman or chauffeur £150, a clerk £300; while prices of food are sometimes egregiously high. Then all consular and diplomatic officials are required to show great, even lavish, hospitality. It is no use issuing circulars, from time to time, to say this is not expected of them: it is. In the first place, they cannot well be entertained by municipal and Government officials, and notabilities of the town in which they live, without offering some form of counter entertainment. And if they do not constantly mix socially with these people they are out of touch with the country in which they dwell. Then their house or their office is the rendezvous of all British subjects, most of whom would go away with very injured feelings (especially if they had brought a letter of introduction) if the Consul or his wife, the Ambassador or his lady, did not offer them some form of hospitality. And it is right on the whole that they should expect this; but equally necessary that the country should provide for it. Seeing the status of the British Empire and its enormous wealth, we can well afford to provide a few more thousand pounds per annum to enable our representatives abroad to display fittingly the qualities of their nation in houses and offices of suitable dimensions and tasteful furniture.

To a great extent the present scale of salaries was fixed in the middle of the nineteenth century, when living, especially, abroad, was far cheaper than it is at the present day. Meantime, not only has the cost of living gone up, but the scale of salaries in other departments of activity, not connected with the Government, has risen most markedly. Especially is this the case with the great commercial houses and shipping companies and the principal correspondents of the Press in foreign parts. These gentlemen receive from their employers salaries

which, as compared with those of consuls and minor diplomatists, are often magnificent. Of course, the employers in question must have good men to represent them, and must offer good salaries to secure good men. Many a consul feels bitterly his utter inability to compete, even in the most modest manner, with the hospitality of his fellow-countrymen in places of importance. He must not live the life of a recluse, yet it is odious to him and to his wife to be constantly under obligations to other British subjects whose operations or desires he may not always be able to endorse officially or to fulfil.

In some big consular posts in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Levant, the difference between the official salary and allowances and the minimum expenditure with which the position can be adequately sustained (especially bearing in mind the style, in which some British representatives are housed in buildings acquired in a more splendid past) amounts to between £300 and £400 a year, which has to be supplied out of private means.

Not a few consuls, minor diplomatists, or their wives, have to do much work, literary or artistic, in order to fill up such deficits. Young, unmarried men in such careers, in past times, have been tempted to gamble in one form or another to find money for the heavy expenses of social life. No one would advocate seriously that our foreign representatives should be encouraged to lead a life of luxury and inordinate display, especially in the minor grades; but an inquiry of a practical kind should be set on foot to ascertain the cost of living suitably at all the foreign posts, and the salaries which should be apportioned to the life.

Another very cruel feature attached to the Foreign Service of the Crown, is the absence of any regular provision for the support of widows of consular or diplomatic officials or of servants of the Foreign Office. Mrs. A. or Lady B. may have been the life and soul of a great foreign town and the most worthy colleague of her husband in representing and supporting British interests. Neither she nor her husband have been able to save a penny out of their official incomes, perhaps have even got slightly into debt. The husband at the end of a very long service retires on a pension, and he and his wife are, as it were,



snuffed out in consequence. From having associated with Royalty and with some of the leading personages of Europe or America, and with many British notabilities on their travels, they seek a refuge in some modest villa at Bournemouth, Torquay, Dorking, or the London suburbs. Perhaps they have children whose education requires finishing; at any rate, they are hard put to it to keep up a decent appearance, especially as the husband may bear a justly decorated name.

But such a life is bliss compared with what happens when the husband dies. Then Mrs. A. or Lady B. is left literally with nothing, unless, of course, there is a private income or—*mirabile dictu!*—they have been able to save and put by something out of the official salary. For, on her husband's death, she has no claim on the State whatever, though she may be advanced in years as well as in honours. In such circumstances an appeal is sometimes made—it has to be a most strenuous appeal to produce any effect at all—to the Prime Minister, to do something for the unfortunate lady out of the Civil Pensions List—I forget the exact name of the List, but it is the one, which to everyone's astonishment, provides meagre pittances for the widows or daughters of unknown water-colour painters or writers of unwanted county histories or works attacking Socialism. Then one day a half-pitiful, half-amused newspaper-reading public takes up its morning paper and sees displayed in it the rags and the abandonment of Mrs. Sophonisba B.—('I never knew her name was Sophonisba! He used to call her Sophie, when we stayed with them for that delightful three weeks, you remember—what was it, ten years ago?')—or Florence, Lady A.: to whom is awarded perhaps £75 a year, 'in consideration of her destitute and verminous condition,' or of some similar rider to the miserable pittance, equally grating to the sensibilities.

There should be an adequate Pension List for all salaried posts in the Foreign Service of the Crown, adequate as well for the vice-consuls, consuls, and minor diplomatists of a long and approved service, as it is for ambassadors, under-secretaries and cabinet ministers; and subject to proper conditions of tenure of post and importance of office. And a proportion of the

pension should be attributable to the widow during her lifetime ; for probably she has done half the work of the post. And, as a last suggestion, I would propose that the bestowal of the distinctions of knightly orders and other State decorations should, as in France, be accompanied by some small stipend of honour, to meet at any rate the extra cost of living which those decorations almost invariably carry with them.







